JUSTICE ROBERTO ABAD: IT IS NOT NECESSARY THAT THE PERSON IN CHARGE OF THE DEFENDANT’S REGULAR PLACE OF BUSINESS BE SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED TO RECEIVE THE SUMMONS. IT IS ENOUGH THAT HE APPEARS TO BE IN CHARGE (EXCEPTION TO THE RULE ON SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF SUMMONS)

In Gentle Supreme Philippines, Inc. vs. Ricardo Consulta, the Supreme Court explained that in order to have a valid substituted service of summons, it is not necessary that the person in charge of the defendant’s regular place of business be specifically authorized to receive the summons. It is enough that he appears to be in charge.  Thus:

 There was valid substituted service of summons on Mr. Consulta at his place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

According to the sheriff’s return, which is prima facie evidence of the facts it states, he served a copy of the complaint on Canave, an authorized representative of both Consulta and Sarayba. Besides Consulta’s bare allegations, he did not present evidence to rebut the presumption of regularity on the manner that the sheriff performed his official duty. Nor did Consulta present clear and convincing evidence that Canave was not competent to receive the summons and the attached documents for him (Guanzon v. Arradaza, G.R. No. 155392, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 309, 318, citing Aboitiz International Forwarders, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142272, May 2, 2006, 488 SCRA 492, 506-507; Rubia v. Government Service Insurance System, 476 Phil. 623, 635 (2004); Spouses Madrigal v. Court of Appeals, 377 Phil. 345, 352 (1999).

In fact, in his petition for annulment of judgment, Consulta said that CTC had been apprised of the civil action through Canave.  In other words, Canave was a person charged with authority to receive court documents for the company as well as its officers who held office in that company. Absent contrary evidence, the veracity of the return’s content and its effectiveness stand. In fine, the Supreme Court has ruled that "it is not necessary that the person in charge of the defendant’s regular place of business be specifically authorized to receive the summons. It is enough that he appears to be in charge (Guanzon v. Arradaza, supra note 19, citing Gochangco v. CFI of Negros Occidental, 241 Phil. 48, 61 (1988).  In this case, Canave, a secretary whose job description necessarily includes receiving documents and other correspondence, would have the semblance of authority to accept the court documents.

It is true that this Court emphasized the importance of strict and faithful compliance in effecting substituted service. (See Robinson v. Miralles, G.R. No. 163584, December 12, 2006, 510 SCRA 678, 684, citing Paluwagan ng Bayan Savings Bank v. King, 254 Phil. 56, 58 (1989), [citing Arevalo v. Quilatan, 202 Phil. 256, 261 (1982) and Keister v. Judge Navarro, supra note 12, at 573]).  It must, however, be reiterated that when the rigid application of rules becomes a conduit for escaping one’s responsibility, the Court will intervene to set things right according to the rules (Robinson v. Miralles; Arevalo v. Quilatan; and Keister v. Judge Navarro). 

Further, Consulta does not deny a) that summons had been properly served on Sarayba, his vice-president, through Canave at the company’s office; b) that the summons on him was served on the same occasion also through Canave; c) that the sheriff had succeeded in garnishing his company’s bank deposits; and d) that his company subsequently made an offer to settle the judgment against it. The Court is not dumb as to believe that Consulta became aware of the suit only when the sheriff served a notice of execution sale covering his house and lot. (GENTLE SUPREME PHILIPPINES, INC., vs. RICARDO F. CONSULTA, G.R. No. 183182, September 1, 2010, ABAD, J.).