JUSTICE ROBERTO ABAD: EFFECT OF STRIKING THE TESTIMONY OF A LONE WITNESS

when the plaintiff’s lone witness died due to illness before the adverse witness could cross-examine him, the striking out of the former’s testimony altogether wiped out the required authentication for those exhibits: Since the Estate presented its documentary exhibits and had the same authenticated through Myron’s testimony, it stands to reason that the striking out of the latter’s testimony altogether wiped out the required authentication for those exhibits. They become inadmissible unless the RTC, in its discretion, reopens the trial upon a valid ground and permits the Estate to rectify its mistakes” (SPOUSES DELA CRUZ vs. PAPA IV, G.R. No. 185899, December 8, 2010, ABAD, J.). 

JUSTICE ROBERTO ABAD: THE PRESENCE OF THE ACCUSED IS NOT REQUIRED FOR THE VALIDITY OF THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION.

In Alfredo Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court held that there is no reason which exists for suspending or interrupting the conduct of the forfeiture proceedings before the Sandiganbayan.  It stated that it cannot subscribe to the Romualdezes’ claim that they are entitled to a new preliminary investigation since they had no opportunity to take part in the one held in 1991, in OMB-0-91-0820. The High Court aptly pointed out that:

Respondents admit that the subpoena for that investigation had been sent to their last known residence at the time it was conducted. The Republic also categorically insists that the appropriate subpoena had been served on the Romualdezes. Accordingly, the Ombudsman could not be faulted for proceeding with the investigation of the Romualdezes’ cases when they did not show up despite notice being sent to them at their last known residence.

The New Rules on Criminal Procedure "does not require as a condition sine qua non to the validity of the proceedings [in the preliminary investigation] the presence of the accused for as long as efforts to reach him were made, and an opportunity to controvert the evidence of the complainant is accorded him.

The obvious purpose of the rule is to block attempts of unscrupulous respondents to thwart the prosecution of offenses by hiding themselves or by employing dilatory tactics" (Mercado v. Court of Appeals, 315 Phil. 657, 662 (1995). In sum, there is no reason for suspending or interrupting the conduct of the forfeiture proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. (ALFREDO T. ROMUALDEZ vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 16160, July 13, 2010, ABAD, J.).

JUSTICE ROBERTO ABAD: A SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS APT WHEN THE ESSENTIAL FACTS OF THE CASE ARE UNCONTESTED OR THE PARTIES DO NOT RAISE ANY GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT.

A summary judgment is apt when the essential facts of the case are uncontested or the parties do not raise any genuine issue of fact. (Rivera v. Solidbank Corporation, G.R. No. 163269, April 19, 2006, 487 SCRA 512, 535, cited in Bitanga v. Pyramid Construction Engineering Corporation, G.R. No. 173526, August 28, 2008, 563 SCRA 544, 560).

In Bank of Philippine Islands vs. Spouses Norman and Angelina Yu, the Supreme Court explained that to resolve the issue of the excessive charges allegedly incorporated into the auction bid price, the RTC simply had to look at a) the pleadings of the parties; b) the loan agreements, the promissory note, and the real estate mortgages between them; c) the foreclosure and bidding documents; and d) the admissions and other disclosures between the parties during pre-trial. Since the parties admitted not only the existence, authenticity, and genuine execution of these documents but also what they stated, the trial court did not need to hold a trial for the reception of the evidence of the parties.

Be that as it may, BPI contends that a summary judgment was not proper given the following issues that the parties raised: 1) whether or not the loan agreements between them were valid and enforceable; 2) whether or not the Yus have a cause of action against BPI; 3) whether or not the Yus are proper parties in interest; 4) whether or not the Yus are estopped from questioning the foreclosure proceeding after entering into a compromise agreement with Magnacraft; 5) whether or not the penalty charges and fees and expenses of litigation and publication are excessive; and 6) whether or not BPI violated the Truth in Lending Act. (RULES OF COURT, Rule 35, Sec. 5).

But, the Supreme Court held that these are issues that could be readily resolved based on the facts established by the pleadings and the admissions of the parties. (A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, Guidelines to be Observed by Trial Court Judges and Clerks of Court in Conduct of Pre-trial and Use of Deposition-Discovery Measures, August 16, 2004).  Indeed, BPI has failed to name any document or item of fact that it would have wanted to adduce at the trial of the case. A trial would have been such a great waste of time and resources. Otherwise stated, a summary judgment is apt when the essential facts of the case are uncontested or the parties do not raise any genuine issue of fact. (BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, INC., vs. SPS. NORMAN AND ANGELINA YU, G.R. No. 184122, January 20, 2010, ABAD, J.).

JUSTICE ROBERTO ABAD: THE FILIAL PRIVILEGE RULE APPLIES ONLY TO “DIRECT” ASCENDANTS AND DESCENDANTS, A FAMILY TIE CONNECTED BY A COMMON ANCESTRY - A STEPDAUGHTER HAS NO COMMON ANCESTRY BY HER STEPMOTHER.

              Under Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence “No person may be compelled to testify against his parents, other direct ascendants, children or other direct descendants.”

              The afore-quoted rule is an adaptation from a similar provision in Article 315 of the Civil Code that applies only in criminal cases. But those who revised the Rules of Civil Procedure chose to extend the prohibition to all kinds of actions, whether civil, criminal, or administrative, filed against parents and other direct ascendants or descendants.

              In Emma Lee vs. Court of Appeals, the person (TIU) who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the stepmother of petitioner Emma Lee. The Supreme Court declared that the privilege cannot apply to them because the rule applies only to “direct” ascendants and descendants, a family tie connected by a common ancestry.  A stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her stepmother.

               Relative thereto, Article 965 of the New Civil Code provides: “The direct line is either descending or ascending. The former unites the head of the family with those who descend from him. The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends.” Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner Emma Lee. (EMMA K. LEE vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 177861, July 13, 2010, ABAD, J.).

JUSTICE ROBERTO ABAD: IT IS NOT NECESSARY THAT THE PERSON IN CHARGE OF THE DEFENDANT’S REGULAR PLACE OF BUSINESS BE SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED TO RECEIVE THE SUMMONS. IT IS ENOUGH THAT HE APPEARS TO BE IN CHARGE (EXCEPTION TO THE RULE ON SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF SUMMONS)

In Gentle Supreme Philippines, Inc. vs. Ricardo Consulta, the Supreme Court explained that in order to have a valid substituted service of summons, it is not necessary that the person in charge of the defendant’s regular place of business be specifically authorized to receive the summons. It is enough that he appears to be in charge.  Thus:

 There was valid substituted service of summons on Mr. Consulta at his place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

According to the sheriff’s return, which is prima facie evidence of the facts it states, he served a copy of the complaint on Canave, an authorized representative of both Consulta and Sarayba. Besides Consulta’s bare allegations, he did not present evidence to rebut the presumption of regularity on the manner that the sheriff performed his official duty. Nor did Consulta present clear and convincing evidence that Canave was not competent to receive the summons and the attached documents for him (Guanzon v. Arradaza, G.R. No. 155392, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 309, 318, citing Aboitiz International Forwarders, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142272, May 2, 2006, 488 SCRA 492, 506-507; Rubia v. Government Service Insurance System, 476 Phil. 623, 635 (2004); Spouses Madrigal v. Court of Appeals, 377 Phil. 345, 352 (1999).

In fact, in his petition for annulment of judgment, Consulta said that CTC had been apprised of the civil action through Canave.  In other words, Canave was a person charged with authority to receive court documents for the company as well as its officers who held office in that company. Absent contrary evidence, the veracity of the return’s content and its effectiveness stand. In fine, the Supreme Court has ruled that "it is not necessary that the person in charge of the defendant’s regular place of business be specifically authorized to receive the summons. It is enough that he appears to be in charge (Guanzon v. Arradaza, supra note 19, citing Gochangco v. CFI of Negros Occidental, 241 Phil. 48, 61 (1988).  In this case, Canave, a secretary whose job description necessarily includes receiving documents and other correspondence, would have the semblance of authority to accept the court documents.

It is true that this Court emphasized the importance of strict and faithful compliance in effecting substituted service. (See Robinson v. Miralles, G.R. No. 163584, December 12, 2006, 510 SCRA 678, 684, citing Paluwagan ng Bayan Savings Bank v. King, 254 Phil. 56, 58 (1989), [citing Arevalo v. Quilatan, 202 Phil. 256, 261 (1982) and Keister v. Judge Navarro, supra note 12, at 573]).  It must, however, be reiterated that when the rigid application of rules becomes a conduit for escaping one’s responsibility, the Court will intervene to set things right according to the rules (Robinson v. Miralles; Arevalo v. Quilatan; and Keister v. Judge Navarro). 

Further, Consulta does not deny a) that summons had been properly served on Sarayba, his vice-president, through Canave at the company’s office; b) that the summons on him was served on the same occasion also through Canave; c) that the sheriff had succeeded in garnishing his company’s bank deposits; and d) that his company subsequently made an offer to settle the judgment against it. The Court is not dumb as to believe that Consulta became aware of the suit only when the sheriff served a notice of execution sale covering his house and lot. (GENTLE SUPREME PHILIPPINES, INC., vs. RICARDO F. CONSULTA, G.R. No. 183182, September 1, 2010, ABAD, J.).

JUSTICE ROBERTO ABAD: Statements of mere conclusions of law expose the complaint to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action

A cause of action is understood to be the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant in violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff (CHUA vs. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. G.R. No. 182311, August 19, 2009, Third Division, Chico-Nazario, J.).

And judgment would be right only if the facts he alleges constitute a cause of action that consists of three elements: (1) the plaintiff’s legal right in the matter; (2) the defendant’s corresponding obligation to honor or respect such right; and (3) the defendant’s subsequent violation of the right. Absent any of these, the complaint would have failed to state a cause of action. The test of sufficiency of a complaint is whether or not, assuming the truth of the facts that plaintiff alleges in it, the court can render judgment granting him the judicial assistance he seeks.

Essentially, however, in the case of Arthur Del Rosario, et. al.,  vs. Hellenor Donato,Jr. et. al., all that the Del Rosarios allege is that respondents NBI agents used an unlawfully obtained search warrant against them, evidenced by the fact that, contrary to the sworn statements used to get such warrant, the NBI agents found no fake Marlboro cigarettes in petitioner Alexander del Rosario's premises.

             But a judicially ordered search that fails to yield the described illicit article does not of itself render the court's order "unlawful." The Del Rosarios did not allege that respondents NBI agents violated their right by fabricating testimonies to convince the RTC of Angeles City to issue the search warrant. Their allegation that the NBI agents used an unlawfully obtained search warrant is a mere conclusion of law. While a motion to dismiss assumes as true the facts alleged in the complaint, such admission does not extend to conclusions of law. (Drilon v. Court of Appeals, 409 Phil. 14, 28 (2001). Statements of mere conclusions of law expose the complaint to a motion to dismiss on ground of failure to state a cause of action. (Philippine National Bank v. Encina, G.R. No. 174055, February 12, 2008, 544 SCRA 608, 620).

Further, the allegation that the search warrant in this case was served in a malicious manner is also not sufficient. Allegations of bad faith, malice, and other related words without ultimate facts to support the same are mere conclusions of law (Drilon v. Court of Appeals, supra).

            The Del Rosarios' broad assertion in their complaint that the search was conducted "in full and plain view of members of the community" does not likewise support their claim that such search was maliciously enforced. There is nothing inherently wrong with search warrants being enforced in full view of neighbors. In fact, when the respondent or his representative is not present during the search, the rules require that it be done in the presence of two residents of the same locality. These safeguards exist to protect persons from possible abuses that may occur if searches were done surreptitiously or clandestinely. Accordingly, statements of mere conclusions of law expose the complaint to a motion to dismiss on ground of failure to state a cause of action (ARTHUR DEL ROSARIO, et al. vs. HELLENOR D. DONATO, Jr. et al. March 5, 2010, G.R. No.180595, Second Division, Abad, J.).

JUSTICE ROBERTO A. ABAD: A SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT IS LIKE ANY COMPLAINT AND THE RULE IS THAT THE FILING FEES DUE ON A COMPLAINT NEED TO BE PAID UPON ITS FILING.

In Do-ALL Metals Industries vs. Security Bank, the Supreme Court observed that what the plaintiffs failed to pay merely was the filing fees for their supplemental complaint.  Thus, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ action from the moment they filed their original complaint accompanied by the payment of the filing fees due on the same. In other words, the plaintiffs’ non-payment of the additional filing fees due on their additional claims did not divest the RTC of the jurisdiction it already had over the case (PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 38, 62 (1998). x x x x x

However, as to the damages that plaintiffs claim under their supplemental complaint, their stand that the RTC committed no error in admitting the complaint even if they had not paid the filing fees due on it since such fees constituted a lien anyway on the judgment award is not correct.

The Supreme Court clarified that the after-judgment lien, which implies that payment depends on a successful execution of the judgment, applies to cases where the filing fees were incorrectly assessed or paid or where the court has discretion to fix the amount of the award. (Rules of Court, Rule 141, Section 2 (Fees in Lien). None of these circumstances obtain in the case.

Here, the supplemental complaint specified from the beginning the actual damages that the plaintiffs sought against the Bank. Still plaintiffs paid no filing fees on the same. And, while petitioners claim that they were willing to pay the additional fees, they gave no reason for their omission nor offered to pay the same. They merely said that they did not yet pay the fees because the RTC had not assessed them for it.

 But a supplemental complaint is like any complaint and the rule is that the filing fees due on a complaint need to be paid upon its filing. (Section 1 (Payment of Fees) in relation to Section 7 (Fees collectible by the Clerks of Regional Trial Courts for filing an action). The rules do not require the court to make special assessments in cases of supplemental complaints.

To aggravate plaintiffs’ omission, although the Bank brought up the question of their failure to pay additional filing fees in its motion for reconsideration, plaintiffs made no effort to make at least a late payment before the case could be submitted for decision, assuming of course that the prescription of their action had not then set it in. Clearly, plaintiffs have no excuse for their continuous failure to pay the fees they owed the court. Consequently, the trial court should have treated their Supplemental Complaint as not filed. x x x x

Plaintiffs of course point out that the Bank itself raised the issue of non-payment of additional filing fees only after the RTC had rendered its decision in the case. The implication is that the Bank should be deemed to have waived its objection to such omission. But it is not for a party to the case or even for the trial court to waive the payment of the additional filing fees due on the supplemental complaint. Only the Supreme Court can grant exemptions to the payment of the fees due the courts and these exemptions are embodied in its rules (DO-ALL METALS INDUSTRIES vs. SECURITY BANK CORPoration, G.R. No. 176339, January 10, 2011, ABAD, J.).

JUSTICE ROBERTO ABAD: THE OMBUDSMAN’S AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF FORFEITURE CASES INVOLVING ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH

 In Alfredo Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court citing Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 90529, August 16, 1991, 200 SCRA 667, 682-683 clarified that the Ombudsman has under its general investigatory powers the authority to investigate forfeiture cases where the alleged ill-gotten wealth had been amassed before February 25, 1986.  Thus:

“While we do not discount the authority of the Ombudsman, we believe and so hold that the exercise of his correlative powers to both investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth is restricted only to cases for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth which were amassed after February 25, 1986.

Prior to said date, the Ombudsman is without authority to initiate such forfeiture proceedings. We, however, uphold his authority to investigate cases for the forfeiture or recovery of such ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed even before the aforementioned date, pursuant to his general investigatory power under Section 15(1) of Republic Act No. 6770” (Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 90529, August 16, 1991, 200 SCRA 667, 682-683).

 Be that as it may, in the same case, the High Court observed that although it was the Ombudsman who conducted the preliminary investigation, it was the OSG that instituted the action in Civil Case 0167 in line with the Court’s ruling in the above-cited Republic and other cases that followed (ALFREDO T. ROMUALDEZ vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 16160, July 13, 2010, ABAD, J.).

JURISPRUDENCE ON SHARI’A DISTRICT COURTS

Jurisdiction over Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Muslims

All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims, probate of wills, issuance of letters of administration or appointment of administrators or executors regardless of the nature or the aggregate value of the property shall be under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Shari’a District Courts (Article 143(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines cited in MONTAÑER vs. SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT, G.R. No. 174975, January 20, 2009, First Division, Puno, C.J.).

1.1.      The Supreme Court held that the Special Rules of Procedure in Shari’a Courts, Ijra-at-al-Mahakim al Shari’a, proscribe "the filing of a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer which would stop the running of the period to file an answer and cause undue delay" xxxxx Moreover, the Shari’a District Court is not deprived of jurisdiction simply because petitioners raised as a defense the allegation that the deceased is not a Muslim. The Shari’a District Court has the authority to hear and receive evidence to determine whether it has jurisdiction, which requires an a priori determination that the deceased is a Muslim. If after hearing, the Shari’a District Court determines that the deceased was not in fact a Muslim, the district court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction (MONTAÑER vs. SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT, G.R. No. 174975, January 20, 2009, First Division, Puno, C.J.).

1.2.      Although private respondents designated the pleading filed before the Shari’a District Court as a "Complaint" for judicial partition of properties, it is a petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the decedent. It contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim (Musa v. Moson, G.R. No. 95574, August 16, 1991, 200 SCRA 715, 719) such as the fact of Alejandro Montañer, Sr.’s death as well as the allegation that he is a Muslim. The said petition also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs, so far as known to the private respondents, and a probable list of the properties left by the decedent, which are the very properties sought to be settled before a probate court. Furthermore, the reliefs prayed for reveal that it is the intention of the private respondents to seek judicial settlement of the estate of the decedent (Vda. de Manalo v. Court of Appeals, 402 Phil. 152, 161 (2001). These include the following: (1) the prayer for the partition of the estate of the decedent; and (2) the prayer for the appointment of an administrator of the said estate (MONTAÑER vs. SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT, G.R. No. 174975, January 20, 2009, First Division, Puno, C.J.).

1.3.      THE proceedingS for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the deceased, is CONSIDERED a special proceeding 

The proceedings before the court a quo are for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the deceased, is a special proceeding. Section 3(c) of the Rules of Court (Rules) defines a special proceeding as "a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." The Supreme Court has applied the Rules, particularly the rules on special proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim (Musa v. Moson, supra note 23, at 721-722). In a petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of estate, the applicants seek to establish the fact of death of the decedent and later to be duly recognized as among the decedent’s heirs, which would allow them to exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent (Vda. de Manalo v. Court of Appeals, 402 Phil. 152, 161 (2001). Here, the respondents seek to establish the fact of Alejandro Montañer, Sr.’s death and, subsequently, for private respondent Almahleen Liling S. Montañer to be recognized as among his heirs, if such is the case in fact.  x x x x x  Petitioners’ argument, that the prohibition against a decedent or his estate from being a party defendant in a civil action (Ventura v. Hon. Militante, 374 Phil. 562 (1999) applies to a special proceeding such as the settlement of the estate of the deceased, is misplaced. Unlike a civil action which has definite adverse parties, a special proceeding has no definite adverse party. x x x As a special proceeding, the purpose of the settlement of the estate of the decedent is to determine all the assets of the estate, pay its liabilities (Pacific Banking Corporation Employees Organization v. Court of Appeals, 312 Phil. 578, 593 (1995) and to distribute the residual to those entitled to the same (Vda. de Manalo v. Court of Appeals, 402 Phil. 152, 161 (2001).

1.4.      Exception to THE REQUIREMENT OF Notice of Hearing

The present case calls for a liberal construction of the rules on notice of hearing, because the rights of the petitioners were not affected. This Court has held that an exception to the rules on notice of hearing is where it appears that the rights of the adverse party were not affected (Victory Liner, Inc. v. Malinias, G.R. No. 151170, May 29, 2007, 523 SCRA 279, 291-292). The purpose for the notice of hearing coincides with procedural due process (Vlason Enterprises Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 369 Phil. 269, 299 (1999) for the court to determine whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the motion, as the Rules do not fix any period within which to file a reply or opposition (Victory Liner, Inc. v. Malinias, G.R. No. 151170, May 29, 2007, 523 SCRA 279, 291-292). In probate proceedings, "what the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard" (De Borja, et al. v. Tan, et al., 93 Phil. 167, 171 (1953).  x x x  In the case at bar, as evident from the Shari’a District Court’s order dated January 17, 2006, petitioners’ counsel received a copy of the motion for reconsideration in question. Petitioners were certainly not denied an opportunity to study the arguments in the said motion as they filed an opposition to the same. Since the Shari’a District Court reset the hearing for the motion for reconsideration in the same order, petitioners were not denied the opportunity to object to the said motion in a hearing. Taken together, these circumstances show that the purpose for the rules of notice of hearing, procedural process, was duly observed. x x x To deny the Shari’a District Court of an opportunity to determine whether it has jurisdiction over a petition for the settlement of the estate of a decedent alleged to be a Muslim would also deny its inherent power as a court to control its process to ensure conformity with the law and justice. To sanction such a situation simply because of a lapse in fulfilling the notice requirement will result in a miscarriage of justice. x x x x x  In the event that a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a decedent is pending, questions regarding heirship, including prescription in relation to recognition and filiation, should be raised and settled in the said proceeding (Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran, G.R. No. 155555, August 16, 2005, 467 SCRA 184, 198). The court, in its capacity as a probate court, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the decedent (Uriarte v. Court of First Instance Negros Occidental, et al., 144 Phil. 205, 215-216 (1970).  In the case at bar, the determination of the heirs of the decedent depends on an affirmative answer to the question of whether the Shari’a District Court has jurisdiction over the estate of the decedent (MONTAÑER vs. SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT, G.R. No. 174975, January 20, 2009, First Division, Puno, C.J.).