ONCE A JUDGMENT ATTAINS FINALITY, IT BECOMES IMMUTABLE AND UNALTERABLE. IT MAY NO LONGER BE MODIFIED IN ANY RESPECT, EVEN IF THE MODIFICATION IS MEANT TO CORRECT WHAT IS PERCEIVED TO BE AN ERRONEOUS CONCLUSION OF FACT OR LAW, AND REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE MODIFICATION IS ATTEMPTED TO BE MADE BY THE COURT RENDERING IT OR BY THIS COURT.
Monday, September 14, 2015
Friday, September 11, 2015
In Torres v. Garchitorena, G.R. No. 153666, December 27, 2002, 394 SCRA 494, 508-509, the Supreme Court stated that under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the criminal action and which requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action with which said question is closely connected. The civil action must be instituted prior to the institution of the criminal action.
Clearly, the civil action must precede the filing of the criminal action for a Prejudicial Question to exist. :yellow;mso-highlight: yellow;mso-ansi-language:EN-PH;mso-fareast-language:EN-US;mso-bidi-language: AR-SA'>Clearly, the civil action must precede the filing of the criminal action for a Prejudicial Question to exist.
Posted by Christian G. Villasis at 4:43 PM
Tuesday, September 8, 2015
The standard under Rule 65 for the issuance of the writ of prohibition is "grave abuse of discretion" and not mere "abuse of discretion." The difference is not a simple matter of semantics. The writs governed by Rule 65 – certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition – are extraordinary remedies designed to correct not mere errors of judgment (i.e., in the appreciation of facts or interpretation of law) but errors of jurisdiction (i.e., lack or excess of jurisdiction). Unlike the first category of errors which the lower tribunal commits in the exercise of its jurisdiction, the latter class of errors is committed by a lower tribunal devoid of jurisdiction or, alternatively, for exercising jurisdiction in an "arbitrary or despotic manner." By conflating "abuse of discretion" with "grave abuse of discretion," the Court of Appeals failed to follow the rigorous standard of Rule 65, diluting its office of correcting only jurisdictional errors.
Posted by Christian G. Villasis at 3:03 PM
Monday, September 7, 2015
The terms "electronic data message" and "electronic document," as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence. When congress drafted the law, it excluded the earlier forms of technology like telegraph, telex, and telecopy (except computer-generated faxes) when the law defined electronic data message.
Posted by Christian G. Villasis at 8:58 AM
Friday, September 4, 2015
IN THE ISSUANCE OF A WARRANT OF ARREST, THE MANDATE OF THE CONSTITUTION IS FOR THE JUDGE TO PERSONALLY DETERMINE THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE.
The words "personal determination," was interpreted by the Supreme Court in Soliven v. Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585, 14 November 1988, 167 SCRA 393, 406)
- the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself as to the existence of probable cause.
(a) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or
(b) if on the basis thereof, he finds no probable cause, disregard the prosecutor's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in determining its existence.
Posted by Christian G. Villasis at 9:16 AM