Tuesday, September 30, 2014

JUSTICE PERALTA:

The People may assail a judgment of acquittal only via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules.

          If the petition, regardless of its nomenclature, merely calls for an ordinary review of the findings of the court a quo, the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy would be violated. (VILLAREAL VS. ALIGA, 2014, PERALTA, J.)

Monday, September 29, 2014

JUSTICE PERALTA:

     when a complaint is dismissed without prejudice at the instance of the plaintiff, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, there is no need to state in the certificate of non-forum shopping in a subsequent re-filed complaint the fact of the prior filing and dismissal of the former complaint. (BENEDICTO vs. LACSON [2010], PERALTA, J.).

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Saturday, September 27, 2014

JUSTICE PERALTA:

   In criminal cases, the grant of demurrer is tantamount to an acquittal and the dismissal order may not be appealed because this would place the accused in double jeopardy. Although the dismissal order is not subject to appeal, it is still reviewable but only through certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. (PEOPLE vs. ATIENZA, 2012, PERALTA, J.).

Thursday, September 25, 2014

JUSTICE PERALTA:

     Forum-shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with different prayers (splitting of causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata). (BORRA vs. CA [2013], PERALTA, J.)

Wednesday, September 24, 2014

JUSTICE PERALTA:

     JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER: It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint. It is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by the defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the defendant. (MEDICAL PLAZA MAKATI CONDOMINIUM VS.  CULLEN [2013], PERALTA, J.)

Tuesday, September 23, 2014

JUSTICE PERALTA:

     PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION: For a writ of preliminary injunction to issue, the following essential requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the invasion of the right is material and substantial; (2) that the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable; and, (3) that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. In the present case, the right of respondents cannot be said to be clear and unmistakable, because the prevailing jurisprudence is that the penalty of dismissal from the service meted on government employees or officials is immediately executory in accordance with the valid rule of execution pending appeal uniformly observed in administrative disciplinary cases. (OMBUDSMAN vs. DE CHAVEZ [2013], PERALTA, J).

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Monday, September 22, 2014

JUSTICE PERALTA:

     the Supreme Court now has the sole authority to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts. (GSIS vs. HEIRS OF CABALLERO [2010], PERALTA, J.).

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JUSTICE PERALTA:

     In determining whether petitioner was deprived of this right, the factors to consider and balance are the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by such delay. (Mari vs. Gonzales, 2011 Peralta, J.)

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JUSTICE PERALTA:

     MOTION TO DISCHARGE A WRIT OF ATTACHMENT: UNENFORCEABILITY OF THE CONTRACT AND THE VERACITY OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S ALLEGATION OF FRAUD, PERTAIN TO THE MERITS OF THE MAIN ACTION. HENCE, THESE ISSUES ARE NOT TO BE TAKEN UP IN RESOLVING THE MOTION TO DISCHARGE, LEST WE RUN THE RISK OF DECIDING OR PREJUDGING THE MAIN CASE AND FORCE A TRIAL ON THE MERITS AT THIS STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS (THE MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY, BULACAN VS. HON. DUMDUM, JR., [2010], PERALTA, J).

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Thursday, September 18, 2014

JUSTICE PERALTA:

     Instances when presence of accused is required by law: Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution, authorizing trials in absentia, allows the accused to be absent at the trial but not at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment and plea, whether of innocence or of guilt; (b) during trial, whenever necessary for identification purposes; and (c) at the promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which case, the accused may appear by counsel or representative. At such stages of the proceedings, his presence is required and cannot be waived (PEOPLE vs. DE GRANO, 2009, Peralta, J.).

Wednesday, September 17, 2014

JUSTICE PERALTA:

        Well-established is the rule that when a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the remedy is not a petition for certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial, without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion to quash

          The above general rule, however admits of several exceptions, one of which is when the court, in denying the motion to dismiss or motion to quash, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies. (JAVIER VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 2009, PERALTA, J.).

Tuesday, September 16, 2014

JUSTICE PERALTA:

   The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over orders, directives and decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases only. (OMBUDSMAN vS. VENTURA, 2009, Peralta, J.)

Monday, September 15, 2014

JUSTICE PERALTA:

     QUAHAL OF THE SEARCH WARRANT: In view of the withdrawal of the Information for Robbery, the quashal of the subject search warrants and the determination of the issue of whether or not there was probable cause warranting the issuance by the RTC of the said search warrants for respondents’ alleged acts of robbery has been rendered moot and academic. (TAN vs. SY TIONG GUE, 2010, PERALTA, J.).

Friday, September 12, 2014

JUSTICE PERALTA:

     Plain view: Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have that view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. The “plain view” doctrine applies when the following requisites concur:

       (a)      the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area;

        (b)      the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent;

        (c)      it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.

      The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused.

          The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent. (MICLAT VS. PEOPLE, 2011, PERALTA, J.).

Wednesday, September 10, 2014

JUSTICE PERALTA:

In searches incident to a lawful arrest, the arrest must precede the search; generally, the process cannot be reversed.

          Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search.  (SY VS. PEOPLE, 2011, PERALTA, J.).

Tuesday, September 9, 2014

JUSTICE PERALTA:

     THE 1987 CONSTITUTION STATES THAT A SEARCH AND CONSEQUENT SEIZURE MUST BE CARRIED OUT WITH A JUDICIAL WARRANT; OTHERWISE, IT BECOMES UNREASONABLE AND ANY EVIDENCE OBTAINED THEREFROM SHALL BE INADMISSIBLE FOR ANY PURPOSE IN ANY PROCEEDING. (SY VS. PEOPLE, 2011, PERALTA, J.).

Monday, September 8, 2014

JUSTICE PERALTA:

COORDINATION WITH THE PDEA IS NOT AN INDISPENSABLE REQUIREMENT BEFORE POLICE AUTHORITIES MAY CARRY OUT A BUY-BUST OPERATION.

         A BUY-BUST OPERATION IS NOT INVALIDATED BY MERE NON-COORDINATION WITH THE PDEA.  (PEOPLE VS. MANTALABA [2011], PERALTA, J.).    

Saturday, September 6, 2014

GENERALLY, A CRIMINAL CASE HAS TWO ASPECTS, THE CIVIL AND THE CRIMINAL:

     The civil aspect is borne of the principle that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. The civil action, in which the offended party is the plaintiff and the accused is the defendant, is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. (RULES OF COURT, Rule 111, Sec. 1(a)). The law allows the merger of the criminal and the civil actions to avoid multiplicity of suits. Thus, when the state succeeds in prosecuting the offense, the offended party benefits from such result and is able to collect the damages awarded to him. But, when the trial court acquits the accused or dismisses the case  on the ground of lack of evidence to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the civil action is not automatically extinguished since liability under such an action can be determined based on mere preponderance of evidence. The offended party may peel off from the terminated criminal action and appeal from the implied dismissal of his claim for civil liability. The purpose of a criminal action, in its purest sense, is to determine the penal liability of the accused for having outraged the state with his crime and, if he be found guilty, to punish him for it. In this sense, the parties to the action are the People of the Philippines and the accused. The offended party is regarded merely as a witness for the state. Also in this wise, only the state, through its appellate counsel, the OSG, has the sole right and authority to institute proceedings before the CA or the Supreme Court. (BURGOS vs. CA, G.R. No. 169711)

Thursday, September 4, 2014

FORECLOSURE AND WRIT OF POSSESSION:

It is settled that questions regarding the validity of a mortgage or its foreclosure as well as the sale of the property covered by the mortgage cannot be raised as ground to deny the issuance of a writ of possession. Any such questions must be determined in a subsequent proceeding (Philippine National Bank v. Sanao Marketing Corporation, G.R. No. 153951, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 287) as in fact, herein respondents commenced an action for Annulment of Certificate of Sale, Promissory Note and Deed of Mortgage.  x x x x  Since respondents failed to redeem the mortgage within the reglementary period, entitlement to the writ of possession becomes a matter of right and the issuance thereof is merely a ministerial function (F. David Enterprises v. Insular Bank of Asia and America, G.R. No. 78714, November 21 1990, 191 SCRA 516, 523).

          The judge to whom an application for a writ of possession is filed need not look into the validity of the mortgage or the manner of its foreclosure. Until the foreclosure sale is annulled, the issuance of the writ of possession is ministerial (Philippine National Bank v. Sanao Marketing Corporation, G.R. No. 153951, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 287).  In fact, even during the period of redemption, the purchaser is entitled as of right to a writ of possession provided a bond is posted to indemnify the debtor in case the foreclosure sale is shown to have been conducted without complying with the requirements of the law. More so when, as in the pres ent case, the redemption period has expired and ownership is vested in the purchaser.  x x x The defaulting mortgagor is not without any expedient remedy, however. For under Section 8 of Act 3135, as amended by Act 4118, it can file with the court which issues the writ of possession a petition for cancellation of the writ within 30 days after the purchaser-mortgagee was given possession.  IN FINE, it would be a grievous error for QC-RTC, Branch 77 to deny petitioners motion for the issuance of a writ of possession (PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK vs. JAMES NG, et al. G.R. No.187556, May 5, 2010, First Division, Carpio Morales, J.).

Wednesday, September 3, 2014

CLAIMS AGAINST THE ESTATE:

     liabilities of the deceased arising from quasi-contracts should be filed as claims in the settlement of his estate, as provided in Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. x x x x We read with approval the CA’s use of the statutory construction principle of lex specialis derogat generali, leading to the conclusion that the specific provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court should prevail over the general provisions of Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court; the settlement of the estate of deceased persons (where claims against the deceased should be filed) is primarily governed by the rules on special proceedings, while the rules provided for ordinary claims, including Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court, merely apply suppletorily. (Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company vs. Absolute Management Corporation, G.R. No. 170498, January 9, 2013, Brion, J.)

Tuesday, September 2, 2014

DIRECT AND COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE TITLE:

     The attack is direct when the objective is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement.  On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof (Roman Catholic Archbishop of San Fernando Pampanga vs. Fernando Soriano Jr., et al., G.R. No. 153829, August 17, 2011,VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

Monday, September 1, 2014

RES JUDICATA:

     For the preclusive effect of res judicata to be enforced, the following requisites must be present: (1) the judgment or order sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the first case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action. As to the fourth element, it is important to note that the doctrine of res judicata has two aspects: first,bar by prior judgment” which is provided in Rule 39, Section 47 (b) of the Rules of Court and second, “conclusiveness of judgment” which is provided in Section 47 (c) of the same Rule.  There is “bar by prior judgment” when, as between the first case where the judgment was rendered, and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. But where there is identity of parties and subject matter in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. On the other hand, under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, facts and issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties, even if the latter suit may involve a different claim or cause of action. The identity of causes of action is not required but merely identity of issues. (PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. SIA, G.R. No. 165836, February 18, 2009, Second Division, Quisumbing, J.).