A preliminary investigation constitutes a realistic judicial appraisal of the
merits of a case. Its purpose is to determine whether (a) a crime has been
committed; and (b) whether there is a probable cause to believe that the
accused is guilty thereof. It is a means
of discovering which person or persons may be reasonably charged with a crime.
It is well-settled that the determination of probable cause for the
purpose of filing an information in court is an executive function which
pertains at the first instance to the public prosecutor and then to the
Secretary of Justice. The Secretary of Justice may reverse or modify the
resolution of the prosecutor, after which he shall direct the prosecutor concerned either to file the
corresponding information without conducting another preliminary investigation,
or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or information with notice
to the parties. The
Court considers it sound judicial policy to refrain from interfering in the
conduct of preliminary investigations and to leave the Department of Justice
ample latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes
sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of supposed
offenders. Its duty in an appropriate case is confined to the issue
of whether the executive or judicial determination, as the case may be, of
probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with abuse of
discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction.
However,
this Court may ultimately resolve the existence or non-existence of probable
cause by examining the records of the preliminary investigation when necessary
for the orderly administration of justice.
Although policy
considerations call for the widest latitude of deference to the prosecutor’s
findings, courts should never shirk from exercising their power, when the
circumstances warrant, to determine whether the prosecutor’s findings are
supported by the facts, or by the law. The Supreme Court
need not over-emphasize that in a
preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor merely determines whether
there is probable cause or sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial.
In
a preliminary investigation, a full and
exhaustive presentation of the parties’ evidence is not required, but only such
as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and
that the accused is probably guilty thereof. Certainly, it does not involve the
determination of whether or not there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt
pointing to the guilt of the person.
Only prima facie evidence is required; or that which is, on its
face, good and sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group or chain of
facts constituting the party's claim or defense; and which, if not rebutted or
contradicted, will remain sufficient.
Therefore, matters of evidence, such as who are the conspirators, are
more appropriately presented and heard during the trial. The term “probable cause” does not mean actual and positive cause nor
does it import absolute certainty. It is
merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.
Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into
whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that
it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the
prosecution in support of the charge. While it is this Court’s
general policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations,
leaving the investigating officers sufficient discretion to determine probable
cause, courts are nevertheless empowered
to substitute their judgment for that of the Secretary of Justice when the same
was rendered without or in excess of authority. Where the Secretary of Justice dismissed the complaint against the
respondent despite sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause,
such clearly constitutes grave error, thus warranting a reversal. The CA thus
clearly erred in sustaining the ruling of Secretary Perez for the exclusion of
respondent Bernardino from the charge of attempted murder despite a prima facie case against him having been
established by the evidence on record (George
Miller vs. Secretary Hernando B. Perez, G.R. No. 165412, May 30, 3011,
VILLARAMA, JR., J.).
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