WHEN STOLEN PROPERTY IS FOUND IN THE POSSESSION OF ONE, NOT THE OWNER, AND WITHOUT A SATISFACTORY EXPLANATION OF SUCH POSSESSION, HE IS PRESUMED TO BE THE THIEF:

     Since the legal presumption of taking operated to shift the burden of evidence on appellant to disprove it, his uncorroborated version that he bought the watch from Gemma does not persuade. (People vs. Anabe, G.R. No. 179033, September 6, 2010, Carpio Morales, J.).

A PRESUMPTION IS AN INFERENCE OF THE EXISTENCE OR NON-EXISTENCE OF A FACT WHICH COURTS ARE PERMITTED TO DRAW FROM PROOF OF OTHER FACTS:

     Presumptions are classified into presumptions of law and presumptions of fact. Presumptions of law are, in turn, either conclusive or disputable.(In The Matter of the Intestate Estates of the Deceased Josefa Delgado et al. vs. Heirs of Marciana Rustia Vda. De Damian et al. G.R. No. 155733 January 27, 2006 Corona, J.).

DISTANCE BETWEEN PLACES:

     Judicial notice could be taken of the travel time by car from San Pedro, Laguna to Pasig City, Metro Manila, because it is capable of unquestionable demonstration, and nowadays is already of public knowledge, especially to commuters. The Supreme Court therefore found no error in the trial court’s finding that it was not impossible for petitioner to be at the scene of the crime, despite his alibi that he was engaged in intelligence work in San Pablo Laguna that same afternoon of October 19, 1990. (Vergara vs. People, G.R. No. 128720, January 23, 2002 Quisumbing, J.).

PROBATE PROCEEDINGS: THE SUPREME COURT TOOK JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE PROBATE PROCEEDINGS REGARDING THE WILL OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS:

     The Supreme Court upheld the grant by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of letters testamentary in solidum to Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. and Imelda Romualdez-Marcos as executors of the last will and testament of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos (Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos II,( G.R. Nos. 130371 &130855, 4 August 2009, 595 SCRA 43 cited in Republic of the Philippines vs. Ma. Imelda “Imee” R. Marcos-Manotocg. G.R. No. 171701, February 8, 2012, Sereno, J.).

UNDER SEC. 53.1 OF THE SECURITIES REGULATION CODE, A CRIMINAL COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF ANY LAW OR RULE ADMINISTERED BY THE SEC MUST FIRST BE FILED WITH IT. IF THE SEC FINDS THAT THERE IS PROBABLE CAUSE, THEN IT SHOULD REFER THE CASE TO THE DOJ.

     A  criminal charge for the violation of the SRC is a specialized dispute.  Hence it must first be referred to an administrative agency of special competence, i.e., the SEC.  Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, court will not determine a controversy involving a question within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the specialized knowledge and expertise of said administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.  (Baviera v. Paglinawan, G.R. No. 168380, February 8, 2007).

DOUBLE JEOPARDY: PRIOR CONVICTION OR ACQUITTAL OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE BARS SUBSEQUENT PROSECUTION FOR THE SAME QUASI-OFFENSE REGARDLESS OF ITS VARIOUS RESULTING ACTS:

     The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts.  (JASON IVLER y AGUILAR vs. HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, G.R. No. 172716, November 17, 2010, CARPIO, J.).

DOUBLE JOEPARDY:

     Double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. A first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. Since we have held that the March 17, 2004 Order granting the motion to dismiss was committed with grave abuse of discretion, then respondents were not acquitted nor was there a valid and legal dismissal or termination of the case. Ergo, the fifth requisite which requires the conviction and acquittal of the accused, or the dismissal of the case without the approval of the accused, was not met. Thus, double jeopardy has not set in. (JOSEPH C. CEREZO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 185230, June 1, 2011, NACHURA, J.)

AMENDMENT AND SUBSTITUTION: INFORMATION MAY BE AMENDED, IN FORM OR IN SUBSTANCE.

     Sec. 14 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that an information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. (Karlo Angelo Dabalos vs. Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, G.R. No. 193960, January 7, 2013, Perlas-Bernabe, J.)

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PREAMBLE AND THE ACCUSATORY PORTION OF THE INFORMATION:

     The Court’s discussion in People vs. Villanueva G.R. No. 138364 October 15, 2003 on the relationship between the preamble and the accusatory portion of the Information is noteworthy, and we quote: The preamble or opening paragraph should not be treated as a mere aggroupment of descriptive words and phrases. It is as much an essential part [of] the Information as the accusatory paragraph itself. The preamble in fact complements the accusatory paragraph which draws its strength from the preamble. It lays down the predicate for the charge in general terms; while the accusatory portion only provides the necessary details. The preamble and the accusatory paragraph, together, form a complete whole that gives sense and meaning to the indictment. x x x The Information sheet must be considered, not by sections or parts, but as one whole document serving one purpose, i.e., to inform the accused why the full panoply of state authority is being marshaled against him. Our task is not to determine whether allegations in an indictment could have been more artfully and exactly written, but solely to ensure that the constitutional requirement of notice has been fulfilled x x x.  (Soledad vs. People G.R. No. 184274 February 23, 2011 Nachura, J.)

WHEN A PRIVATE PROSECUTOR MAY PROSECUTE A CASE EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR:

     A private prosecutor may prosecute the criminal action up to the end of the trial even in the absence of the public prosecutor if he authorized to do so in writing. This written authorization shall be given by either the Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecutor. The written authorization in order to be given effect must however, be appointed by the court (Sec. 5, Rule 110, Rules of court; A.M. No. 02-2-07-SC, April 10, 2002 effective May 1, 2002). The written authorization to the private prosecutor shall be given because of either of the following reasons: (a) the public prosecutor has a heavy work load or, (b) there is a lack of public prosecutor (sec. 5, Rule 110, Rules of Court; A.M. No. 02-2-07-SC, April 10, 2002 effective May 1, 2002). 

SECTION 5, RULE 135 OF THE RULES OF COURT GIVES THE TRIAL COURT AMPLE INHERENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS TO EFFECTIVELY CONTROL THE CONDUCT OF ITS PROCEEDINGS:

     There is nothing arbitrary about Judge Yadao’s policy of allowing only one public prosecutor and one private prosecutor to address the court during the hearing for determination of probable cause but permitting counsels representing the individual accused to do so. A criminal action is prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. The burden of establishing probable cause against all the accused is upon him, not upon the private prosecutors whose interests lie solely in their clients’ damages claim. Besides, the public and the private prosecutors take a common position on the issue of probable cause. On the other hand, each of the accused is entitled to adopt defenses that are personal to him. (People vs. Hon. Ma. Theresa L. Dela Torre Yadao, G.R. No. 162144-54; November 13, 2012, Abad J.)

MANDAMUS IS A PROPER REMEDY WHEN RESOLUTION OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT IS TAINTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION:

     The writ of mandamus is not available to control discretion neither may it be issued to compel the exercise of discretion. Truly, it is a matter of discretion on the part of the prosecutor to determine which persons appear responsible for the commission of a crime. However, the moment he finds one to be so liable it becomes his inescapable duty to charge him therewith and to prosecute him for the same. In such a situation, the rule loses its discretionary character and becomes mandatory. (METROPOLITAN BANK and TRUST COMPANY vs. ROGELIO REYNADO and JOSE C. ADRANDEA, G.R. No. 164538, August 9, 2010, DEL CASTILLO, J.).

THE PROSECUTOR HAS THE DISCRETION TO DETERMINE WHO MUST BE CHARGED WITH WHAT CRIME OR FOR WHAT OFFENSE:

     x x x x The proper remedy under the circumstances where persons who ought to be charged were not included in the complaint of the private complainant is definitely not to dismiss the complaint but to include them in the information. (METROPOLITAN BANK and TRUST COMPANY vs. ROGELIO REYNADO and JOSE C. ADRANDEA, G.R. No. 164538, August 9, 2010, DEL CASTILLO, J.).

THE PROSECUTOR IS NOT MANDATED TO REQUIRE THE RES PONDENT TO SUBMIT HIS COUNTER-AFFIDAVITS TO OPPOSE THE COMPLAINT:

     While probable cause should first be determined before an information may be filed in court, the prosecutor is not mandated to require the respondent to submit his counter-affidavits to oppose the complaint. In the determination of probable cause, the prosecutor may solely rely on the complaint, affidavits and other supporting documents submitted by the complainant. If he does not find probable cause, the prosecutor may dismiss outright the complaint or if he finds probable cause or sufficient reason to proceed with the case, he shall issue a resolution and file the corresponding information (TEODORO C. BORLONGAN, Jr. et al. vs. MAGDALENO M. PEÑA, et al. G.R. No. 143591, May 5, 2010, Second Division, Perez, J.).

GEOGRAPHICAL DIVISIONS:

     The Court takes judicial notice of the existence of both barangay Tigbe and barangay Bigte, in Norzagaray, Bulacan. In fact, the trial court erred grievously in not taking judicial notice of the barangays within its territorial jurisdiction, believing the prosecution’s submission that there was only barangay Tigbe, and that barangay Bigte in the certification was a typographical error. (Del Rosario vs. People G.R. No. 142295.  May 31, 2001 Pardo, J.).

OFFICIAL ACTS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES:

     It is mandatory for the Court to take judicial notice of the official acts of the President of the Philippines, who heads the executive branch of our government. The court shall take judicial notice of the same without introduction of evidence. Since the act of cancellation by President Macapagal-Arroyo of the proposed ZTE-NBN Project during the meeting of October 2, 2007 with the Chinese President in China is considered as an official act of the executive department, the Court must take judicial notice of such official act without need of evidence. In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160, the Supreme Court took judicial notice of the announcement by the Office of the President banning all rallies and canceling all permits for public assemblies following the issuance of Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 and General Order No. 5.  In Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. No. 146710, March 2, 2001, 353 SCRA 452, the Supreme Court also resorted to judicial notice in resolving the factual ingredient of the petition. (Sulpico vs. NEDA et. al, G.R. No. 178830, July 14, 2008).

DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR:

     Res ipsa loquitur is a rebuttable presumption or inference that the defendant was negligent. The presumption only arises upon proof that the instrumentality causing injury was in the defendant's exclusive control, and that the accident was one (1) which ordinarily does not happen in the absence of negligence. It is a rule of evidence whereby negligence of the alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from the mere fact that the accident happened, provided that the character of the accident and circumstances attending it lead reasonably to the belief that in the absence of negligence it would not have occurred and that the thing which caused injury is shown to have been under the management and control of the alleged wrongdoer. (Bontilao vs. Gerona, G.R. No. 176675, September 15, 2010, Villarama, Jr., J.).

PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY:

     A party in whose favor the legal presumption exists may rely on and invoke such legal presumption to establish a fact in issue. He need not introduce evidence to prove that fact. For, a presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed. However, it cannot be over-emphasized, that while a fact thus prima facie established by legal presumption shall, unless overthrown, stand as proved, the presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 of the Family Code may be availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis therefor, i.e., that the child's parents were legally married and that his/her conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage. Else, the presumption of law that a child is legitimate does not arise. (Belen Sagad Angeles vs. Aleli 'Corazon Angeles Maglaya, G.R. No. 153798).

SUPPRESSION OF TESTIMONY:

     Under Rule 131, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the rule that “evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced” does not apply if (a) the evidence is at the disposal of both parties; (b) the suppression was not willful; (c) it is merely corroborative or cumulative; and (d) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege. Plainly, there was no suppression of evidence in this case.  First, the defense had the opportunity to subpoena Rowena even if the prosecution did not present her as a witness.  Instead, the defense failed to call her to the witness stand.  Second, Rowena was certified to be suffering from “Acute Psychotic Depressive Condition” and thus “cannot stand judicial proceedings yet.” The non-presentation, therefore, of Rowena was not willful.  Third, in any case, while Rowena was the victim, Nimfa was also present and in fact witnessed the violation committed on her sister. (People vs. Padrigone, G.R. No. 137664, May 9, 2002, Ynares-Santiago, J.).

DUPLICITOUS OFFENSES:

     The Rules prohibit the filing of duplicitous information to avoid confusing the accused in preparing his defense.  By duplicity of charges is meant a single complaint or information that charges more than one offense. x x x   Otherwise stated, there is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges more than one offense. In this case, however, Soriano was faced not with one information charging more than one offense, but with more than one information, each charging a different offense - violation of DOSRI Rules in one, and estafa through falsification of commercial documents in the others. Ilagan, on the other hand, was charged with estafa through falsification of commercial documents in separate informations. Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the Informations (SORIANO vs. PEOPLE, G.R. Nos. 159517-18, June 30, 2009, Third Division, Nachura, J.).

BURDEN OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL CASES:

     When an accused invokes self-defense, the burden of proof to show that the killing was justified shifts to him.  Even if the prosecution evidence may be weak, it could not be disbelieved after his open admission owing authorship of the killing.  However, to implicate a co-accused as a co-principal, conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.  In the absence of conspiracy, the responsibility of the two accused is individual, not collective. Otherwise stated, when the accused invoke self-defense, the burden of proof is shifted to them to prove that the killing was justified and that they incurred no criminal liability therefor.  They must rely on the strength of their own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if the latter is weak, it could not be disbelieved after their open admission of responsibility for the killing. (People vs. Tan, G.R. No. 132324, September 28, 1999, Panganiban, J.). 

THE BURDEN OF PROOF MAY BE ON THE PLAINTIFF OR THE DEFENDANT:

     The party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.  The burden of proof may be on the plaintiff or the defendant.  It is on the defendant if he alleges an affirmative defense which is not a denial of an essential ingredient in the plaintiff’s cause of action, but is one which, if established, will be a good defense – i.e., an “avoidance” of the claim.  Indeed, “in the final analysis, the party upon whom the ultimate burden lies is to be determined by the pleadings, not by who is the plaintiff or the defendant.” Burden of proof is the duty of any party to present evidence to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law, which is preponderance of evidence in civil cases.  The party, whether plaintiff or defendant, who asserts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof to obtain a favorable judgment.  Upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts, though in the course of trial, once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to the defendant to controvert the plaintiff's prima facie case; otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of the plaintiff.  It is the burden of evidence which shifts from party to party depending upon the exigencies of the case in the course of trial. x x x  The term prima facie evidence denotes evidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain the proposition it supports or to establish the facts. Prima facie means it is “sufficient to establish a fact or raise a presumption unless disproved or rebutted” (REPUBLIC vs. SANDIGANBAYAN EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., ET AL., April 12, 2011, G.R. No. 166859, CARPIO MORALES, J.).