2012-2013 PHILJUST/MLQU-SCHOOL OF LAW ADVANCE BAR REVIEW

PHILIPPINE SOCIAL JUSTICE FOUNDATION, INC. (PHILJUST), 
NATIONAL BAR REVIEW CENTER
LEX REVIEWS AND SEMINARS, INC.
(SINCE 1988)
and

MANUEL L. QUEZON UNIVERSITY

PROF. SAMSON S. ALCANTARA
REVIEW DIRECTOR

2013 ADVANCED PRE-BAR REVIEW
Saturdays & Sundays
from November 24, 2012 up to March 31, 2013
at
Manuel L. Quezon University (MLQU)
916 R. Hidalgo Street, Quiapo, Manila

BAR REVIEW METHODS…. PROF. ABELARDO T. DOMONDON

CIVIL LAW…………………… DEAN AUGUSTO K. ALIGADA, JR.
PROF. MA. LIZA LOPEZ-ROSARIO
PROF. RHETT EMMANUEL C.
SERFINO
JUDGE FERNANDO V.
PAMINTUAN

COMMERCIAL LAW……… DEAN NILO T. DIVINA
PROF. MINDA C. GAPUZ
PROF. ESTRELLITA BELTRAN-
ABELARDO
JUDGE EMMANUEL A. SILVA

CRIMINAL LAW……………… DEAN CARLOS M. ORTEGA
PROF. PEDRO T. DABU, JR.
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA

INTERNATIONAL LAW…….. PROF. ROLANDO B. FALLER
PROF. JUSTINO MORALES

LABOR LAWS………………… PROF. SAMSON S. ALCANTARA
PROF. GENEROSO V. SANTOS

LAND REGISTRATION…… DIR. RAMON N. CASANOVA
JUDGE FERNANDO V.
PAMINTUAN

LEGAL ETHICS……………… DEAN NICZON YAO
PROF. CARMENCITA C. DABU

LEGAL FORMS……………… DEAN NICZON YAO
PROF. CARMENCITA C. DABU

LEGAL WRITING…………… PROF. RHETT EMMANUEL C.
SERFINO

POLITICAL LAW….………… PROF. SAMSON S. ALCANTARA
PROF. NOEL T. TIAMPONG
PROF. ROLANDO B. FALLER

REMEDIAL LAW………..….. DEAN LOPE E. FEBLE
PROF. CHRISTIAN G. VILLASIS
JUDGE CARLITO B. CALPATURA

TAXATION…………………… PROF. ABELARDO T. DOMONDON
PROF. VIRGINIA JEANNIE P. LIM
PROF. CARMENCITA C. DABU
SPECIAL LECTURES…….. JUSTICE ARTEMIO G. TUQUERO

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AIR CONDITIONED REVIEW ROOMS
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REGISTRATION AND ENROLMENT NOW GOING ON. REVIEW IS OPEN TO UNDERGRADUATES WHO WANT TO IMPROVE THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAW, AND TO PARALEGALS.
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2012-2013 U.P.L.C. ADVANCED BAR REVIEW

‎2012-2013 ADVANCED BAR REVIEW

POLITICAL LAW Dean MERLIN M. MAGALLONA
Prof. RENE B. GOROSPE
Prof. EDWIN R. SANDOVAL

Prof. JACINTO D. JIMENEZ

LABOR LAW Justice VICENTE S.E. VELOSO

CIVIL LAW Dean MERLIN M. MAGALLONA
Justice OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI
Dean AUGUSTO K. ALIGADA
Prof. EDUARDO A. LABITAG
Prof. CRISOSTOMO A. URIBE

TAXATION Prof. EDWIN A. ABELLA
Prof. ABELARDO T. DOMONDON

MERCANTILE LAW Prof. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG
Dean EDUARDO A. ABELLA

CRIMINAL LAW Dean CARLOS M. ORTEGA
Judge MARLO B. CAMPANILLA

REMEDIAL LAW Justice MARIA CRISTINA J. CORNEJO
Dean CARLOS M. ORTEGA
Prof. CHRISTIAN G. VILLASIS
LEGAL ETHICS &
PRACTICAL EXERCISES Prof. ABELARDO T. DOMONDON


ENROLLMENT NOW GOING ON
Classes Start: November 13 (Tuesday), 5:00 P.M.
Schedule: Mon. to Fri. 5:00-9:00 P.M. & Sat. 9:12/1:00-6:00 P.M.

For Particulars: Please call

U.P. LAW CENTER
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USTICE MARTIN VILLARMA, JR.: THERE IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHERE THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTS IN A CAPRICIOUS, WHIMSICAL, ARBITRARY OR DESPOTIC MANNER IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS JUDGMENT AS TO BE EQUIVALENT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION

The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. (People v. Sandiganbayan). Under the facts on record, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the SB when it submitted the case for decision and rendered the judgment of conviction on the basis of the prosecution evidence after the defense failed to present its evidence despite ample opportunity to do so. (Marino B. Icdang vs. Sandiganbayan (Second Division) and People of the Phils., G.R. No. 185960, January 25, 2012, VILLARAMA, JR., J.). 

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: EXPROPRIATION: THE POWER TO DECIDE JUST COMPENSATION CASES FOR THE TAKING OF LANDS UNDER R.A. NO. 6657 IS VESTED IN THE COURTS

In Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132767, January 18, 2000, 322 SCRA 139.), petitioner landowner who was dissatisfied with the valuation made by LBP and DARAB, filed a petition for determination of just compensation in the RTC (SAC).  However, the RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that it was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period for filing appeals from the orders of the DARAB.  On appeal, the CA upheld the order of dismissal. When the case was elevated to the Supreme Court, it likewise affirmed the CA and declared that:

As we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals, this rule is an acknowledgment by the DARAB that the power to decide just compensation cases for the taking of lands under R.A. No. 6657 is vested in the courts.  It is error to think that, because of Rule XIII, §11, the original and exclusive jurisdiction given to the courts to decide petitions for determination of just compensation has thereby been transformed into an appellate jurisdiction.  It only means that, in accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR as an administrative agency to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid for the lands taken under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, but such determination is subject to challenge in the courts.

           The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts is not any less “original and exclusive” because the question is first passed upon by the DAR, as the judicial proceedings are not a continuation of the administrative determination.  For that matter, the law may provide that the decision of the DAR is final and unappealable.  Nevertheless, resort to the courts cannot be foreclosed on the theory that courts are the guarantors of the legality of the administrative action (Land Bank of the Phils. vs. Severino Listana, G.R. No. 168105, July 27, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA,. JR.: EJECTMENT:

An ejectment case is designed to restore, through summary proceedings, the physical possession of any land or building to one who has been illegally deprived of such possession, without prejudice to the settlement of the parties’ opposing claims of juridical possession in appropriate proceedings.  Any ruling on the question of ownership is only provisional and made for the sole purpose of determining who is entitled to possession de facto. Certainly, a judgment in an ejectment case could only resolve the question as to who has a better right to possess the subject property but definitely, it could not conclusively determine whether petitioners are entitled to the award under the ZIP or ascertain if respondents are disqualified beneficiaries (Heirs of Agapatio T. Olarte and Angela A. Olarte et al. vs. Office of the President of the Philippines et al., G.R. No. 177995, June 15, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

THE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR LIES WITHIN THE DISCRETION OF THE COURT

In Heirs of Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo v. Lacuata-Gabriel, G.R. No. 162934, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 747, 759-760, it was stated that:

“It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior or preferred right of certain persons to the appointment of administrator under Section 1, Rule 81, as well as the statutory provisions as to causes for removal of an executor or administrator under section 653 of Act No. 190, now Section 2, Rule 83, do not apply to the selection or removal of special administrator. x x x As the law does not say who shall be appointed as special administrator and the qualifications the appointee must have, the judge or court has discretion in the selection of the person to be appointed, discretion which must be sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary to reason, justice or equity. (Emphasis supplied; citation omitted.)

This principle was reiterated in the Ocampo case, where the Supreme Court ruled that: “While the RTC considered that respondents were the nearest of kin to their deceased parents in their appointment as joint special administrators, this is not a mandatory requirement for the appointment. It has long been settled that the selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators. The probate court may appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules at its discretion, such that the need to first pass upon and resolve the issues of fitness or unfitness and the application of the order of preference under Section 6 of Rule 78, as would be proper in the case of a regular administrator, do not obtain. As long as the discretion is exercised without grave abuse, and is based on reason, equity, justice, and legal principles, interference by higher courts is unwarranted (Emphasis supplied.)

While the trial court has the discretion to appoint anyone as a special administrator of the estate, such discretion must be exercised with reason, guided by the directives of equity, justice and legal principles. It may, therefore, not be remiss to reiterate that the role of a special administrator is to preserve the estate until a regular administrator is appointed. As stated in Sec. 2, Rule 80 of the Rules:

Section 2. Powers and duties of special adminsitrator. — Such special administrator shall take possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the executors or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose may commence and maintain suits as administrator. He may sell only such perishable and other property as the court orders sold. A special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the deceased unless so ordered by the court.

Given this duty on the part of the special administrator, it would, therefore, be prudent and reasonable to appoint someone interested in preserving the estate for its eventual distribution to the heirs. Such choice would ensure that such person would not expose the estate to losses that would effectively diminish his or her share. While the court may use its discretion and depart from such reasoning, still, there is no logical reason to appoint a person who is a debtor of the estate and otherwise a stranger to the deceased. To do so would be tantamount to grave abuse of discretion. (DIOSDADO MANUNGAS VS. MARGARITA AVILA LORETO & FLORENCIA AVILA PARRENO, G.R. NO. 193161, AUGUST 22, 2011, VELASCO, JR., J.).

WRIT OF AMPARO PROCEEDINGS

An amparo proceeding is not criminal in nature nor does it ascertain the criminal liability of individuals or entities involved.  Neither does it partake of a civil or administrative suit.

It bears stressing that command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity, and thus a substantive rule that points to criminal or administrative liability. An amparo proceeding is not criminal in nature nor does it ascertain the criminal liability of individuals or entities involved.  Neither does it partake of a civil or administrative suit. Rather, it is a remedial measure designed to direct specified courses of action to government agencies to safeguard the constitutional right to life, liberty and security of aggrieved individuals.

In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to identify those accountable individuals that have the power to effectively implement whatever processes an amparo court would issue. In such application, the amparo court does not impute criminal responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the best position to protect the rights of the aggrieved party. 

Contrary to the ruling of the appellate court, there is no need to file a motion for execution for an amparo or habeas corpus decision.  Since the right to life, liberty and security of a person is at stake, the proceedings should not be delayed and execution of any decision thereon must be expedited as soon as possible since any form of delay, even for a day, may jeopardize the very rights that these writs seek to immediately protect. The Solicitor General’s argument that the Rules of Court supplement the Rule on the Writ of Amparo is misplaced.  The Rules of Court only find suppletory application in an amparo proceeding if the Rules strengthen, rather than weaken, the procedural efficacy of the writ.   As it is, the Rule dispenses with dilatory motions in view of the urgency in securing the life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.  Suffice it to state that a motion for execution is inconsistent with the extraordinary and expeditious remedy being offered by an amparo proceeding.  In fine, the appellate court erred in ruling that its directive to immediately release Sherlyn, Karen and Merino was not automatically executory. For that would defeat the very purpose of having summary proceedings in amparo petitions.  Summary proceedings, it bears emphasis, are immediately executory without prejudice to further appeals that may be taken therefrom. (LT. COL. ROGELIO BOAC ET AL, VS. ERLINDA T. CADAPAN & CONCEPCION E. EMPENO G.R. NO. 184461-62, MAY 31, 2011, CARPIO MORALES, J.). 

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: TRANSFER OF PERSON UNDER DETENTION: THE POWER TO ORDER THE RELEASE OR TRANSFER OF A PERSON UNDER DETENTION BY LEGAL PROCESS IS VESTED IN THE COURT, NOT IN THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT, MUCH LESS THE GOVERNOR

TRANSFER OF PERSON UNDER DETENTION:  the power to order the release or transfer of a person under detention by legal process is vested in the court, not in the provincial government, much less the governor: Indubitably, the power to order the release or transfer of a person under detention by legal process is vested in the court, not in the provincial government, much less the governor (Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan and People of the Phils. G.R. No. 175457, July 6, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION:

              A preliminary investigation constitutes a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of a case. Its purpose is to determine whether (a) a crime has been committed; and (b) whether there is a probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof.  It is a means of discovering which person or persons may be reasonably charged with a crime.  It is well-settled that the determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing an information in court is an executive function which pertains at the first instance to the public prosecutor and then to the Secretary of Justice. The Secretary of Justice may reverse or modify the resolution of the prosecutor, after which he shall direct the prosecutor concerned either to file the corresponding information without conducting another preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to the parties. The Court considers it sound judicial policy to refrain from interfering in the conduct of preliminary investigations and to leave the Department of Justice ample latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of supposed offenders. Its duty in an appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the executive or judicial determination, as the case may be, of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction. However, this Court may ultimately resolve the existence or non-existence of probable cause by examining the records of the preliminary investigation when necessary for the orderly administration of justice. Although policy considerations call for the widest latitude of deference to the prosecutor’s findings, courts should never shirk from exercising their power, when the circumstances warrant, to determine whether the prosecutor’s findings are supported by the facts, or by the law.  The Supreme Court need not over-emphasize that in a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor merely determines whether there is probable cause or sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.        

In a preliminary investigation, a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties’ evidence is not required, but only such as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.  Certainly, it does not involve the determination of whether or not there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt pointing to the guilt of the person.  Only prima facie evidence is required; or that which is, on its face, good and sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting the party's claim or defense; and which, if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient.  Therefore, matters of evidence, such as who are the conspirators, are more appropriately presented and heard during the trial. The term “probable cause” does not mean actual and positive cause nor does it import absolute certainty.  It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.  Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge. While it is this Court’s general policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations, leaving the investigating officers sufficient discretion to determine probable cause, courts are nevertheless empowered to substitute their judgment for that of the Secretary of Justice when the same was rendered without or in excess of authority. Where the Secretary of Justice dismissed the complaint against the respondent despite sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause, such clearly constitutes grave error, thus warranting a reversal. The CA thus clearly erred in sustaining the ruling of Secretary Perez for the exclusion of respondent Bernardino from the charge of attempted murder despite a prima facie case against him having been established by the evidence on record (George Miller vs. Secretary Hernando B. Perez, G.R. No. 165412, May 30, 3011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: OMBUDSMAN’S FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE

In Galario v. Office of the Ombudsman (Mindanao), G.R. No. 166797, July 10, 2007, the Supreme Court held: “[A] finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and there is enough reason to believe that it was committed by the accused. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt. ‘The term does not mean “actual and positive cause” nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. x x x. Probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction.”  

It is worth stressing that the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause does not touch on the issue of guilt or innocence of the accused.  It is not the function of the Office of the Ombudsman to rule on such issue.  All that the Office of the Ombudsman did was to weigh the evidence presented together with the counter-allegations of the accused and determine if there was enough reason to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused are probably guilty thereof. In this light, the Supreme Court found no compelling reason to disturb the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman (MARCELO G. GANADEN ET AL. VS. HON. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND ROBERT K. HUMIWAT, G.R. NOS. 169359-61, JUNE 1, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: THE DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST THOSE IN PUBLIC OFFICE DURING A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS A FUNCTION THAT BELONGS TO THE OMBUDSMAN

The Ombudsman is vested with the sole power to investigate and prosecute, motu proprio or upon the complaint of any person, any act or omission which appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient (Vergara v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 174567, March 12, 2009, 580 SCRA 693, 708.). It has the discretion to determine whether a criminal case, given its attendant facts and circumstances, should be filed or not. (M.A. JIMENEZ ENTERPRISES, INC., VS. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN, JESUS P.  CAMMAYO G.R. NO. 155307, JUNE 6, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

DOUBLE JEOPARDY: PRIOR CONVICTION OR ACQUITTAL OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE BARS SUBSEQUENT PROSECUTION FOR THE SAME QUASI-OFFENSE REGARDLESS OF ITS VARIOUS RESULTING ACTS:

The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts. x x x x Hence, the Supreme Court finds merit in petitioner’s submission that the lower courts erred in refusing to extend in his favor the mantle of protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting jurisprudence could not be tailored to petitioner’s case than People v. Silva, No. L-15974, 30 January 1962, 4 SCRA 95, a Diaz progeny. There, the accused, who was also involved in a vehicular collision, was charged in two separate Informations with "Slight Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence" and "Homicide with Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence." Following his acquittal of the former, the accused sought the quashal of the latter, invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause. The trial court initially denied relief, but, on reconsideration, found merit in the accused’s claim and dismissed the second case. x x x x (JASON IVLER y AGUILAR vs. HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, G.R. No. 172716, November 17, 2010, CARPIO, J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: THE FACTS FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT, AS AFFIRMED IN TOTO BY THE COURT OF APPEALS, ARE AS A GENERAL RULE, CONCLUSIVE UPON THE SUPREME COURT IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY SHOWING OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

The Court gives weight and respect to the trial court’s findings in criminal prosecution because the latter is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses in person and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. Absent any showing that the lower courts overlooked substantial facts and circumstances, which if considered, would change the result of the case, this Court gives deference to the trial court’s appreciation of the facts and of the credibility of witnesses. (Anita l. Miranda vs. The People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 176298, January 25, 2012, VILLARAMA, JR., J.). 

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN ARE CONCLUSIVE UPON THE SUPREME COURT

-FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN are conclusive UPON THE SUPREME COURT except where: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts and the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record (Virginia M. Guadines vs. Sandiganbayan and People of the Phils., G.R. No. 164891, June 6, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL:

It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a judgment of acquittal shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.(Id.) When the exoneration is merely due to the failure to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the court should award the civil liability in favor of the offended party in the same criminal action. (Id.)  In other words, the “extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil [liability] might arise did not exist.” (Calalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74613, February 27, 1991, 194 SCRA 514, 523-524.)  In Banal v. Tadeo, Jr., 240 Phil. 326, 331 (1987), the Supreme Court elucidated on the civil liability of the accused despite his exoneration in this wise:

While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another.  Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law. x x x 

Simply stated, civil liability arises when one, by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, causes damage to another.  Hence, for petitioner to be civilly liable to spouses Alonto, it must be proven that the acts he committed had caused damage to the spouses. (FELIXBERTO A. ABELLANA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILS. ET AL., G.R. NO. 174654, AUGUST 17, 2011, DEL CASTILLO, J.). 

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: PROMULGATION OF JUDGMENT

There is nothing in the rules that requires the presence of counsel for the promulgation of the judgment of conviction to be valid. While notice must be served on both accused and his counsel, the latter’s absence during the promulgation of judgment would not affect the validity of the promulgation. Indeed, no substantial right of the accused on the merits was prejudiced by such absence of his counsel when the sentence was pronounced. (Marino B. Icdang vs. Sandiganbayan (Second Division) and People of the Phils., G.R. No. 185960, January 25, 2012, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: FORMS AND CONTENTS OF JUDGMENTS:

The Constitution commands that “[n]o decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.” (Art. VIII, Sec. 14, 1987 Constitution.) Judges are expected to make complete findings of fact in their decisions and scrutinize closely the legal aspects of the case in the light of the evidence presented. They should avoid the tendency to generalize and form conclusions without detailing the facts from which such conclusions are deduced. (LENIDO LUMANOG AND AUGUSTO SANTOS VS. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 182555, SEPTEMBER 7, 2010, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR: GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION is defined as capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. (Marcelo G. Ganaden et al. vs. Hon. Office of the Ombudsman and Robert K. Humiwat, G.R. Nos. 169359-61, June 1, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: THERE IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHERE THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTS IN A CAPRICIOUS, WHIMSICAL, ARBITRARY OR DESPOTIC MANNER IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS JUDGMENT AS TO BE EQUIVALENT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION.

 The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.  (Marino B. Icdang vs. Sandiganbayan (Second Division) and People of the Phils., G.R. No. 185960, Jan. 25, 2012, VILLARAMA, JR., J.)

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: PAROL EVIDENCE RULE: WHEN THE TERMS OF AN AGREEMENT WERE REDUCED IN WRITING, AS IN THIS CASE, IT IS DEEMED TO CONTAIN ALL THE TERMS AGREED UPON AND NO EVIDENCE OF SUCH TERMS CAN BE ADMITTED OTHER THAN THE CONTENTS THEREOF

parol evidence rule:  when the terms of an agreement were reduced in writing, as in this case, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of such terms can be admitted other than the contents thereof (Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court)  Rudlin argues that under Section 9, Rule 130, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if it is put in issue in the pleading, "[t]he failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and the agreement of the parties thereto."  x x x x Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid contract (FINANCIAL BUILDING CORPORATION vs. CORPORATION, BLOOMFIELD EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION, INC., RODOLFO J. LAGERA, MA. ERLINDA J. LAGERA AND JOSAPHAT R. BRAVANTE, RUDLIN INTERNATIONAL, G.R. No. 164186, October 4, 2010, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: ADMISSION OF A PARTY

An admission is any statement of fact made by a party against his interest or unfavorable to the conclusion for which he contends or is inconsistent with the facts alleged by him. Admission against interest is governed by Section 26 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides: “Sec. 26. Admissions of a party. – The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.” To be admissible, an admission must (a) involve matters of fact, and not of law; (b) be categorical and definite; (c) be knowingly and voluntarily made; and (d) be adverse to the admitter’s interests, otherwise it would be self-serving and inadmissible (BETTY B. LACBAYAN VS. BAYANI S. SAMOY, JR. G.R. NO. 165427, MARCH 21, 2011, VILLARAMA, J.). 

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: THE ISSUE OF CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES IS "A QUESTION BEST ADDRESSED TO THE PROVINCE OF THE TRIAL COURT

the issue of credibility of witnesses is "a question best addressed to the province of the trial court because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses’ deportment on the stand while testifying which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts and "absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the trial court’s assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the former’s findings, particularly when no significant facts and circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded which when considered would have affected the outcome of the case." (PEOPLE OF THE PHILS. VS. CONRADO LAOG, G.R. NO. 178321, OCTOBER 5, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.). 

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: IF THE VICTIM DIES AS A RESULT OF A DELIBERATE ACT OF THE MALEFACTORS, INTENT TO KILL IS PRESUMED:

Intent to kill and not motive is the essential element of the offense on which her conviction rests. Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist, inter alia, in the means used by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim, the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of the victim, the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused. If the victim dies as a result of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is presumed (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SUSAN LATOSA y CHICO, G.R. No. 186128, June 23, 2010, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: OBJECTIONS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE CANNOT BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL:

objections to the admissibility of evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection, he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drug s as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of herein appellant (PEOPLE vs. BAIDA SALAK, G.R. No. 181249, MARCH 14, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLRAMA, JR.: CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES

Jurisprudence has decreed that the issue of credibility of witnesses is "a question best addressed to the province of the trial court because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses’ deportment on the stand while testifying which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts and "absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the trial court’s assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the former’s findings, particularly when no significant facts and circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded which when considered would have affected the outcome of the case (People of the Phils. vs. Conrado Laog, G.R. No. 178321, October 5, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLRAMA, JR.: IN CRIMINAL CASES, THE EVALUATION OF THE CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES IS ADDRESSED TO THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE

in criminal cases, the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge.  The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals (People of the Phils. vs. Eduardo Castro and Renerio delos Reyes, G.R. No. 187073, March 14, 2012, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: ALIBI IS THE WEAKEST OF ALL DEFENSES

alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to fabricate and difficult to prove; it cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by the witnesses. Moreover, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and place must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed, but he must also demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time the same was committed (People of the Phils. vs. Eduardo Castro and Renerio delos Reyes, G.R. No. 187073, March 14, 2012, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: THE FACTS FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT, AS AFFIRMED IN TOTO BY THE CA, ARE AS A GENERAL RULE, CONCLUSIVE UPON THE SUPREME COURT IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY SHOWING OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

The Court gives weight and respect to the trial court’s findings in criminal prosecution because the latter is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses in person and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. Absent any showing that the lower courts overlooked substantial facts and circumstances, which if considered, would change the result of the case, this Court gives deference to the trial court’s appreciation of the facts and of the credibility of witnesses (ANITA L. MIRANDA VS. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 176298, JANUARY 25, 2012, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: A LAWYER MAY BE SUSPENDED OR DISBARRED FOR ANY MISCONDUCT SHOWING ANY FAULT OR DEFICIENCY IN HIS MORAL CHARACTER, HONESTY, PROBITY OR GOOD DEMEANOR

In Gonzales, the notary public who notarized the document despite the non-appearance of one of the signatories was meted the penalties of revocation of his notarial commission and disqualification from re-appointment for two years. The notary in Gonzales was likewise suspended from the practice of law for one year. x x x  

The Court found that by notarizing the questioned deed, the respondent in Gonzales engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.  In the instant case, the Supreme Court held that respondent should similarly be meted the penalty of suspension and revocation of his notarial commission for having violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice (Pacita Caalim-Verzonilla vs. Atty. Victoriano G. Pascua, A.C. No. 6655 , October 11, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).