POLITICAL PERSECUTION AS A GROUND TO JUSTIFY THE PROHIBITION OF A CRIMINAL PROSECUTION

Indeed, this Court has recognized that, in certain instances, political persecution or political motives may have impelled the filing of criminal charges against certain political rivals. But this Court has also ruled that any allegation that the filing of the charges is politically motivated cannot justify the prohibition of a criminal prosecution if there is otherwise evidence to support the charges (Paredes, Jr. v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, 322 Phil. 709, 732-733 (1996). x x x x  To establish political harassment, respondents must prove that the public prosecutor, not just the private complainant, acted in bad faith in prosecuting the case or has lent himself to a scheme that could have no other purpose than to place respondents in contempt and disrepute. It must be shown that the complainant possesses the power and the influence to control the prosecution of cases. (Paredes, Jr. v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, 322 Phil. 709, 732-733 (1996).  x x x x  Likewise, the allegation that the filing of the complaint was politically motivated does not serve to justify the nullification of the informations where the existence of such motive has not been sufficiently established nor substantial evidence presented in support thereof (Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, 324 Phil. 151, 167 (1996).  x x x x

Other than their own self-serving claims, respondents have adduced absolutely no proof of the perceived political persecution being waged by their rivals. Respondents have not shown any evidence of such a grand design. They have not alleged, much less proved, any ill motive or malice that could have impelled the provincial prosecutor, the judge, and even the Secretary of Justice to have respectively ruled in the way each of them did. In short, respondents are holding tenuously only on the hope that this Court will take them at their word and grant the relief they pray for. This Court, however, cannot anchor its ruling on mere allegations. Needless to say, a full-blown trial is to be preferred to ferret out the truth (AAA v. Carbonell, supra note 48, at 511, citing Abugotal v. Judge Tiro, 160 Phil. 884, 890 (1975) If, as respondents claim, there is no evidence of their culpability, then their petition for bail would easily be granted. Thereafter, the credibility of the prosecution’s and the accused’s respective evidence may be tested during the trial. It is only then that the guilt or innocence of respondents will be determined. Whether the criminal prosecution was merely a tool for harassment or whether the prosecution’s evidence can pass the strict standards set by the law and withstand the exacting scrutiny of the court will all be resolved at the trial of the case. The criminal Information in this case was filed four years ago and trial has yet to begin. The victim’s kin, indeed, all the parties, are awaiting its resolution. Any further delay will amount to an injustice. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. JOSEPH "JOJO" V. GREY, G.R. No. 180109, July 26, 2010, NACHURA, J.)

PARTIAL OR DISCRETIONARY EXECUTION:

When an appeal had been duly perfected, execution of the judgment, whether wholly or partially, was not a matter of right, but of discretion provided good reasons therefor existed. The compelling grounds for the issuance of the writ must be stated in a special order after due hearing. Aside from the existence of good reasons, the rules also require that the motion for partial execution should have been filed while the trial court still had jurisdiction over the case. (Rules of Court, Rule 39, Section 2(b). x x x In the present case, the RTC's May 9, 2002 Order granting the issuance of the writ of execution failed to state good reasons for the issuance of the writ. The RTC mistakenly deemed that the execution should issue as a matter of right because it had held that part of its September 14, 2001 Decision had become final and executory. As previously discussed, the said proposition is erroneous because the Decision in the present case is not properly severable. x x x 

Furthermore, the motion for partial execution was filed only on August 22, 2001, more than four months after the appeal was perfected. "In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties." Each party only has at most 15 days from their receipt of the final order to appeal it. Thus, when respondents filed their motion for partial execution the RTC no longer had jurisdiction over the case and it no longer had jurisdiction to act on the said motion for partial execution. (Rules of Court, Rule 41, Section 9). (ASSOCIATED ANGLO-AMERICAN TOBACCO CORPORATION and FLORANTE DY, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. CRISPIN C. LARON, G.R. No. 167237, April 23, 2010 DEL CASTILLO, J.). 

PETITION FOR RELIEF

It is a remedy provided by law to any person against whom a decision or order is entered into through fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. The relief provided for is of equitable character, allowed only in exceptional cases as where there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy available to him, which may either be a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the lower court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking the appeal, he cannot avail himself of the relief provided in Rule 38. The rule is that relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence or a mistaken mode of procedure, otherwise the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has already been lost either because of inexcusable negligence or due to a mistake in the mode of procedure by counsel. x x x 

The mistake contemplated by Rule 38 of the Rules of Court pertains generally to mistake of fact, not of law, which relates to the case. The word "mistake" which grants relief from judgment, does not apply and was never intended to apply to a judicial error which the court might have committed in the trial. Such error may be corrected by means of an appeal. x x x  To reiterate, petition for relief is an equitable remedy that is allowed only in exceptional cases where there is no other available or adequate remedy which is not present in petitioner’s case. Thus, petitioner's resort to a petition for relief under Rule 38 was not proper and the CA correctly ruled that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the petition for relief from judgment (SAMONTE vs. S.F. NAGUIAT, INC. G.R. No. 165544, October 2, 2009, Third Division, Peralta, J.).

DECLARATORY RELIEF:

An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and determination of the validity of the written instrument and the judicial declaration of the parties’ rights or duties thereunder. The Court correctly made a distinction between the first and the second paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, describes the general circumstances in which a person may file a petition for declaratory relief, x x x may be brought before the appropriate RTC. The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court specifically refers to (1) an action for the reformation of an instrument, recognized under Articles 1359 to 1369 of the Civil Code; (2) an action to quiet title, authorized by Articles 476 to 481 of the Civil Code; and (3) an action to consolidate ownership required by Article 1607 of the Civil Code in a sale with a right to repurchase. These three remedies are considered similar to declaratory relief because they also result in the adjudication of the legal rights of the litigants, often without the need of execution to carry the judgment into effect. x x x 

It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court does not categorically require that an action to quiet title be filed before the RTC. It repeatedly uses the word "may" – that an action for quieting of title "may be brought under [the] Rule" on petitions for declaratory relief, and a person desiring to file a petition for declaratory relief "may x x x bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court." The use of the word "may" in a statute denotes that the provision is merely permissive and indicates a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option. In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, uses the word "shall" and explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve title to or possession of real property where the assessed value does not exceed P20,000.00. As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject property as stated in Tax Declaration No. 02-48386 is only P410.00; therefore, petitioners’ Complaint involving title to and possession of the said property is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC, not the RTC. (MALANA vs. TAPPA, G.R. No. 181303, September 17, 2009, Third Division, Chico-Nazario, J.).

DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED TO BE STATE WITNESS:

Turning an accused into a state witness is not a magic formula that cures all the deficiencies in the prosecution’s evidence.  The state witness cannot simply allege everything left unproved and automatically produce a conviction of the crime charged against the remaining accused.  Corroboration of the account of the state witness is key.  It is in fact a requirement for the discharge of an accused to be a state witness under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court that the testimony to be given can be substantially corroborated in its material points.

           

“Sec. 17.  Discharge of accused to be state witness. — When two or more persons are jointly charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state when, after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the court is satisfied that:

          (a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;

          (b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;

          (c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;

          (d)  Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and

          (e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.

            Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part of the trial. If the court denies the motion for discharge of the accused as state witness, his sworn statement shall be inadmissible in evidence” (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

 

          The Court is not unaware that as an exception to the general rule requiring corroboration, the uncorroborated testimony of a state witness may be sufficient when it is shown to be sincere in itself because it is given unhesitatingly and in a straightforward manner and full of details which, by their nature, could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought (People v. Sunga, G.R. No. 126029, March 27, 2003, 399 SCRA 624, 647-648). This exception, however, applies only if the state witness is an eyewitness since the testimony would then be direct evidence.  The above-quoted Section 17 of Rule 119 actually assumes that the testimony of the accused sought to be discharged as a state witness would constitute direct evidence (i.e., that he or she is an eyewitness) in that it requires that there is no other direct evidence, except the testimony of the said accused. 

         

Where, as here, the state witness is not an eyewitness, the testimony partakes of the nature of circumstantial evidence.  The rule on circumstantial evidence thus applies.  If the testimony is uncorroborated, it does not suffice.  It cannot merit full credence.  Again, the rule on circumstantial evidence requires that, among other things, there is more than one circumstance and the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.  The circumstantial evidence suffices to convict an accused of the crime charged only if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. The uncorroborated testimony of Felicita does not suffice to establish that appellant committed violence on Uy.  Neither does appellant’s flight.  The fact remains that the three persons present at around the time the crime was committed all fled thereafter.  Appellant’s involvement in every element of the crime charged must still be proved beyond reasonable doubt. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FELICIANO  ANABE y CAPILLAN, G.R. No.  179033,September 6, 2010,CARPIO MORALES, J.)  

PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE:

In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. "Preponderance of evidence" is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence." "Preponderance of evidence" is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. Rule 133, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides the guidelines in determining preponderance of evidence, thus:

In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number (CAVILE vs. LITANIA-HONG, G.R. No. 179540, March 13, 2009, Third Division, Chico-Nazario, J.).

COMPUTATION OF TIME:

The Supreme Court clarified that procedural rules are designed for the orderly conduct of proceedings and expeditious settlement of cases in the courts of law.  Like all rules, they are required to be followed and utter disregard of the same cannot be expediently rationalized by harping on the policy of liberal construction which was never intended as an unfettered license to disregard the letter of the law or, for that matter, a convenient excuse to substitute substantial compliance for regular adherence thereto.  When it comes to compliance with time rules, the Court cannot afford inexcusable delay. (J. TIOSEJO INVESTMENT CORP vs. SPOUSES BENJAMIN AND ELEANOR ANG, G.R. No. 174149, September 8, 2010, PEREZ, J.).

                                                             

 How to compute time. — In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of performance included. If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day (Section 1 of Rule 22 of the Rules of Court). x x x In Alma Russel vs. Teofista Ebasan, the Supreme Court ruled that when petitioner filed her petition for review with the appellate court on May 15, 2007, the same was well within the extended period for the filing thereof. This is true because petitioner’s Fifteen (15) days from April 28, 2007 would be May 13, 2007. This was, however, a Sunday. On the other hand, May 14, 2007, the following day, was a legal holiday—the holding of the national and local elections. Therefore, the filing of petition the petition on May 15, 2007 was done within the reglementary period. (ALMA B. RUSSEL vs. TEOFISTA EBASAN and AGAPITO AUSTRIA, G.R. No. 184542, April 23, 2010, NACHURA, J.:)

SERVICE OF PAPERS AND JUDGMENTS:

On many occasions, the Court has strictly construed the requirements of the proper service of papers and judgments. Both in Heirs of Delos Santos v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 139167, 29 June 2005, 462 SCRA 98 and Tuazon v. Molina, No. L-55697, 26 February 1981, 103 SCRA 365, the service of the trial courts decision at an adjacent office and the receipt thereof by a person not authorized by the counsel of record was held ineffective. Likewise, the service of the decision made at the ground floor instead of at the 9^th floor of a building in the address on record of petitioners counsel, was held invalid in PLDT v. NLRC, No. L-60050, 213 Phil. 362 (1984). In these cases, there was no constructive service of the decision even if the service was made at the offices adjacent to the address on record of the parties counsels and even if the copies eventually found their way to persons duly authorized to receive them. (See also Adamson Ozanan Educational Institution, Inc. v. Adamson University Faculty and Employees Association, G. R. No. 86819, 9 November 1989, 179 SCRA 279; BPI-Family Savings Bank, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 94925, 22 April 1991, 196 SCRA 242 cited in SPOUSES DOMINGO M. BELEN, ET. AL., vs. HON. PABLO R. CHAVEZ, et al. G.R. No. 175334, March 26, 2008, Second Division, Tinga, J.).

EXCEPTION TO THE PROSCRIPTION AGAINST AN AMENDMENT TO CONFER JURSIDICTION TO THE COURT:

The High Court pronounced that while it is a basic jurisprudential principle that an amendment cannot be allowed when the court has no jurisdiction over the original complaint and the purpose of the amendment is to confer jurisdiction on the court (Siasoco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132753, February 15, 1999, 303 SCRA 186, 196), the RTC in the case clearly had jurisdiction over the original complaint and the amendment of the complaint was then still a matter of right under Section 2, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court.  Ergo, the amendment of the complaint was in order. (IRENE SANTE AND REYNALDOSANTE vs. HON. EDILBERTO T. CLARAVALL, G.R. No. 173915, February 22, 2010, VLLARAMA, JR., J.). 

A DEFENDANT'S ANSWER SHOULD BE ADMITTED WHERE IT IS FILED BEFORE A DECLARATION OF DEFAULT:

Petitioner correctly points out that the rule is that a defendant's answer should be admitted where it is filed before a declaration of default and no prejudice is caused to the plaintiff. Indeed, where the answer is filed beyond the reglementary period but before the defendant is declared in default and there is no showing that defendant intends to delay the case, the answer should be admitted (Sablas v. Sablas, G.R. No. 144568, July 3, 2007, 526 SCRA 292, 298). x x x x 

In the case at bar, it is inconsequential that the trial court declared petitioner in default on the same day that petitioner filed its Answer. As reflected above, the trial court slept on petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss for almost a year, just as it also slept on respondents’ Motion to Declare petitioner in Default. It was only when petitioner filed a Motion to Withdraw Motion to Dismiss and to Admit Answer that it denied the Motion to Dismiss, and acted on/granted respondents’ Motion to Declare petitioner in Default. This is procedurally unsound. The policy of the law is to have every litigant's case tried on the merits as much as possible. Hence, judgments by default are frowned upon. A case is best decided when all contending parties are able to ventilate their respective claims, present their arguments and adduce evidence in support thereof. The parties are thus given the chance to be heard fully and the demands of due process are subserved. Moreover, it is only amidst such an atmosphere that accurate factual findings and correct legal conclusions can be reached by the courts. (SAN PEDRO CINEPLEX PROPERTIES vs. HEIRS OF MANUEL HUMADA ENAÑO, G.R. No. 190754, November 17, 2010, CARPIO MORALES, J.)

REMEDIES WHEN A PARTY IS DECLARED IN DEFAULT:

It is well-settled that a defendant who has been declared in default has the following remedies, to wit: he may, at any time after discovery of the default but before judgment, file a motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and that he has a meritorious defense; if judgment has already been rendered when he discovered the default, but before the same has become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial under Section 1(a) of Rule 37; if he discovered the default after the judgment has become final and xecutor, he may file a petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38; and he may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been presented by him. Thus, respondent, which had been declared in default, may file a notice of appeal and question the validity of the trial court’s judgment without being considered to have submitted to the trial court’s authority (B.D. LONGSPAN BUILDERS, INC. vs. R.S. AMPELOQUIO REALTY DEVELOPMENT, INC. G.R. No. 169919, September 11, 2009, First Division, Carpio, J.).

EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE THAT ALLEGATIONS NOT SPECIFICALLY DENIED ARE DEEMED ADMITTED:

Even granting that Rule 8, Section 11 of the Rules of Court finds application in the case, petitioners must remember that there remain averments that are not deemed admitted by the failure to deny the same. Among them are immaterial allegations and incorrect conclusions drawn from facts set out in the complaint. (Herrera, Remedial Law, Vol. I, p. 548 (2000 ed.).  Thus, even if respondents failed to file their answer, it does not mean that all averments found in the complaint will be considered as true and correct in their entirety, and that the forthcoming decision will be rendered in favor of the petitioners. We must not forget that even in administrative proceedings, it is still the complainant, or in this case the petitioners, who have the burden of proving, with substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint or in the formal charges (First United Construction Corporation v. Valdez, G.R. No. 154108, December 10, 2008, 573 SCRA 391, 399 cited in GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) vs. DINNAH VILLAVIZA ET. AL., G.R. No. 180291, July 27, 2010, MENDOZA, J.).

SPECIFIC DENIAL:

It is basic in remedial law that a defendant in a civil case must apprise the trial court and the adverse party of the facts alleged by the complaint that he admits and of the facts alleged by the complaint that he wishes to place into contention. The defendant does the former either by stating in his answer that they are true or by failing to properly deny them. There are two ways of denying alleged facts: one is by general denial, and the other, by specific denial (Friedenthal, et al., Civil Procedure, 2nd Edition, §§5.18 and 5.19).  In this jurisdiction, only a specific denial shall be sufficient to place into contention an alleged fact. Section 11, Rule 8, Rules of Court, provides:

Section 11. Allegations not specifically denied deemed admitted. ̶ Material averment in the complaint, other than those as to the amount of unliquidated damages, shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied. Allegations of usury in a complaint to recover usurious interest are deemed admitted if not denied under oath. (1a,R9).

Under Section 10, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, a specific denial of an allegation of the complaint may be made in any of three ways, namely: (a) a defendant specifies each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit and, whenever practicable, sets forth the substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial; (b) a defendant who desires to deny only a part of an averment specifies so much of it as is true and material and denies only the remainder; and (c) a defendant who is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment made in the complaint states so, which has the effect of a denial. x x x x x x  In other words, while the admission is admissible in evidence, its probative value is to be determined from the whole statement and others intimately related or connected therewith as an integrated unit. Although acts or facts admitted do not require proof and cannot be contradicted, however, evidence aliunde can be presented to show that the admission was made through palpable mistake.  The rule is always in favor of liberality in construction of pleadings so that the real matter in dispute may be submitted to the judgment of the court (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No. 166859, April 12, 2011, BERSAMIN, J.).

THE RULE ON PERMISSIVE COUNTERCLAIMS IN RELATION TO THE PAYMENT OF THE DOCKET FEES

Going now to the first assigned error, petitioner submits that its counterclaim for the rentals collected by Fernando from the CMTC is in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim in the original action of Fernando against petitioner for annulment of bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT No. 76183. Respondents, on the other hand, alleged that petitioner's counterclaim is permissive and its failure to pay the prescribed docket fees results into the dismissal of its claim.

To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not, the Court has devised the following tests: (a) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely the same? (b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff’s claim as well as the defendant’s counterclaim? and (d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim? A positive answer to all four questions would indicate that the counterclaim is compulsory. (Manuel C. Bungcayao , Sr., represented in this case by his Attorney-in-fact Romel R. Bungcayao, v. Fort Ilocandia Property Holdings and Development Corporation, G.R. No. 170483, April 19, 2010). Tested against the above-mentioned criteria, this Court agrees with the CA's view that petitioner's counterclaim for the recovery of the amount representing rentals collected by Fernando from the CMTC is permissive.

The evidence needed by Fernando to cause the annulment of the bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT is different from that required to establish petitioner's claim for the recovery of rentals. The issue in the main action, i.e., the nullity or validity of the bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT in favor of CMTC, is entirely different from the issue in the counterclaim, i.e., whether petitioner is entitled to receive the CMTC's rent payments over the subject property when petitioner became the owner of the subject property by virtue of the consolidation of ownership of the property in its favor. x x x x

The rule in permissive counterclaims is that for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees. This, petitioner did not do, because it asserted that its claim for the collection of rental payments was a compulsory counterclaim. Since petitioner failed to pay the docket fees, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over its permissive counterclaim. The judgment rendered by the RTC, insofar as it ordered Fernando to pay petitioner the rentals which he collected from CMTC, is considered null and void. Any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time, even on appeal before this Court. (Manuel C. Bungcayao , Sr., represented in this case by his Attorney-in-fact Romel R. Bungcayao, v. Fort Ilocandia Property Holdings and Development Corporation, G.R. No. 170483, April 19, 2010). (GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) vs. HEIRS OF FERNANDO F. CABALLERO, G.R. Nos. 158090, October 4, 2010, PERALTA, J.).

THE RULE ON PERMISSIVE COUNTERCLAIMS IN RELATION TO THE PAYMENT OF THE DOCKET FEES

Going now to the first assigned error, petitioner submits that its counterclaim for the rentals collected by Fernando from the CMTC is in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim in the original action of Fernando against petitioner for annulment of bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT No. 76183. Respondents, on the other hand, alleged that petitioner's counterclaim is permissive and its failure to pay the prescribed docket fees results into the dismissal of its claim.

To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not, the Court has devised the following tests: (a) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely the same? (b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff’s claim as well as the defendant’s counterclaim? and (d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim? A positive answer to all four questions would indicate that the counterclaim is compulsory. (Manuel C. Bungcayao , Sr., represented in this case by his Attorney-in-fact Romel R. Bungcayao, v. Fort Ilocandia Property Holdings and Development Corporation, G.R. No. 170483, April 19, 2010). Tested against the above-mentioned criteria, this Court agrees with the CA's view that petitioner's counterclaim for the recovery of the amount representing rentals collected by Fernando from the CMTC is permissive.

The evidence needed by Fernando to cause the annulment of the bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT is different from that required to establish petitioner's claim for the recovery of rentals. The issue in the main action, i.e., the nullity or validity of the bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT in favor of CMTC, is entirely different from the issue in the counterclaim, i.e., whether petitioner is entitled to receive the CMTC's rent payments over the subject property when petitioner became the owner of the subject property by virtue of the consolidation of ownership of the property in its favor. x x x x 

The rule in permissive counterclaims is that for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees. This, petitioner did not do, because it asserted that its claim for the collection of rental payments was a compulsory counterclaim. Since petitioner failed to pay the docket fees, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over its permissive counterclaim. The judgment rendered by the RTC, insofar as it ordered Fernando to pay petitioner the rentals which he collected from CMTC, is considered null and void. Any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time, even on appeal before this Court. (Manuel C. Bungcayao , Sr., represented in this case by his Attorney-in-fact Romel R. Bungcayao, v. Fort Ilocandia Property Holdings and Development Corporation, G.R. No. 170483, April 19, 2010). (GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) vs. HEIRS OF FERNANDO F. CABALLERO, G.R. Nos. 158090, October 4, 2010, PERALTA, J.).

THE RULE ON PERMISSIVE COUNTERCLAIMS IN RELATION TO THE PAYMENT OF THE DOCKET FEES

Going now to the first assigned error, petitioner submits that its counterclaim for the rentals collected by Fernando from the CMTC is in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim in the original action of Fernando against petitioner for annulment of bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT No. 76183. Respondents, on the other hand, alleged that petitioner's counterclaim is permissive and its failure to pay the prescribed docket fees results into the dismissal of its claim.

To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not, the Court has devised the following tests: (a) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely the same? (b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff’s claim as well as the defendant’s counterclaim? and (d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim? A positive answer to all four questions would indicate that the counterclaim is compulsory. (Manuel C. Bungcayao , Sr., represented in this case by his Attorney-in-fact Romel R. Bungcayao, v. Fort Ilocandia Property Holdings and Development Corporation, G.R. No. 170483, April 19, 2010). Tested against the above-mentioned criteria, this Court agrees with the CA's view that petitioner's counterclaim for the recovery of the amount representing rentals collected by Fernando from the CMTC is permissive.

The evidence needed by Fernando to cause the annulment of the bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT is different from that required to establish petitioner's claim for the recovery of rentals. The issue in the main action, i.e., the nullity or validity of the bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT in favor of CMTC, is entirely different from the issue in the counterclaim, i.e., whether petitioner is entitled to receive the CMTC's rent payments over the subject property when petitioner became the owner of the subject property by virtue of the consolidation of ownership of the property in its favor. x x x x 

The rule in permissive counterclaims is that for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees. This, petitioner did not do, because it asserted that its claim for the collection of rental payments was a compulsory counterclaim. Since petitioner failed to pay the docket fees, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over its permissive counterclaim. The judgment rendered by the RTC, insofar as it ordered Fernando to pay petitioner the rentals which he collected from CMTC, is considered null and void. Any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time, even on appeal before this Court. (Manuel C. Bungcayao , Sr., represented in this case by his Attorney-in-fact Romel R. Bungcayao, v. Fort Ilocandia Property Holdings and Development Corporation, G.R. No. 170483, April 19, 2010). (GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) vs. HEIRS OF FERNANDO F. CABALLERO, G.R. Nos. 158090, October 4, 2010, PERALTA, J.).

MOTION FOR INTERVENTION CAN BE FILED AT ANY TIME BEFORE RENDITION OF JUDGMENT BY THE TRIAL COURT:

The Rules provide explicitly that a motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. In the instant case, the Omnibus Motion for Intervention was filed only on July 22, 2008, after the Decision of the CA was promulgated on June 26, 2008.  x x x Thus, it cannot be denied that the Omnibus Motion for Intervention was belatedly filed. As the Supreme Court held in Rockland Construction Co., Inc. v. Singzon, Jr., no intervention is permitted after a decision has already been rendered. (A.M. No. RTJ-06-2002, November 24, 2006, 508 SCRA 1, 11 cited in Office of the Ombudsman vs. Sison, G.R. No. 185954, February 16, 2010, VELASCO JR., J.). 

COMPLAINT-IN-INTERVENTION

Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to enable him, her or it to protect or preserve a right or interest which may be affected by such proceedings. (Asia’s Emerging Dragon Corporation v. Department of Transportation and Communications, G.R. Nos. 169914 and 174166, March 24, 2008, 549 SCRA 44, 49). It is a proceeding in a suit or action by which a third person is permitted by the court to make himself a party, either joining plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint, or uniting with defendant in resisting the claims of plaintiff, or demanding something adversely to both of them; the act or proceeding by which a third person becomes a party in a suit pending between others; the admission, by leave of court, of a person not an original party to pending legal proceedings, by which such person becomes a party thereto for the protection of some right of interest alleged by him to be affected by such proceedings. (Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Presiding Judge, RTC Manila, Br. 39, G.R. No. 89909, September 21, 1990, 189 SCRA 820, 824).

Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court states:

SECTION 1. Who may intervene. — A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.

Under this Rule, intervention shall be allowed when a person has (1) a legal interest in the matter in litigation; (2) or in the success of any of the parties; (3) or an interest against the parties; (4) or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or disposition of property in the custody of the court or an officer thereof. (Alfelor v. Halasan, G.R. No. 165987, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 451, 460). Moreover, the court must take into consideration whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor’s right or interest can be adequately pursued and protected in a separate proceeding (MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY VS. HEIRS OF ESTANISLAO MIÑOZA, G.R. NO. 186045, 2 FEBRUARY 2011, SECOND DIVISION, PERALTA, J.) 

NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS:

Lis pendens which literally means pending suit refers to the jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over the property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until final judgment. (St. Mary of the Woods School, Inc. v. Office of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City, G.R. No. 174290 and G.R. No. 176116, January 20, 2009, 576 SCRA 713, 730; Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 146262, January 21, 2005, 449 SCRA 173, 186; Romero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142406, May 16, 2005, 458 SCRA 483, 492).  

Founded upon public policy and necessity, lis pendens is intended to keep the properties in litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated, and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation. (Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. v. Enriquez, supra; Romero v. Court of Appeals, supra, citing Lim v. Vera Cruz, 356 SCRA 386, 393 (2001).  Its notice is an announcement to the whole world that a particular property is in litigation and serves as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property^. (Yared v. Ilarde, 391 Phil. 722, 730 (2000). A notice of lis pendens, once duly registered, may be cancelled by the trial court before which the action involving the property is pending. This power is said to be inherent in the trial court and is exercised only under express provisions of law. (St. Mary of the Woods School, Inc. v. Office of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City, supra note 24; Fernandez v. Court of Appeals, 397 Phil. 205, 216 (2000). 

Accordingly, Section 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the trial court to cancel a notice of lis pendens where it is properly shown that the purpose of its annotation is for molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be annotated. Be that as it may, the power to cancel a notice of lis pendens is exercised only under exceptional circumstances, such as: where such circumstances are imputable to the party who caused the annotation; where the litigation was unduly prolonged to the prejudice of the other party because of several continuances procured by petitioner; where the case which is the basis for the lis pendens notation was dismissed for non prosequitur on the part of the plaintiff; or where judgment was rendered against the party who caused such a notation. In such instances, said notice is deemed ipso facto cancelled. (Fernandez v. Court of Appeals, supra, at 217, citing Regalado, Justice Florenz D., Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I, 5th Revised Edition, p. 145, 1988) (LU vs. LU YM, Sr. G.R. No. 153690, August 4, 2009, Special 3rd Division, Nachura, J.).

Supreme Court Invitation for the revision of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure

Hi Friends! I was invited by the Supreme Court to join the Committee that will propose amendments and revisions to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Should you have any suggestions and recommendations, you can e-mail me at profvillasis@yahoo.com or atty.christian_villasis@yahoo.com. I shall apreciate to receive your response the soonest. Thank you and best regards