IN DETERMINING PROPERTIES TO BE LEVIED UPON, THE RULES REQUIRE THE SHERIFF TO LEVY ONLY ON THOSE “PROPERTIES OF THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR” WHICH ARE “NOT OTHERWISE EXEMPT FROM EXECUTION.”

           For purposes of the levy, a property is deemed to belong to the judgment debtor if he holds a beneficial interest in such property that he can sell or otherwise dispose of for value.( Feria and Noche, Civil Procedure Annotated, Volume II (2001 ed.), p. 45, citing Reyes v. Grey, 21 Phil. 73, 76 (1911).

  In a contract of mortgage, the debtor retains beneficial interest over the property notwithstanding the encumbrance, since the mortgage only serves to secure the fulfillment of the principal obligation. Indeed, even if the debtor defaults, this fact does not operate to vest in the creditor the ownership of the property; the creditor must still resort to foreclosure proceedings.  Thus, a mortgaged property may still be levied upon by the sheriff to satisfy the judgment debtor’s obligations, as what happened in the present case.  After ascertaining the judgment debtor’s (Reyes’) interest over the car, the respondent properly enforced the levy thereon — an act that, to our mind, is in accordance with the Rules of Court. 

It was thus irrelevant for the complainant to argue that had the respondent checked the car’s certificate of registration, the respondent would have been aware of the encumbrance.  The encumbrance, until foreclosed, will not in any way affect the judgment debtor’s rights over the property or exempt the property from the levy.  Even the pendency of the proceeding for replevin that the complainant instituted would not serve to prevent the sheriff from levying on the car, since Reyes’ default and the complainant’s right to foreclose still had to be settled in the proceeding. (In Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation v. Yllas Lending Corporation (G.R. No. 158997, October 6, 2008, 567 SCRA 454, 471).

          We emphasize that a sheriff’s duty to execute a writ is simply ministerial, Philippine Bank of Communications v. Torio, 348 Phil. 74, 84 (1998) and he is bound to perform only those tasks stated under the Rules of Court and no more.  Any interest a third party may have on the property levied upon by the sheriff to enforce a judgment is the third party’s responsibility to protect through the remedies provided under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.  Thus, we can not hold the respondent liable on the ground that the complainant cites. If at all, the respondent should have required, as a matter of sound established practice, the production of the certificate of registration, but this is an altogether different matter that we do not here pass upon (Golden Sun Finance Corporation vs. Ricardo R. Albano, A.M. No. P-11-2888, July 27, 2011 BRION, J.).