COMPLETENESS OF SERVICE

Section 10, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides:

          "SEC. 10. Completeness of service. – Personal service is complete upon actual delivery. Service by ordinary mail is complete upon the expiration of ten (10) days after mailing, unless the court otherwise provides. Service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee, or after five (5) days from the date he received the first notice of the postmaster, whichever date is earlier" (emphasis supplied).

The rule on service by registered mail contemplates two situations:  (1) actual service the completeness of which is determined upon receipt by the addressee of the registered mail; and (2) constructive service the completeness of which is determined upon expiration of five days from the date the addressee received the first notice of the postmaster.⁽ Philemploy Services and Resources, Inc. v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 152616, 31 March 2006, 486 SCRA 302, 321.)

               

           Insofar as constructive service is concerned, there must be conclusive proof that a first notice was duly sent by the postmaster to the addressee. ( Id.; Spouses Aguilar v. Court of Appeals, 369 Phil. 655, 661 (1999). Not only is it required that notice of the registered mail be issued but that it should also be delivered to and received by the addressee. (Spouses Aguilar v. Court of Appeals, supra at 662, citing De la Cruz v. De la Cruz, 160 SCRA 361 (1988). Notably, the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed is not applicable in this situation. It is incumbent upon a party who relies on constructive service to prove that the notice was sent to, and received by, the addressee.( Spouses Aguilar v. Court of Appeals, supra at 662, citing Barrameda v. Castillo, 168 Phil. 170, (1977).

                

        The best evidence to prove that notice was sent would be a certification from the postmaster, who should certify not only that the notice was issued or sent but also as to how, when and to whom the delivery and receipt was made. The mailman may also testify that the notice was actually delivered. (Barrameda v. Castillo, 168 Phil. 170, 173 (1977).)  (Jose Mel Bernarte vs. Phil. Basketball Association (PBA) et al., G.R. No. 192084, September 14, 2011, CARPIO, J.). 

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS

Lis pendens, which literally means pending suit, refers to the jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until final judgment.   Founded upon public policy and necessity, lis pendens is intended to keep the properties in litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated, and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation.  Its notice is an announcement to the whole world that a particular property is in litigation and serves as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property.( Associated Bank v. Pronstroller, G.R. No. 148444, July 14, 2008, 558 SCRA 113, 133, citing Romero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142406, May 16, 2005, 458 SCRA 483, 492.)

The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect: (1) to keep the subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the final judgment to prevent the defeat of the final judgment by successive alienations; and (2) to bind a purchaser, bona fide or not, of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court will promulgate subsequently. Id., citing Romero v. Court of Appeals, id. at 492-493 and Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 146262, January 21, 2005, 449 SCRA 173, 186.

                        Once a notice of lis pendens has been duly registered, any subsequent transaction affecting the land involved would have to be subject to the outcome of the litigation. (Vicente v. Avera, G.R. No. 169970, January 20, 2009, 576 SCRA 634, 643.)

Petitioner being a mere transferee at the time the decision of the RTC of Pasig in Civil Case No. 35305 had become final and executory on December 6, 1988, it  is bound by the said judgment which ordered the heirs of Emilio Gregorio to convey Lots 1, 2, 3 & 4, Psu-204875 in favor of private respondent and Trinidad. 

“It is to be noted that the notation of the lis pendens on the back of the owner’s duplicate is not mentioned for the purpose of constituting a constructive notice because usually such owner’s duplicate certificate is presented for the purpose of the annotation later, and sometimes not at all until [it is] ordered by the court.” (A. H. Noblejas and E. H. Noblejas, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, 2007 Ed., pp. 436-437.)

                         Strictly speaking, the lis pendens annotation is not to be referred to “as a part of the doctrine of notice; the purchaser pendente lite is affected, not by notice, but because the law does not allow litigating parties to give to others, pending the litigation, rights to the property in dispute so as to prejudice the opposite party.  The doctrine rests upon public policy, not notice.” (Id. at 437, citing 2 Bouvier’s Law Dictionary and Concise Encyclopedia, p. 2033, SCRA Annotation on Civil Law, the Public Land Act and the Property Registration Decree, 1983 Ed., pp. 118-119 quoted in Tirado v. Sevilla, G.R. No. 84201, August 3, 1990, 188 SCRA 321, 326-327.)

                        Thus we have held that one who buys land where there is a pending notice of lis pendens cannot invoke the right of a purchaser in good faith; neither can he have acquired better rights than those of his predecessor in interest. (Yu v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109078, December 25, 1995, 251 SCRA 509, 513-514, citing Constantino v. Espiritu, No. L-23268, June 30, 1972, 45 SCRA 557, 563 and Tanchoco v. Aquino, No. L-30670, September 15, 1987, 154 SCRA 1, 15; see Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, No. L-34404, June 25, 1980, 98 SCRA 207, 232.) (Top Management Programs Corporation vs. Luis Fajardo & The Register of Deeds of Las Pinas City, G.R. No. 150462, June 15, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING

There is forum shopping when the following elements are present: “(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions[;] (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts[;] and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars[,] such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration; said requisites [are] also constitutive of the requisites for auter action pendant or lis pendens.”( Mondragon Leisure and Resorts Corporation v. United Coconut Planters Bank, G.R. No. 154187, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 585, 590, citing Saura v. Saura, Jr., 372 Phil. 337, 349 (1999). The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment, through means other than by appeal or certiorari. (Melo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123686, November 16, 1999, 318 SCRA 94, 100; Ligon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127683, August 7, 1998, 294 SCRA 73, 88, citing Washington Distillers, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118151, August 22, 1996, 260 SCRA 821, 835.)

                        With respect to identity of cause of action, a cause of action is defined in Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court as the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another.  This Court has laid down the test in determining whether or not the causes of action in the first and second cases are identical, to wit: would the same evidence support and establish both the present and former cause of action? If so, the former recovery is a bar; if otherwise, it does not stand in the way of the former action. (Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163433, August 22, 2011, 655 SCRA 707, 714, citing Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) v. Group Management Corporation (GMC), G.R. Nos. 167000 & 169971, June 8, 2011, 651 SCRA 279, 313.)

                Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court requires every litigant to notify the court of the filing or pendency of a complaint involving the same or similar action or claim within five days of learning of that fact. While both Civil Case Nos. B-6242 and B-7110 were raffled to the same court, the RTC of Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25, respondent did not report the filing of Civil Case No. B-7110 in the proceedings of Civil Case No. 6242. This fact clearly established respondent’s furtive intent to conceal the filing of Civil Case No. B-7110 for the purpose of securing a favorable judgment. For this reason, Civil Case No. 6242 was correctly dismissed with prejudice. (Asia United Bank v. Goodland Company, Inc., G.R. No. 190231, December 8, 2010, 637 SCRA 691, 696-697.) (Emphasis supplied.)

Under Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff is required under oath to certify, among others, his undertaking to report to the court the fact of filing of a similar case, failing which shall be cause for the dismissal of the case, to wit:

“(c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.

…non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions.  If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful  and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.”

                The totality of circumstances considered, plaintiff’s forum shopping committed in multifarious fashion cannot but be willful and deliberate.  Hence, consistent with established rule and jurisprudence, the same is punishable by and results in the summary dismissal of the actions filed.  Both Civil Case No. 03-045 and Civil Case No.06-1032 are therefore dismissed with prejudice.  x x x(Id. at 527-528.) (Emphasis supplied.)

The CA concurred with the RTC that petitioner’s act of forum shopping was deliberate and malicious considering that it knowingly filed Civil Case No. 06-1032 despite the pendency of Civil Case No. 03-045.  The appellate court said that petitioner unscrupulously took advantage of the availability of competent tribunals and tried its luck in different fora for a favorable result.

We concur with the CA’s finding that a decision in either case will amount to res judicata in the other considering that both courts were called upon to rule on the same issue of whether the REM was falsified.  Indeed, the possibility of conflicting rulings or decisions rendered by different courts on such issue militates against petitioner’s posture that it never intended to conceal the subsequent filing of Civil Case No. 06-1032.

                        Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.( Spouses Marasigan v. Chevron Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 184015, February 8, 2012, p. 12, citing  Benedicto v. Lacson, G.R. No. 141508,  May 5, 2010, 620 SCRA 82, 98.)

                 Litis pendentia is a Latin term, which literally means “a pending suit” and is variously referred to in some decisions as lis pendens and auter action pendant. As a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, it refers to the situation where two actions are pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, so that one of them becomes unnecessary and vexatious. It is based on the policy against multiplicity of suits. (Id., citing Dotmatrix Trading v. Legaspi, G.R. No. 155622, October 26, 2009, 604 SCRA 431, 436.

  Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as those representing the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (3) identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.(Id.)

                What is truly important to consider in determining whether forum shopping exists or not is the vexation caused the courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes and/or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same issues. (Municipality of Taguig v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142619, September 13, 2005, 469 SCRA 588, 595, citing First Philippine International Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115849, January 24, 1996, 252 SCRA 259, 289 and  Borromeo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73592, March 15, 1996, 255 SCRA 75, 84.) (Good Company, Inc. vs. Asia United Bank et al., G.R. No. 195546, March 14, 2012, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: VERIFICATION OF A PLEADING IS ONLY A FORMAL REQUIREMENT. IT IS NOT JURISDICTIONAL

It is simply a condition affecting the form of the pleading, and non-compliance therewith does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The court may order the correction of the pleading if verification is lacking or act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served (MEDISERV, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al. G.R. No. 161368, April 5, 2010, First Division, Villarama, Jr., J.).

SUMMONS UPON PUBLIC CORPORATIONS

                          Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him.  Service of such writ is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person.  Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired through coercive process, generally by the service of summons issued by the court, or through the defendant's voluntary appearance or submission to the court.( Guiguinto Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Torres, G.R. No. 170926, September 15, 2006, 502 SCRA 182, 189-190.)

Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court states that:

SEC. 13. Service upon public corporations. – When the defendant is the Republic of the Philippines, service may be effected on the Solicitor General; in case of a province, city or municipality, or like public corporations, service may be effected on its executive head, or on such other officer or officers as the law or the court may direct.  (Emphasis ours.)

             Jurisprudence further instructs that when a suit is directed against an unincorporated government agency, which, because it is unincorporated, possesses no juridical personality of its own, the suit is against the agency's principal, i.e., the State. (Philippine Rock Industries, Inc. v. Board of Liquidators, 259 Phil. 650, 655-656 (1989). See also Farolan, Jr. v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. 42204, January 21, 1993, 217 SCRA 298, 306.)  In the similar case of Heirs of Mamerto Manguiat v. Court of Appeals, (G.R. Nos. 150768 and 160176, August 20, 2008, 562 SCRA 422.) where summons was served on the Bureau of Telecommunications which was an agency attached to the Department of Transportation and Communications, we held that:

Rule 14, Section 13 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure provides:

SEC. 13.                Service upon public corporations. — When the defendant is the Republic of the Philippines, service may be effected on the Solicitor General; in case of a province, city or municipality, or like public corporations, service may be effected on its executive head, or on such other officer or officers as the law or the court may direct.

        It is clear under the Rules that where the defendant is the Republic of the Philippines, service of summons must be made on the Solicitor General. The BUTEL is an agency attached to the Department of Transportation and Communications created under E.O. No. 546 on July 23, 1979, and is in charge of providing telecommunication facilities, including telephone systems to government offices. It also provides its services to augment limited or inadequate existing similar private communication facilities. It extends its services to areas where no communication facilities exist yet; and assists the private sector engaged in telecommunication services by providing and maintaining backbone telecommunication network. It is indisputably part of the Republic, and summons should have been served on the Solicitor General (Republic of the Phils.  vs. Alfredo Domingo, G.R. No. 175299. September 14, 2011, LEONARDO – DE CASTRO, J.). 

THE RULES ON VENUE UNDER THE RULES OF COURT CANNOT BE MADE TO APPLY TO THE PETITION FOR EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE

The exclusive venue of Makati City, as stipulated by the parties and sanctioned by Section 4, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, cannot be made to apply to the Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure filed by respondent bank because the provisions of Rule 4 pertain to venue of actions, which an extrajudicial foreclosure is not.

 Pertinent are the following disquisitions in Supena v. De la Rosa: (334 Phil. 671 (1997).

Section 1, Rule 2 [of the Rules of Court] defines an action in this wise:

"Action means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which one party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong."

Hagans v. Wislizenus does not depart from this definition when it states that "[A]n action is a formal demand of one's legal rights in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. x x x." It is clear that the determinative or operative fact which converts a claim into an "action or suit" is the filing of the same with a "court of justice." Filed elsewhere, as with some other body or office not a court of justice, the claim may not be categorized under either term.

Unlike an action, an extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage is initiated by filing a petition not with any court of justice but with the office of the sheriff of the province where the sale is to be made. By no stretch of the imagination can the office of the sheriff come under the category of a court of justice. And as aptly observed by the complainant, if ever the executive judge comes into the picture, it is only because he exercises administrative supervision over the sheriff. But this administrative supervision, however, does not change the fact that extrajudicial foreclosures are not judicial proceedings, actions or suits (SPOUSES HERMES P. OCHOA and ARACELI D. OCHOA CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, G.R. No. 192877,   March 23, 2011, NACHURA, J.).

INDISPENSABLE PARTIES:

Section 7, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

SEC. 7 – Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. - Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined as plaintiffs or defendants.

                The test to determine if a party is an indispensable party is as follows:

An indispensable party is a party who has an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest, a party who has not only an interest in the subject matter of the controversy, but also has an interest of such nature that a final decree cannot be made without affecting his interest or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience. It has also been considered that an indispensable party is a person in whose absence there cannot be a determination between the parties already before the court which is effective, complete or equitable. Further, an indispensable party is one who must be included in an action before it may properly go forward.

            A person who is not an indispensable party, however, if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is separable from the interest of the other parties, so that it will not necessarily be directly or injuriously affected by a decree which does complete justice between them. Also, a person is not an indispensable party if his presence would merely permit a complete relief between him and those already parties to the action, or if he has no interest in the subject matter of the action. It is not a sufficient reason to declare a person to be an indispensable party that his presence will avoid multiple litigation.( Lagunilla v. Velasco, G.R. No. 169276, 16 June 2009, 589 SCRA 224, 232-233 citing Regner v. Logarta, G.R. No. 168747, 19 October 2007, 537 SCRA 277 and Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 250 (1997). (Aquilino R. Pimentel, Jr.  et al. vs. Senate Committee of the Whole, G.R. No. 187714, March 8, 2011, CARPIO, J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: -EVERY ACTION MUST BE PROSECUTED OR DEFENDED IN THE NAME OF THE REAL PARTY-IN-INTEREST

The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, i.e., the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. (RULES OF COURT, Rule 3, Sec. 2).  A case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action (ALLAN C. GO, vs. MORTIMER F. CORDERO, G.R. No. 164703, May 4, 2010, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

SPLITTING A SINGLE CAUSE OF ACTION

         Splitting a single cause of action is the act of dividing a single or indivisible cause of action into several parts or claims and instituting two or more actions upon them.( Perez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. No. 157616, July 22, 2005, 464 SCRA 89; citing Nabus v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91670, February 7, 1991, 193 SCRA 732.) A single cause of action or entire claim or demand cannot be split up or divided in order to be made the subject of two or more different actions.( Tuttle v. Everhot Heater Co., Inc., 249 N.W. 467 (1933). Thus, Section 4, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court expressly prohibits splitting of a single cause of action, viz:

Section 4. Splitting a single cause of action; effect of. — If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others. (4a) Catalina B. Chu et al. vs. Sps. Fernando c. Cunanan & Trinidad N. Cunanan, G.R. No.  156185, September 12, 2011, BERSAMIN, J.:)

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION

The rule on joinder of actions under Section 5, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, requires that the joinder shall not include special civil actions governed by special rules.   

Section 6 of Rule 2 explicitly provides that misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal of an action (Roman Catholic Archbishop of San Fernando Pampanga vs. Fernando Soriano Jr., et al., G.R. No. 153829, August 17, 2011,VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

AN AMENDED COMPLAINT THAT CHANGES THE PLAINTIFF’S CAUSE OF ACTION IS TECHNICALLY A NEW COMPLAINT

An amended complaint that changes the plaintiff’s cause of action is technically a new complaint.  Consequently, the action is deemed filed on the date of the filing of such amended pleading, not on the date of the filing of its original version.  Thus, the statute of limitation resumes its run until it is arrested by the filing of the amended pleading.  The Court acknowledges, however, that an amendment which does not alter the cause of action but merely supplements or amplifies the facts previously alleged, does not affect the reckoning date of filing based on the original complaint.  The cause of action, unchanged, is not barred by the statute of limitations that expired after the filing of the original complaint.( Wallem Philippines Shipping, Inc. v. S.R. Farms, Inc., G.R. No. 161849, July 9, 2010.) (Spouses Vicente Dionisio at Anita Dionisio vs. Wilfredo Linsangan, G.R. No. 178159,   March 2, 2011, ABAD, J.). 

AN ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE IS AN ACTION IN PERSONAM

An action for reconveyance is an action in personam available to a person whose property has been wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in another’s name.  Although the decree is recognized as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, the registered owner is not necessarily held free from liens.  As a remedy, an action for reconveyance is filed as an ordinary action in the ordinary courts of justice and not with the land registration court.  Reconveyance is always available as long as the property has not passed to an innocent third person for value.  A notice of lis pendens may thus be annotated on the certificate of title immediately upon the institution of the action in court.  The notice of lis pendens will avoid transfer to an innocent third person for value and preserve the claim of the real owner.( Id. at 190.  (Emphases ours.)

 The rule is that: (1) a judgment in rem is binding upon the whole world, such as a judgment in a land registration case or probate of a will; and (2) a judgment in personam is binding upon the parties and their successors-in-interest but not upon strangers.  A judgment directing a party to deliver possession of a property to another is in personam; it is binding only against the parties and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action.  An action for declaration of nullity of title and recovery of ownership of real property, or re-conveyance, is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing.  Any judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded. (Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc., 426 Phil. 61, 86-87 (2002).

In Domagas v. Jensen, we have explained the nature of an action in personam and enumerated some actions and proceedings which are in personam, viz:

“The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its character. Whether a proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is determined by its nature and purpose, and by these only. A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations brought against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the court. The purpose of a proceeding in personam is to impose, through the judgment of a court, some responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the defendant.  Of this character are suits to compel a defendant to specifically perform some act or actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on him.  An action in personam is said to be one which has for its object a judgment against the person, as distinguished from a judgment against the propriety to determine its state. It has been held that an action in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights or obligations; such action is brought against the person. As far as suits for injunctive relief are concerned, it is well-settled that it is an injunctive act in personam. In Combs v. Combs, the appellate court held that proceedings to enforce personal rights and obligations and in which personal judgments are rendered adjusting the rights and obligations between the affected parties is in personam. Actions for recovery of real property are in personam.” (Emerita Munoz vs. ATTY. VICTORIANO R. YABUT, JR. and SAMUEL GO CHAN, G.R. No.  142676, June 6, 2011, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.).

THE RULE IS THAT PAYMENT IN FULL OF THE DOCKET FEES WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED PERIOD IS MANDATORY

In Manchester v. Court of Appeals, it was held that a court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. The strict application of this rule was, however, relaxed two (2) years after in the case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, 252 Phil. 280 (1989), wherein the Court decreed that where the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by the payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable period of time, but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. This ruling was made on the premise that the plaintiff had demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees required. (Id. at 291.)

                Thus, in the more recent case of United Overseas Bank v. Ros, G.R. No. 171532, August 7, 2007, (529 SCRA 334, 353), the Court explained that where the party does not deliberately intend to defraud the court in payment of docket fees, and manifests its willingness to abide by the rules by paying additional docket fees when required by the court, the liberal doctrine enunciated in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., and not the strict regulations set in Manchester, will apply.  It has been on record that the Court, in several instances, allowed the relaxation of the rule on non-payment of docket fees in order to afford the parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on the merits. In the case of La Salette College v. Pilotin, (463 Phil. 785 (2003), the Court stated:

              

             Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the requirement of payment of appellate docket fees, we also recognize that its strict application is qualified by the following: first, failure to pay those fees within the reglementary period allows only discretionary, not automatic, dismissal; second, such power should be used by the court in conjunction with its exercise of sound discretion in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, as well as with a great deal of circumspection in consideration of all attendant circumstances. (Id. at 794.)

          

            While there is a crying need to unclog court dockets on the one hand, there is, on the other, a greater demand for resolving genuine disputes fairly and equitably, Santos v. Court of Appeals, 323 Phil. 762, 770 (1996) for it is far better to dispose of a case on the merit which is a primordial end, rather than on a technicality that may result in injustice.

 In this case, it cannot be denied that the case was litigated before the RTC and said trial court had already rendered a decision.  While it was at that level, the matter of non-payment of docket fees was never an issue. It was only the CA which motu propio dismissed the case for said reason.

                

              Considering the foregoing, there is a need to suspend the strict application of the rules so that the petitioners would be able to fully and finally prosecute their claim on the merits at the appellate level rather than fail to secure justice on a technicality, for, indeed, the general objective of procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties, bearing always in mind that procedure is not to hinder but to promote the administration of justice. (Bautista v. Unangst, G.R. No. 173002, July 4, 2008, 557 SCRA 256, 271.)

                

              The Court also takes into account the fact that the case was filed before the Manchester ruling came out. Even if said ruling could be applied retroactively, liberality should be accorded to the petitioners in view of the recency then of the ruling. Leniency because of recency was applied to the cases of Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 130150, October 1, 1998, 297 SCRA 30.)and Spouses Jimmy and Patri Chan v. RTC of Zamboanga. (G.R. No. 149253, April 15, 2004, 427 SCRA 796.)

                

                In the case of  Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Mangubat (Mactan), (371 Phil. 393 (1999). it was stated that the “intent of the Court is clear to afford litigants full opportunity to comply with the new rules and to temper enforcement of sanctions in view of the recency of the changes introduced by the new rules.” In Mactan, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) also failed to pay the correct docket fees on time.

We held in another case:

         x x x It bears stressing that the rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice.  They were conceived and promulgated to effectively aid the court in the dispensation of justice.  Courts are not slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion.  In rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that, on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way around.  Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, it is always within the power of the Court to suspend the Rules, or except a particular case from its operation. (Cua, Jr.  v. Tan, G.R. Nos. 181455-56, December 4, 2009, 607 SCRA 645, 687.) 

The petitioners, however, are liable for the difference between the actual fees paid and the correct payable docket fees to be assessed by the clerk of court which shall constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 141 which provides:

 SEC. 2. Fees in lien. – Where the court in its final judgment awards a claim not alleged, or a relief different from, or more than that claimed in the pleading, the party concerned shall pay the additional fees which shall constitute a lien on the judgment in satisfaction of said lien. The clerk of court shall assess and collect the corresponding fees.

As the Court has taken the position that it would be grossly unjust if petitioners’ claim would be dismissed on a strict application of the Manchester doctrine, the appropriate action, under ordinary circumstances, would be for the Court to remand the case to the CA. Considering, however, that the case at bench has been pending for more than 30 years and the records thereof are already before this Court, a remand of the case to the CA would only unnecessarily prolong its resolution. In the higher interest of substantial justice and to spare the parties from further delay, the Court will resolve the case on the merits (The Heirs of the Late Ruben Reinoso, Sr., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 116121, July 18, 2011, MENDOZA, J.).

LACHES SHOULD BE CLEARLY PRESENT FOR THE SIBONGHANOY DOCTRINE TO APPLY

In Regalado v. Go, the Court held that laches should be clearly present for the Sibonghanoy doctrine to apply, thus:

Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.”

The ruling in People v. Regalario that was based on the landmark doctrine enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction by estoppel is the exception rather than the rule. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. In such controversies, laches should have been clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it. (Celia S. Vda. De Herrera vs. Emelita Bernardo and Crisanto Bernardo, G.R. No. 170251, June 1, 2011, PERALTA, J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR TIME IS CONSIDERED A SUBMISSION TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT:

A party who makes a special appearance in court challenging the jurisdiction of said court based on the ground of invalid service of summons is not deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. (United Coconut Planters Bank v. Ongpin, G.R. No. 146593, October 26, 2001, 368 SCRA 464, 470).  In this case, however, although the Motion to Dismiss filed specifically stated as one (1) of the grounds the lack of "personal jurisdiction," it must be noted that defendant had earlier filed a Motion for Time to file an appropriate responsive pleading even beyond the time provided in the summons by publication.  Such motion did not state that it was a conditional appearance entered to question the regularity of the service of summons, but an appearance submitting to the jurisdiction of the court by acknowledging the summons by publication issued by the court and praying for additional time to file a responsive pleading. Consequently, defendant having acknowledged the summons by publication and also having invoked the jurisdiction of the trial court to secure affirmative relief in his motion for additional time, he effectively submitted voluntarily to the trial court’s jurisdiction. He is now estopped from asserting otherwise, even before this Court. (ALLAN C. GO, vs. MORTIMER F. CORDERO, G.R. No. 164703, May 4, 2010, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLLARAMA, JR.: MOOT AND ACADEMIC CASE

In Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas vs. Orient Commercial Banking Corporation, the Supreme Court held that with the final settlement of the claims of petitioner against herein respondents, the issues raised in the present petition regarding the propriety of the issuance of writ of attachment by the trial court and the grave abuse of discretion allegedly committed by the appellate court in reversing the orders of the trial court, have now become moot and academic.

“A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value” (See Lacson v. MJ Lacson Development Company, Inc., G.R. No. 168840, December 8, 2010, p. 10, citing Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Atienza, G.R. No. 175241, February 24, 2010, 613 SCRA 510, 522-523). x x x  In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which petitioner would be entitled to and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition (Chuidian v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 156383 & 160723, July 31, 2006, 497 SCRA 327 cited in Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas vs. Orient Commercial Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 148483, June 29, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: VERIFICATION OF A PLEADING IS ONLY A FORMAL REQUIREMENT. IT IS NOT JURISDICTIONAL

It is simply a condition affecting the form of the pleading, and non-compliance therewith does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The court may order the correction of the pleading if verification is lacking or act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served (MEDISERV, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al. G.R. No. 161368, April 5, 2010, First Division, Villarama, Jr., J.).

FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION

In a motion to dismiss a complaint based on lack of cause of action (FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION), the question submitted to the court for determination is the sufficiency of the allegations made in the complaint to constitute a cause of action and not whether those allegations of fact are true, for said motion must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. The inquiry is confined to the four corners of the complaint, and no other. x x x The test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the complaint.(JESSE U. LUCAS vs. JESUS S. LUCAS, G.R. No. 190710, SECOND DIVISION, June 6, 2011 NACHURA, J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: CAUSE OF ACTION

                       A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another (Section 2, Rule 2, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended). 


                       A complaint states a cause of action when it contains three essential elements: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and whatever law it arises; (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant to respect such right; and (3) the act or omission of the defendant violates the right of the plaintiff.  If any of these elements is absent, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action (Heirs of Loreto C. Maramag v. Maramag, G.R. No. 181132, June 5, 2009, 588 SCRA 774, 784 and Bank of America NT & SA v. Court of Appeals cited in Development Bank of the Phils. vs. Hon. Silverio Q. Castillo & Cristina Trinidad Zarate Romero, G.R. No. 163827, August 17, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

A cause of action is the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant in violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff (CHUA vs. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. G.R. No. 182311, August 19, 2009, Third Division, Chico-Nazario, J.). 

The test of sufficiency of a complaint is whether or not, assuming the truth of the facts that plaintiff alleges in it, the court can render judgment granting him the judicial assistance he seeks. And judgment would be right only if the facts he alleges constitute a cause of action that consists of three elements: (1) the plaintiff’s legal right in the matter; (2) the defendant’s corresponding obligation to honor or respect such right; and (3) the defendant’s subsequent violation of the right. Absent any of these, the complaint would have failed to state a cause of action. x x x Statements of mere conclusions of law expose the complaint to a motion to dismiss on ground of failure to state a cause of action (ARTHUR DEL ROSARIO, et al. vs. HELLENOR D. DONATO, Jr. et al. March 5, 2010, G.R. No.180595, Second Division, Abad, J.).    

PERSONAL ACTION AND REAL ACTIONS

In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a contract, or the recovery of damages. Real actions, on the other hand, are those affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein (IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 154096, August 22, 2008, 2nd Division, Velasco, Jr., J.).

IN PERSONAM, IN REM AND QUASI IN REM ACTIONS

An action in personam is lodged against a person based on personal liability; an action in rem is directed against the thing itself instead of the person; while an action quasi in rem names a person as defendant, but its object is to subject that person's interest in a property to a corresponding lien or obligation. A petition directed against the "thing" itself or the res, which concerns the status of a person, like a petition for adoption, annulment of marriage, or correction of entries in the birth certificate, is an action in rem. (JESSE U. LUCAS vs. JESUS S. LUCAS, G.R. No. 190710, SECOND DIVISION, June 6, 2011 NACHURA, J.)

DETERMINATION OF THE NATURE OF AN ACTION OR PROCEEDING

The determination of the nature of an action or proceeding is controlled by the averments and character of the relief sought in the complaint or petition (Vda. de Manalo v. Court of Appeals, 402 Phil. 152, 161 (2001). The designation given by parties to their own pleadings does not necessarily bind the courts to treat it according to the said designation. Rather than rely on "a falsa descriptio or defective caption," courts are "guided by the substantive averments of the pleadings" (MONTAÑER vs. SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT, G.R. No. 174975, January 20, 2009, First Division, Puno, C.J.).

KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY LAW

THE PRESIDING JUDGE WAS PENALIZED FOR referrING THE CASE BACK TO the barangay FOR CONCILIATION DURING THE PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE, DESPITE THE MANIFESTATION OF THE PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL THAT THERE WAS ALREADY A PRIOR UNSUCCESSFUL BARANGAY CONCILIATION AS SHOWN BY THE CERTIFICATE TO FILE ACTION. There was no reason anymore to refer the case back to the barangay for the sole purpose of amicable settlement, because Sections 7 and 8 of the rules of Summary Procedure (RSP) provided already for such action. (FELICISIMA R. DIAZ VS. JUDGE GERARDO E. GESTOPA, JR., MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, NAGA, CEBU, A.M. NO. MTJ-11-1786, 22 JUNE 2011, PERALTA, J.).

RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE (RSP)

1.         If the extension for the filing of pleadings cannot be allowed, it is illogical and incongruous to admit a pleading that is already filed late. to admit a late answer is to put a premium on dilatory measures, the very mischief that the rules seek to redress. (TERAÑA vs. DESAGUN, G.R. No. 152131, April 29, 2009, Second Division, Brion, J.).

2.         The failure of one party to submit his position paper does not bar at all the MTC from issuing a judgment on the ejectment complaint. x x x In such a case, what would be extant in the record and the bases for the judgment would be the complaint, answer, and the record of the preliminary conference (TERAÑA vs. DESAGUN, G.R. No. 152131, April 29, 2009, Second Division, Brion, J.).

3.         if a sole defendant shall fail to appear in the preliminary conference, the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment in accordance with Section 6 of the Rule, that is, the court shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the Complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein (Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure).  However, "[t]his Rule (Sec. 7) shall not apply where one of two or more defendants sued under a common cause of action, who had pleaded a common defense, shall appear at the preliminary conference." x x x The Supreme Court held that the afore-quoted provision does not apply in the case where petitioner is not a co-defendant in the same case but actually sued in a separate case for ejectment. (SORIENTE vs. THE ESTATE OF ARSENIO E. CONCEPCION, G.R. No. 160239, Nov. 25, 2009, Third Division, Peralta, J.).

SHARI’A DISTRICT COURTS

1.         All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims, probate of wills, issuance of letters of administration or appointment of administrators or executors regardless of the nature or the aggregate value of the property shall be under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Shari’a District Courts (Article 143(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines cited in MONTAÑER vs. SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT, G.R. No. 174975, January 20, 2009, First Division, Puno, C.J.).

2.         the Special Rules of Procedure in Shari’a Courts, Ijra-at-al-Mahakim al Shari’a, proscribe "the filing of a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer which would stop the running of the period to file an answer and cause undue delay" x x x Moreover, the Shari’a District Court is not deprived of jurisdiction simply because petitioners raised as a defense the allegation that the deceased is not a Muslim. The Shari’a District Court has the authority to hear and receive evidence to determine whether it has jurisdiction, which requires an a priori determination that the deceased is a Muslim. If after hearing, the Shari’a District Court determines that the deceased was not in fact a Muslim, the district court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction (MONTAÑER vs. SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT, G.R. No. 174975, January 20, 2009, First Division, Puno, C.J.).

3.         THE proceedingS for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the deceased muslim, is CONSIDERED a special proceeding: The Supreme Court has applied the Rules, particularly the rules on special proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim (Musa v. Moson, supra note 23, at 721-722).

4.         In the event that a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a decedent is pending, questions regarding heirship, including prescription in relation to recognition and filiation, should be raised and settled in the said proceeding The court, in its capacity as a probate court, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the decedent In the case at bar, the determination of the heirs of the decedent depends on an affirmative answer to the question of whether the Shari’a District Court has jurisdiction over the estate of the decedent (MONTAÑER vs. SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT, G.R. No. 174975, Jan. 20, 2009, 1st Division, Puno, C.J.).