WHEN INJUNCTION MAY BE ISSUED TO RESTRAIN CRIMINAL PROSECUTION:

     It is an established doctrine that injunction will not lie to enjoin a criminal prosecution because public interest requires that criminal acts be immediately investigated and prosecuted for the protection of society (Asutilla v. PNB, 225 Phil. 40, 43 (1986). However, it is also true that various decisions of this Court have laid down exceptions to this rule, among which are: a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;  c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub[-]judice;  d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent; g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; h. Where there is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance;  j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied;  and] [k.] Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners.  (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. JOSEPH "JOJO" V. GREY, G.R. No. 180109, July 26, 2010, NACHURA, J.)

PRINCIPLE OF JUDICIAL HIERARCHY OF COURTS:

     A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (“inferior”) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. (CONSTANCIO F. MENDOZA AND SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY OF BALATASAN, BULALACAO, ORIENTAL MINDORO VS. MAYOR ENRILO VILLAS ET AL., G.R. NO. 187256, FEB. 23, 2011, VELASCO, JR., J.)

GENERAL PRINCIPLES:

     the Supreme Court now has the sole authority to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts. (GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) vs. HEIRS OF FERNANDO F. CABALLERO, G.R. Nos. 158090, October 4, 2010, PERALTA, J.).

PRE-TRIAL IS MANDATORY IN CHARACTER:

     The mandatory character of pre-trial is embodied in Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999, and found its way in Section 2, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, which imposes a duty upon the plaintiff to promptly move ex parte that the case be set for pre-trial.  x x x x  To further show that the Court is serious in implementing the rules on pre-trial, in Alviola v. Avelino, A.M. No. MTJ-P-08-1697, February 29, 2008, the Supreme Court imposed the penalty of suspension on a judge who merely failed to issue a pre-trial order within ten (10) days after the termination of the pre-trial conference as mandated by Paragraph 8, Title I (A) of A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC.  x x x Here, respondent judge failed to conduct the pre-trial conference itself.  It is elementary and plain that the holding of such a pre-trial conference is mandatory and failure to do so is inexcusable. When the law or procedure is so elementary, such as the provisions of the Rules of Court, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. (NPC VS. ADIONG, A.M. NO. RTJ-07-2060, JULY 27, 2011, VILLARAMA, J.)

FORMAL OFFER OF EVIDENCE:

    The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.  The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. (Rule 132, Sec. 34, Rules of Court). The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties. Unless and until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for which such document is offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper barren of probative weight. (WESTMONT INVESTMENT CORPORATION VS. AMOS FRANCIS, JR., G.R. NO. 194128, DECEMBER 7, 2011, MENDOZA, J.).

THE RULES OF COURT DOES NOT PROHIBIT A PARTY FROM REQUESTING THE COURT TO ALLOW IT TO PRESENT ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE EVEN AFTER IT HAS RESTED ITS CASE.

   Any such opportunity, however, for the ultimate purpose of the admission of additional evidence is already addressed to the sound discretion of the court.  (Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 4th Division, G.R. No. 152375, December 16, 2011, Brion, J.)

LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE:

     law of the case doctrine applies in a situation where an appellate court has made a ruling on a question on appeal and thereafter remands the case to the lower court for further proceedings; the question settled by the appellate court becomes the law of the case at the lower court and in any subsequent appeal. (VIOS vs. PANTANGCO, JR., G.R. No. 163103, February 6, 2009, Second Division, Brion, J.).

EXECUTION AND SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENTS:

     In determining properties to be levied upon, the Rules require the sheriff to levy only on those “properties of the judgment debtor” which are “not otherwise exempt from execution.”  (Golden Sun Finance Corp. vs. Ricardo Albano, A.M. No. P-11-2888, July 27, 2011 BRION, J.).

OPINION OF AN EXPERT WITNESS:

     Section 49, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court states that the opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training, which he is shown to possess, may be received in evidence. The use of the word “may” signifies that the use of opinion of an expert witness is permissive and not mandatory on the part of the courts.  Allowing the testimony does not mean, too, that courts are bound by the testimony of the expert witness.  The testimony of an expert witness must be construed to have been presented not to sway the court in favor of any of the parties, but to assist the court in the determination of the issue before it, and is for the court to adopt or not to adopt depending on its appreciation of the attendant facts and the applicable law.  It has been held of expert testimonies: Although courts are not ordinarily bound by expert testimonies, they may place whatever weight they may choose upon such testimonies inaccordance with the facts of the case. The relative weight and sufficiency of expert testimony is peculiarly within the province of the trial court to decide, considering the ability and character of the witness, his actions upon the witness stand, the weight and process of the reasoning by which he has supported his opinion, his possible bias in favor of the side for whom he testifies, the fact that he is a paid witness, the relative opportunities for study and observation of the matters about which he testifies, and any other matters which deserve to illuminate his statements.  The opinion of the expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to be considered by the court in view of all the facts and circumstances in the case and when common knowledge utterly fails, the expert opinion may be given controlling effect.  The problem of the credibility of the expert witness and the evaluation of his testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of abuse of discretion. (Tabao vs. People, G.R. No. 187246, July 20, 2011, Brion, J.).

TESTIMONY OR DEPOSITION AT A FORMER PROCEEDING:

     Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is an entirely different provision. While a former testimony or deposition appears under the Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, the classification of former testimony or deposition as an admissible hearsay is not universally conceded. (Jovito R. Salonga, Philippine Law of Evidence, p. 540, 2nd ed., 1958.) A fundamental characteristic of hearsay evidence is the adverse party’s lack of opportunity to cross-examine the out-of-court declarant. However, Section 47, Rule 130 explicitly requires, inter alia, for the admissibility of a former testimony or deposition that the adverse party must have had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness or the deponent in the prior proceeding. This opportunity to cross-examine though is not the ordinary cross-examination (Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court) afforded an adverse party in usual trials regarding “matters stated in the direct examination or connected therewith.” Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court contemplates a different kind of cross-examination, whether actual or a mere opportunity, whose adequacy depends on the requisite identity of issues in the former case or proceeding and in the present case where the former testimony or deposition is sought to be introduced.  (Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 4th Division, G.R. No. 152375, December 16, 2011, Brion, J.).

ENTRIES IN OFFICIAL RECORDS MADE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTY BY A PUBLIC OFFICER OF THE PHILIPPINES, OR BY A PERSON IN THE PERFORMANCE OF A DUTY SPECIALLY ENJOINED BY LAW, ARE PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF THE FACTS THEREIN STATED” (Rule 130, Sec. 44, Rules of Court).

     In the herein case, although complainant made it appear that she has evidence to prove that there was anomaly in the notarization of the subject documents, she failed to present the same. An attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges preferred against him until the contrary is proved and that as an officer of the court he has performed his duties in accordance with his oath.  The burden of proof rests upon the complainant to overcome the presumption and establish his charges by a clear preponderance of evidence (Rizalina M. Gemina vs. Atty. Isidro Madamba, A.C. No. 6689, August 24, 2011, Brion, J.).

ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE AND THE PROBATIVE WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE:

     Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence) is to be considered at all. On the other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the question of whether or not it proves an issue. (RICO ROMMEL ATIENZA vs. BOARD OF MEDICINE and EDITHA SIOSON, G.R. No. 177407, February 9, 2011, NACHURA, J.).

ADMISSION AGAINST INTEREST:

     The joint affidavits are very solid pieces of evidence in the petitioners' favor.  They constitute admissions against interest made by the respondents under oath.  An admission against interest is the best evidence that affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute, (Heirs of Miguel Franco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123924, December 11, 2003) based on the presumption that no man would declare anything against himself unless such declaration is true. (Republic vs. Bautista, G.R. No. 169801, September 11, 2007)  It is fair to presume that the declaration corresponds with the truth, and it is his fault if it does not. (Rufina Patis Factory v. Alusitain, G. R. No. 146202, July 14, 2004) Taghoy vs. Tigol, G.R. No. 159665, August 03, 2010, Brion, J.).

ADMISSION BY SILENCE:

     The rule allowing silence of a person to be taken as an implied admission of the truth of the statements uttered in his presence is applicable in criminal cases. But before the silence of a party can be taken as an admission of what is said, it must appear: (1) that he heard and understood the statement; (2) that he was at liberty to interpose a denial; (3) that the statement was in respect to some matter affecting his rights or in which he was then interested, and calling, naturally, for an answer; (4) that the facts were within his knowledge; and (5) that the fact admitted or the inference to be drawn from his silence would be material to the issue. It is noteworthy that throughout the entire process, and despite the many opportunities given to respondent, he refused to comment and present his side.  The gravity of the charges and the weight of the evidence against him would have prompted an innocent man to come out and clear his name.  However, he opted to maintain his silence. The respondent’s refusal to face the charges against him head-on is contrary to the principle in criminal law that the first impulse of an innocent man, when accused of wrongdoing, is to express his innocence at the first opportune time. For his silence and inaction can easily be misinterpreted as a defiance to the directives issued, or worse, an admission of guilt. Moreover, silence is admission if there was chance to deny, especially if it constitutes one of the principal charges against her).  Besides, assuming without admitting that accused did take flight and left the country, we can conclude that this is a clear indication of guilt. (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Bernardino, A.M. No. P-97-1258, January 31, 2005, Per Curiam). 

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65:

     As extraordinary writs, both Sections 1 (certiorari) and 3 (mandamus), Rule 65 of the Rules of Court require, as a pre-condition for these remedies, that there be no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. (Erdito Quarto vs. The Hon. Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo, et al, G.R. No. 169042,  October 5, 2011, Brion, J.)

THE COURT IS GUIDED BY THE FOLLOWING JURISPRUDENCE WHEN CONFRONTED WITH THE ISSUE OF CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES ON APPEAL:

     First, the Court gives the highest respect to the RTC’s evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses, considering its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of a witness on the stand.  From its vantage point, the trial court is in the best position to determine the truthfulness of witnesses. (People vs. Conrado Laog y Ramin, G.R. No. 178321, October 5, 2011).  Second, absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the RTC’s assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the lower court’s findings, particularly when no significant facts and circumstances, affecting the outcome of the case, are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded. And third, the rule is even more stringently applied if the Court of Appeals concurred with the Regional Trial Court. (People of the Phils. vs. Julieto Sanchez , G.R. No. 197815, February 8, 2012, Brion, J.)

TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE, TO BE BELIEVED, MUST NOT ONLY COME FROM CREDIBLE LIPS BUT MUST BE CREDIBLE IN SUBSTANCE.

     A story that defies reason and logic and above all runs against the grain of common experience cannot persuade. (People  vs. Rodel Singson, G.R. No. 194719, September 21, 2011, Abad, J.).

WHATEVER IS NOT FOUND IN THE WRITING IS UNDERSTOOD TO HAVE BEEN WAIVED AND ABANDONED.

     The petitioner does not dispute the due execution and the authenticity of these documents, (Permanent Savings and Loan Bank vs. Velarde (G.R. No. 140608, September 23, 2004) particularly the Agreement. However, he claims that since the Agreement does not reflect the true intention of the parties, the Affidavit was subsequently executed in order to reflect the parties’ true intention. The petitioner’s argument calls to for the application of the parol evidence rule, i.e., when the terms of an agreement are reduced to writing, the written agreement is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of these terms can be admitted other than what is contained in the written agreement.  Whatever is not found in the writing is understood to have been waived and abandoned.  To avoid the operation of the parol evidence rule, the Rules of Court allows a party to present evidence modifying, explaining or adding to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading, as in this case, the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties. The failure of the written agreement to express the true intention of the parties is either by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or accident, which nevertheless did not prevent a meeting of the minds of the parties. (Leoveras vs. Valdez, G.R. No. 169985, June 15, 2011, Brion, J.).

UNDER THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE, NO ADDITIONAL OR CONTRADICTORY TERMS TO THIS WRITTEN AGREEMENT CAN BE ADMITTED TO SHOW THAT, AT OR BEFORE THE SIGNING OF THE DOCUMENT, OTHER OR DIFFERENT TERMS WERE ORALLY AGREED UPON BY THE PARTIES.

     (Sps. Agbada v. Inter-Urban Developers, Inc., 438 Phil. 168, 192 (2002).  Thus, the terms of the Katibayan should be the prevailing terms of the transaction between the parties, not any oral or side agreement the petitioner alleged. (Dulce Pamintuan vs. People of The Philippines, G.R. No. 172820, June 23, 2010, Brion, J.).

APPEALS:

     objection to the admissibility of evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. (People of the Philippines vs. Sitti Domado, G.R. No. 172971, June 16, 2010, Brion, J.)

DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL OR ESTOPPEL BY LACHES:

In Tijam v. Sibonghanoy (131 Phil. 556 (1968), the party-litigant actively participated in the proceedings before the lower court and filed pleadings therein. Only 15 years thereafter, and after receiving an adverse Decision on the merits from the appellate court, did the party-litigant question the lower court’s jurisdiction. Considering the unique facts in that case, the Supreme Court held that estoppel by laches had already precluded the party-litigant from raising the question of lack of jurisdiction on appeal. In Figueroa v. People, G.R. No. 147406, 14 July 2008, 558 SCRA 63, the Supreme Court cautioned that Tijam must be construed as an exception to the general rule and applied only in the most exceptional cases whose factual milieu is similar to that in the latter case (REPUBLIC VS. BANTIGUE POINT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, G. R. NO. 162322, MARCH 14, 2012, SERENO, J.). 

APPLICATION OF NEYPES DOCTRINE IN CRIMINAL CASES:

     While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Court's pronouncement of a "fresh period" to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Judith Yu vs. Hon. Rosa Samson-Tatad, G. R. No. 170979, February 9, 2011, brion, j.).

ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT:

     Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a recourse equitable in character and allowed only in exceptional cases where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of petitioner” (PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY VS. PHILIPPINE GOLF DEVELOPMENT & EQUIPMENT, INC., G.R. NO. 176628, MARCH 19, 2012, BRION, J.).

SUSPENSION OF ARRAIGNMENT:

The grounds for suspension of arraignment are provided under Section 11, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

SEC. 11. Suspension of Arraignment. – Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases: (a)    The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose; (b)   There exists a prejudicial question; and (c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; Provided, that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.

     In Samson v. Daway, G.R. Nos. 160054-55, July 21, 2004, 434 SCRA 612, the Court explained that while the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the afore-cited provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.  It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.  (SPOUSES ALEXANDER TRINIDAD VS. VICTOR ANG, G.R. No. 192898, January 31, 2011, BRION, J.)

PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45:

     The jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the CA via Rule 45 is generally limited to reviewing errors of law or jurisdiction. the above rule is not ironclad. There are instances in which factual issues may be resolved by this Court, to wit: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals goes beyond the issues of the case, and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellees; (7) the findings of fact of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court (in this case, the Labor Arbiter and NLRC); (8) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition, as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs, are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. (Nelson B. Gan vs. Galderma Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 177167, January 17, 2013, Peralta, J.)

EXCEPTION:

     When the factual findings of the CA conflict with those of the labor authorities, the Court is forced to review the evidence on record. (Sampaguita Auto Transport Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commmission, G.R. No. 197384, January 30, 2013, Brion, J.)

APPELLATE JURISDICTION:

     An appeal taken to either the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed. (Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90; Goco vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No.  157449 April 6, 2010 Brion, J.)

TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES: THE COURT MAY GRANT EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE MEMORANDA, BUT THE NINETY (90) DAY PERIOD FOR DECIDING THE CASE SHALL NOT BE INTERRUPTED THEREBY.

     No less than the Constitution sets the limits on this all-important aspect in the administration of justice.  It mandates that lower courts have three (3) months or ninety (90) days within which to decide cases or matters submitted to them for resolution. Also, the Code of Judicial Conduct requires judges to dispose of the Court’s business promptly and decide cases within the prescribed period.  (Tilan vs. Piscoso-Flor A.M. No. RTJ-09-2188 January 10, 2011 Brion, J.)

TO AVOID THE OPERATION OF THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE, THE RULES OF COURT ALLOWS A PARTY TO PRESENT EVIDENCE MODIFYING, EXPLAINING OR ADDING TO THE TERMS OF THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT IF HE PUTS IN ISSUE IN HIS PLEADING, THE FAILURE OF THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT TO EXPRESS THE TRUE INTENT AND AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES.

     The failure of the written agreement to express the true intention of the parties is either by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or accident, which nevertheless did not prevent a meeting of the minds of the parties (Article 1359 of the Civil Code of the Philippines) (MODESTO LEOVERAS VS. CASIMERO VALDEZ, G.R. NO. 169985, JUNE 15, 2011, BRION, J.).

ARRAIGNMENT:

     An arraignment is that stage where, in the mode and manner required by the Rules, an accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. The accused is formally informed of the charges against him, to which he enters a plea of guilty or not guilty (Albert v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 164015, 26 February 2009, 580 SCRA 279). Section 1(g), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court and the last clause of Section 7 of RA 8493 otherwise known as the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, mean the same thing, that the 30-day period shall be counted from the time the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused, which is when the accused appears before the court. The grounds for suspension of arraignment are provided under Section 11, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court applies suppletorily in matters not provided under the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman or the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner failed to show that any of the instances constituting a valid ground for suspension of arraignment obtained in this case. Thus, the Sandiganbayan committed no error when it proceeded with petitioner’s arraignment, as mandated by Section 7 of RA 8493. (BRIG. GEN. (Ret.) JOSE RAMISCAL, JR. VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. Nos. 172476-99, September 15, 2010, second division, CARPIO, J.).

PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL:

   Order granting a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense is not governed by Section 8 of Rule 117.  While the provision on provisional dismissal is found within Rule 117 (Motion to Quash), it does not follow that a motion to quash results in a provisional dismissal to which Section 8, Rule 117 applies.  Hence, the time-bar rule does not apply to the dismissal of the information and the case may be re-opened if the trial court finds that the quashal was improper. (LOS BAÑOS vs. PEDRO, G.R. No. 173588, April 22, 2009, En Banc, Brion, J.).

PARTIES:

   There is no law which vest juridical or legal personality upon a sole proprietorship nor empower it to file or defend an action in court.  (ROGER V. NAVARRO, vs. HON. JOSE L. ESCOBIDO, G.R. No.  153788, November 27, 2009, BRION, J.).

PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL:

     A case is provisionally dismissed if the following requirements concur: (1) the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused, or the accused, moves for a provisional dismissal (sin perjuicio) of his case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for its provisional dismissal; (2) the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case; (3) the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; and (4) the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case” There are sine quanon requirements in the application of the time-bar rule stated in the second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117. It also ruled that the time-bar under the foregoing provision is a special procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute, making the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that the lapse of the time-bar operates to extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the accused. (LOS BAÑOS vs. PEDRO, G.R. No. 173588, April 22, 2009, En Banc, Brion, J.).

EXECUTION AND SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENTS:

     general rule: the Rule on Execution by Motion or by Independent Action UNDER SECTION 6, RULE 39 APPLIES ONLY TO CIVIL ACTIONS AND NOT TO SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS such as an ex parte petition for the issuance of the writ of possession as it is not in the nature of a civil action. (SPOUSES ERNESTO and VICENTA TOPACIO, vs. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS and MORTGAGE BANK, G.R. No. 157644, November 17, 2010, BRION, J.).

A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 IS NOT THE PROPER REMEDY AGAINST AN ORDER DENYING A MOTION TO QUASH.

     The accused should instead go to trial, without prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had invoked in his motion and, if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law. (LYNDON D. BOISER vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 180299, January 31, 2008, NACHURA, J.).

AS A RULE, THE DENIAL OF A MOTION TO QUASH IS AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER AND IS NOT APPEALABLE;

     an appeal from an interlocutory order is not allowed under Section 1(b), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Neither can it be a proper subject of a petition for certiorari which can be used only in the absence of an appeal or any other adequate, plain and speedy remedy. (Santos vs. People, G.R. No. 173176, August 26, 2008) The plain and speedy remedy upon denial of an interlocutory order is to proceed to trial. Thus, a direct resort to a special civil action for certiorari is an exception rather than the general rule, and is a recourse that must be firmly grounded on compelling reasons. (Galzote vs. Briones G.R. No. 164682 September 14, 2011 Brion, J.)

PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT DEMANDS THAT UNWAVERING EXACTITUDE BE OBSERVED IN ESTABLISHING THE CORPUS DELICTI - THE BODY OF THE CRIME WHOSE CORE IS THE CONFISCATED ILLICIT DRUG.

     Thus, every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be established. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in buy-bust operations as it ensures that doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of the exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would, thus, include a testimony about the every link in the chain, from the moment the item was seized to the time it was offered in court as evidence, such that every person who handled the same would admit as to how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. The same witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. It is from the testimony of every witness who handled the evidence from which a reliable assurance can be derived that the evidence presented in court is one and the same as that seized from the accused. Due to the procedural lapses pointed out above, serious uncertainty hangs over the identification of the seized shabu that the prosecution introduced into evidence. In effect, the prosecution failed to fully prove the elements of the crime charged, creating a reasonable doubt on the criminal liability of the accused. (People of the Philippines, vs. Erlinda Capuno Y Tison, G.R. No. 185715 January 19, 2011, Brion, J.).

MODES OF APPEAL:

Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides the three modes of appeal, which are as follows: “Section 2.  Modes of appeal. —

(a)     Ordinary appeal. — The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.  No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require.  In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.

(b)     Petition for review. — The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in accordance with Rule 42.

(c)     Appeal by certiorari. — In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45” (emphasis supplied). 

          The first mode of appeal, the ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, is brought to the CA from the RTC, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, and resolves questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal, the petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, is brought to the CA from the RTC, acting in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, and resolves questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal, the appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, is brought to the Supreme Court and resolves only questions of law (HEIRS OF NICOLAS S. CABIGAS VS. MELBA L. LIMBACO ET AL., G.R. NO. 175291, JULY 27, 2011, BRION, J.).