The
doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense
by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or
acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same
quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts. x x x x Hence, the Supreme Court finds merit in
petitioner’s submission that the lower courts erred in refusing to extend in
his favor the mantle of protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause.
A more fitting jurisprudence could not be tailored to petitioner’s case than People
v. Silva, No.
L-15974, 30 January 1962, 4 SCRA 95, a Diaz progeny. There, the accused, who
was also involved in a vehicular collision, was charged in two separate
Informations with "Slight Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence"
and "Homicide with Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless
Imprudence." Following his acquittal of the former, the accused sought the
quashal of the latter, invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause. The trial court initially
denied relief, but, on reconsideration, found merit in the accused’s claim and
dismissed the second case. x x x x (JASON IVLER y AGUILAR vs. HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, G.R. No. 172716,
November 17, 2010, CARPIO, J.).
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