The exclusive
venue of Makati City, as stipulated by the parties and sanctioned by Section 4,
Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, cannot be made to apply to the Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure
filed by respondent bank because the provisions of Rule 4 pertain to venue of
actions, which an extrajudicial foreclosure is not.
Pertinent
are the following disquisitions in Supena v. De la Rosa: (334 Phil. 671
(1997).
Section 1, Rule 2 [of the Rules of Court]
defines an action in this wise:
"Action means an
ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which one party prosecutes another
for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong."
Hagans v. Wislizenus does not depart from this
definition when it states that "[A]n action is a formal demand of one's
legal rights in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by
the law. x x x." It is clear that the determinative or operative fact
which converts a claim into an "action or suit" is the filing of the
same with a "court of justice." Filed elsewhere, as with some other
body or office not a court of justice, the claim may not be categorized under
either term.
Unlike an action, an
extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage is initiated by filing a
petition not with any court of justice but with the office of the sheriff of the province where the sale is to be made. By no stretch of
the imagination can the office of the sheriff come under the category of a
court of justice. And as aptly observed by the complainant, if ever the
executive judge comes into the picture, it is only because he exercises
administrative supervision over the sheriff. But this administrative
supervision, however, does not change the fact that extrajudicial foreclosures
are not judicial proceedings, actions or suits (SPOUSES HERMES P. OCHOA and
ARACELI D. OCHOA CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, G.R. No. 192877, March 23, 2011, NACHURA, J.).
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