In People vs. Lucena, G.R. No. 137281, April 3, 2001, the
Supreme Court ruled that the testimony of a witness may be partly believed or
disbelieved, depending on the corroborative evidence and intent on the part of
the witness to pervert the truth. The principle falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is not strictly applied
in this jurisdiction. The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in
omnibus deals only with the weight of evidence and is not a positive rule
of law; the rule is not an inflexible one of universal application. Modern
trend in jurisprudence favors more flexibility when the testimony of a witness
may be partly believed and partly disbelieved depending on the corroborative
evidence presented at the trial. Thus, where the challenged testimony is sufficiently
corroborated in its material points, or where the mistakes arise from innocent
lapses and not from an apparent desire to pervert the truth, the rule may be
relaxed. It is a rule that is neither absolute nor mandatory and
binding upon the court, which may accept or reject portions of the witness’
testimony based on its inherent credibility or on the
corroborative evidence in the case. (People vs. Negosa, G.R. No. 142856-57,
August 25, 2003, Callejo, Sr., J.).
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