JURISPRUDENCE ON SHARI’A DISTRICT COURTS

Jurisdiction over Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Muslims

All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims, probate of wills, issuance of letters of administration or appointment of administrators or executors regardless of the nature or the aggregate value of the property shall be under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Shari’a District Courts (Article 143(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines cited in MONTAÑER vs. SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT, G.R. No. 174975, January 20, 2009, First Division, Puno, C.J.).

1.1.      The Supreme Court held that the Special Rules of Procedure in Shari’a Courts, Ijra-at-al-Mahakim al Shari’a, proscribe "the filing of a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer which would stop the running of the period to file an answer and cause undue delay" xxxxx Moreover, the Shari’a District Court is not deprived of jurisdiction simply because petitioners raised as a defense the allegation that the deceased is not a Muslim. The Shari’a District Court has the authority to hear and receive evidence to determine whether it has jurisdiction, which requires an a priori determination that the deceased is a Muslim. If after hearing, the Shari’a District Court determines that the deceased was not in fact a Muslim, the district court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction (MONTAÑER vs. SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT, G.R. No. 174975, January 20, 2009, First Division, Puno, C.J.).

1.2.      Although private respondents designated the pleading filed before the Shari’a District Court as a "Complaint" for judicial partition of properties, it is a petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the decedent. It contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim (Musa v. Moson, G.R. No. 95574, August 16, 1991, 200 SCRA 715, 719) such as the fact of Alejandro Montañer, Sr.’s death as well as the allegation that he is a Muslim. The said petition also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs, so far as known to the private respondents, and a probable list of the properties left by the decedent, which are the very properties sought to be settled before a probate court. Furthermore, the reliefs prayed for reveal that it is the intention of the private respondents to seek judicial settlement of the estate of the decedent (Vda. de Manalo v. Court of Appeals, 402 Phil. 152, 161 (2001). These include the following: (1) the prayer for the partition of the estate of the decedent; and (2) the prayer for the appointment of an administrator of the said estate (MONTAÑER vs. SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT, G.R. No. 174975, January 20, 2009, First Division, Puno, C.J.).

1.3.      THE proceedingS for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the deceased, is CONSIDERED a special proceeding 

The proceedings before the court a quo are for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the deceased, is a special proceeding. Section 3(c) of the Rules of Court (Rules) defines a special proceeding as "a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." The Supreme Court has applied the Rules, particularly the rules on special proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim (Musa v. Moson, supra note 23, at 721-722). In a petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of estate, the applicants seek to establish the fact of death of the decedent and later to be duly recognized as among the decedent’s heirs, which would allow them to exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent (Vda. de Manalo v. Court of Appeals, 402 Phil. 152, 161 (2001). Here, the respondents seek to establish the fact of Alejandro Montañer, Sr.’s death and, subsequently, for private respondent Almahleen Liling S. Montañer to be recognized as among his heirs, if such is the case in fact.  x x x x x  Petitioners’ argument, that the prohibition against a decedent or his estate from being a party defendant in a civil action (Ventura v. Hon. Militante, 374 Phil. 562 (1999) applies to a special proceeding such as the settlement of the estate of the deceased, is misplaced. Unlike a civil action which has definite adverse parties, a special proceeding has no definite adverse party. x x x As a special proceeding, the purpose of the settlement of the estate of the decedent is to determine all the assets of the estate, pay its liabilities (Pacific Banking Corporation Employees Organization v. Court of Appeals, 312 Phil. 578, 593 (1995) and to distribute the residual to those entitled to the same (Vda. de Manalo v. Court of Appeals, 402 Phil. 152, 161 (2001).

1.4.      Exception to THE REQUIREMENT OF Notice of Hearing

The present case calls for a liberal construction of the rules on notice of hearing, because the rights of the petitioners were not affected. This Court has held that an exception to the rules on notice of hearing is where it appears that the rights of the adverse party were not affected (Victory Liner, Inc. v. Malinias, G.R. No. 151170, May 29, 2007, 523 SCRA 279, 291-292). The purpose for the notice of hearing coincides with procedural due process (Vlason Enterprises Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 369 Phil. 269, 299 (1999) for the court to determine whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the motion, as the Rules do not fix any period within which to file a reply or opposition (Victory Liner, Inc. v. Malinias, G.R. No. 151170, May 29, 2007, 523 SCRA 279, 291-292). In probate proceedings, "what the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard" (De Borja, et al. v. Tan, et al., 93 Phil. 167, 171 (1953).  x x x  In the case at bar, as evident from the Shari’a District Court’s order dated January 17, 2006, petitioners’ counsel received a copy of the motion for reconsideration in question. Petitioners were certainly not denied an opportunity to study the arguments in the said motion as they filed an opposition to the same. Since the Shari’a District Court reset the hearing for the motion for reconsideration in the same order, petitioners were not denied the opportunity to object to the said motion in a hearing. Taken together, these circumstances show that the purpose for the rules of notice of hearing, procedural process, was duly observed. x x x To deny the Shari’a District Court of an opportunity to determine whether it has jurisdiction over a petition for the settlement of the estate of a decedent alleged to be a Muslim would also deny its inherent power as a court to control its process to ensure conformity with the law and justice. To sanction such a situation simply because of a lapse in fulfilling the notice requirement will result in a miscarriage of justice. x x x x x  In the event that a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a decedent is pending, questions regarding heirship, including prescription in relation to recognition and filiation, should be raised and settled in the said proceeding (Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran, G.R. No. 155555, August 16, 2005, 467 SCRA 184, 198). The court, in its capacity as a probate court, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the decedent (Uriarte v. Court of First Instance Negros Occidental, et al., 144 Phil. 205, 215-216 (1970).  In the case at bar, the determination of the heirs of the decedent depends on an affirmative answer to the question of whether the Shari’a District Court has jurisdiction over the estate of the decedent (MONTAÑER vs. SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT, G.R. No. 174975, January 20, 2009, First Division, Puno, C.J.).