objectives of barangay conciliation

           The primordial objective of Presidential Decree No. 1508 is to reduce the number of court litigations and prevent the deterioration of the quality of justice which has been brought by the indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts. To ensure this objective, Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1508 requires the parties to undergo a conciliation process before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo as a precondition to filing a complaint in court subject to certain exceptions which are inapplicable to this case. The said section has been declared compulsory in nature. (LIBRADA M. AQUINO, vs. ERNEST S. LAURE, G.R. No. 153567, February 18, 2008)

IN DETERMINING PROPERTIES TO BE LEVIED UPON, THE RULES REQUIRE THE SHERIFF TO LEVY ONLY ON THOSE “PROPERTIES OF THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR” WHICH ARE “NOT OTHERWISE EXEMPT FROM EXECUTION.”

           For purposes of the levy, a property is deemed to belong to the judgment debtor if he holds a beneficial interest in such property that he can sell or otherwise dispose of for value.( Feria and Noche, Civil Procedure Annotated, Volume II (2001 ed.), p. 45, citing Reyes v. Grey, 21 Phil. 73, 76 (1911).

  In a contract of mortgage, the debtor retains beneficial interest over the property notwithstanding the encumbrance, since the mortgage only serves to secure the fulfillment of the principal obligation. Indeed, even if the debtor defaults, this fact does not operate to vest in the creditor the ownership of the property; the creditor must still resort to foreclosure proceedings.  Thus, a mortgaged property may still be levied upon by the sheriff to satisfy the judgment debtor’s obligations, as what happened in the present case.  After ascertaining the judgment debtor’s (Reyes’) interest over the car, the respondent properly enforced the levy thereon — an act that, to our mind, is in accordance with the Rules of Court. 

It was thus irrelevant for the complainant to argue that had the respondent checked the car’s certificate of registration, the respondent would have been aware of the encumbrance.  The encumbrance, until foreclosed, will not in any way affect the judgment debtor’s rights over the property or exempt the property from the levy.  Even the pendency of the proceeding for replevin that the complainant instituted would not serve to prevent the sheriff from levying on the car, since Reyes’ default and the complainant’s right to foreclose still had to be settled in the proceeding. (In Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation v. Yllas Lending Corporation (G.R. No. 158997, October 6, 2008, 567 SCRA 454, 471).

          We emphasize that a sheriff’s duty to execute a writ is simply ministerial, Philippine Bank of Communications v. Torio, 348 Phil. 74, 84 (1998) and he is bound to perform only those tasks stated under the Rules of Court and no more.  Any interest a third party may have on the property levied upon by the sheriff to enforce a judgment is the third party’s responsibility to protect through the remedies provided under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.  Thus, we can not hold the respondent liable on the ground that the complainant cites. If at all, the respondent should have required, as a matter of sound established practice, the production of the certificate of registration, but this is an altogether different matter that we do not here pass upon (Golden Sun Finance Corporation vs. Ricardo R. Albano, A.M. No. P-11-2888, July 27, 2011 BRION, J.).

REPLEVIN:

 Replevin is one of the most ancient actions known to law, taking its name from the object of its process (Stone v. Church, 16 N.Y.S.2d 512, 515, 172 Misc. 1007, 1008 (1939). It originated in common law as a remedy against the wrongful exercise of the right of distress for rent (Sinnott v. Feiock, 59 N.E. 265, 165 N.Y. 444, 80 Am.S.R. 736, 53 L.R.A. 565  (1901); and Kurzweil v. Story & Clark Piano Co. and Blumgarten v. Mason & Hamlin Co., 159 N.Y.S. 231, 95 Misc. 484 (1916) and, according to some authorities, could only be maintained in such a case (Palmer v. King, 41 App. DC. 419, L.R.A.1916D 278, Ann. Cas.1915C 1139 (1914). But by the weight of authority, the remedy is not and never was restricted to cases of wrongful distress in the absence of any statutes relating to the subject, but is a proper remedy for any unlawful taking (Stone v. Church, 2216 N.Y.S.2d 512, 515, 172 Misc. 1007, 1008 (1939). “Replevied,” used in its technical sense, means delivered to the owner (Steuer v. Maguire, 66 N. E. 706, 707; 182 Mass. 575, 576 (1903) while the words “to replevy” means to recover possession by an action of replevin (Tillson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89870, May 28, 1991, 197 SCRA 587, 598).

Broadly understood in this jurisdiction, replevin is both a form of principal remedy and of provisional relief.  It may refer either to the action itself, i.e., to regain the possession of personal chattels being wrongfully detained from the plaintiff by another, or to the provisional remedy that would allow the plaintiff to retain the thing during the pendency of the action and to hold it pendente lite (BA Finance Corporation v. CA, 327 Phil. 716, 724-725 (1996); See also Tillson v. Court of Appeals, id.; Bouvier's Dictionary, Third (Rawle's) Revision, Vol. 2; Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 1299). The action is primarily possessory in nature and generally determines nothing more than the right of possession. (BA Finance Corporation v. CA, supra, at 725). The law presumes that every possessor is a possessor in good faith (Art. 527 of the New Civil Code). He is entitled to be respected and protected in his possession (Art. 539 of the New Civil Code) as if he were the true owner thereof until a competent court rules otherwise (Yu v. Honrado, No. 50025, August 21, 1980, 99 SCRA 273, 277, citing Chua Hai v. Kapunan,  Jr., etc. and Ong Shu, 104 Phil. 110, 118 (1958). Before a final judgment, property cannot be seized unless by virtue of some provision of law. (Heath v. Steamer “San Nicolas,” 7 Phil. 532, 538 (1907). The Rules of Court, under Rule 60, authorizes such seizure in cases of replevin. However, a person seeking a remedy in an action for replevin must follow the course laid down in the statute, since the remedy is penal in nature. (Weaver Piano Co., Inc. v. Curtis, 158 S.C. 117; 155 SE 291, 300 (1930). (TERLYNGRACE RIVERA vs. FLORENCIO L. VARGAS, G.R. No. 165895, 2009 June 5, Nachura J).

REPLEVIN:

:  Replevin is one of the most ancient actions known to law, taking its name from the object of its process (Stone v. Church, 16 N.Y.S.2d 512, 515, 172 Misc. 1007, 1008 (1939). It originated in common law as a remedy against the wrongful exercise of the right of distress for rent (Sinnott v. Feiock, 59 N.E. 265, 165 N.Y. 444, 80 Am.S.R. 736, 53 L.R.A. 565  (1901); and Kurzweil v. Story & Clark Piano Co. and Blumgarten v. Mason & Hamlin Co., 159 N.Y.S. 231, 95 Misc. 484 (1916) and, according to some authorities, could only be maintained in such a case (Palmer v. King, 41 App. DC. 419, L.R.A.1916D 278, Ann. Cas.1915C 1139 (1914). But by the weight of authority, the remedy is not and never was restricted to cases of wrongful distress in the absence of any statutes relating to the subject, but is a proper remedy for any unlawful taking (Stone v. Church, 2216 N.Y.S.2d 512, 515, 172 Misc. 1007, 1008 (1939). “Replevied,” used in its technical sense, means delivered to the owner (Steuer v. Maguire, 66 N. E. 706, 707; 182 Mass. 575, 576 (1903) while the words “to replevy” means to recover possession by an action of replevin (Tillson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89870, May 28, 1991, 197 SCRA 587, 598).

Broadly understood in this jurisdiction, replevin is both a form of principal remedy and of provisional relief.  It may refer either to the action itself, i.e., to regain the possession of personal chattels being wrongfully detained from the plaintiff by another, or to the provisional remedy that would allow the plaintiff to retain the thing during the pendency of the action and to hold it pendente lite (BA Finance Corporation v. CA, 327 Phil. 716, 724-725 (1996); See also Tillson v. Court of Appeals, id.; Bouvier's Dictionary, Third (Rawle's) Revision, Vol. 2; Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 1299). The action is primarily possessory in nature and generally determines nothing more than the right of possession. (BA Finance Corporation v. CA, supra, at 725). The law presumes that every possessor is a possessor in good faith (Art. 527 of the New Civil Code). He is entitled to be respected and protected in his possession (Art. 539 of the New Civil Code) as if he were the true owner thereof until a competent court rules otherwise (Yu v. Honrado, No. 50025, August 21, 1980, 99 SCRA 273, 277, citing Chua Hai v. Kapunan,  Jr., etc. and Ong Shu, 104 Phil. 110, 118 (1958). Before a final judgment, property cannot be seized unless by virtue of some provision of law. (Heath v. Steamer “San Nicolas,” 7 Phil. 532, 538 (1907). The Rules of Court, under Rule 60, authorizes such seizure in cases of replevin. However, a person seeking a remedy in an action for replevin must follow the course laid down in the statute, since the remedy is penal in nature. (Weaver Piano Co., Inc. v. Curtis, 158 S.C. 117; 155 SE 291, 300 (1930). (TERLYNGRACE RIVERA vs. FLORENCIO L. VARGAS, G.R. No. 165895, 2009 June 5, Nachura J).

ATTACHMENT

Attachment is an ancillary remedy. It is not sought for its own sake but rather to enable the attaching party to realize upon relief sought and expected to be granted in the main or principal action. (BAC Manufacturing and Sales Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 200 SCRA 130, 139). Being an ancillary or auxiliary remedy, it is available during the pendency of the action which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and interests therein pending rendition, and for purposes of the ultimate effects, of a final judgment in the case. They are provisional because they constitute temporary measures availed of during the pendency of the action and they are ancillary because they are mere incidents in and are dependent upon the result of the main action. [Regalado, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, Vol. 1 (7th Ed.), p. 606]

              A writ of preliminary attachment is a species of provisional remedy. As such, it is a collateral proceeding, permitted only in connection with a regular action, and as one of its incidents; one of which is provided for present need, or for the occasion; that is, one adapted to meet a particular exigency [Feria Noche, CIVIL PROCEDURE ANNOTATED (2001 Ed.), p. 261). (Golez v. Leonidas, G.R. No. L- 56587, 31 August 1981, 107 SCRA 187,189 cited in SILANGAN TEXTILE MANUFACTURING CORPORATION vs. HON. AVELINO G. DEMETRIA,,G.R. No. 166719, March 12, 2007, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.)

HEARSAY EVIDENCE

: It has indeed been held that hearsay evidence whether objected to or not cannot be given credence for having no probative value. This principle, however, has been relaxed in cases where, in addition to the failure to object to the admissibility of the subject evidence, there were other pieces of evidence presented or there were other circumstances prevailing to support the fact in issue. In Top-Weld Manufacturing, Inc. v. ECED S.A., the Suprerme Court held:

“Hearsay evidence alone may be insufficient to establish a fact in an injunction suit (Parker v. Furlong, 62 P. 490) but, when no objection is made thereto, it is, like any other evidence, to be considered and given the importance it deserves. (Smith v. Delaware & Atlantic Telegraph & Telephone Co., 51 A 464). Although we should warn of the undesirability of issuing judgments solely on the basis of the affidavits submitted, where as here, said affidavits are overwhelming, uncontroverted by competent evidence and not inherently improbable, we are constrained to uphold the allegations of the respondents regarding the multifarious violations of the contracts made by the petitioner (HEIRS OF POLICRONIO URETA, SR. ET AL. VS. HIERS OF LIBERATO M. URETA,  ET AL., G.R. NO. 165748; HIERS OF LIBERATO M. URETA, ET AL. VS. HEIRS OF POLICRONIO URETA, SR. ET AL.  G.R. NO. 165930, SEPTEMBER 14, 2011 , MENDOZA, J.). -

COURTS CANNOT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF FOREIGN LAWS:

As held in Garcia v. Recio, 418 Phil. 723, 723-735 (2001), divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country. x x x x  It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative (MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN VS. LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE, G. R. NO. 183622, FEBRUARY 8, 2012, SERENO, J.).

AN ACTING APPOINTEE HAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION TO FILE A PETITION FOR QUO WARRANTO AGAINST THE NEW APPOINTEE:

Quo warranto is a remedy to try disputes with respect to the title to a public office. Generally, quo warranto proceedings are commenced by the Government as the proper party-plaintiff. However, under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, an individual may commence such action if he claims to be entitled to the public office allegedly usurped by another. The Supreme Court stressed that the person instituting the quo warranto proceedings in his own behalf must show that he is entitled to the office in dispute; otherwise, the action may be dismissed at any stage. Emphatically, Section 6, Rule 66 requires the petitioner to  state in  the  petition his right to the public office and the respondent's unlawful possession of the disputed position. As early as 1905, the Court already held that for a petition for quo warranto to be successful, the suing private individual must show a clear right to the contested office. His failure to establish this right warrants the dismissal of the suit for lack of cause of action; it is not even necessary to pass upon the right of the defendant who, by virtue of his appointment, continues in the undisturbed possession of his office. Since the petitioner merely holds an acting appointment (and an expired one at that), he clearly does not have a cause of action to maintain the present petition. (HON. LUIS MARIO M. GENERAL, COMMISSIONER, NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION,VS. HON. ALEJANDRO S. URRO ET AL., G.R. NO. 191560, MARCH 29, 2011, BRION, J.). 

AN ACCUSED IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING ANY IRREGULARITY OF HIS ARREST IF HE FAILS TO RAISE THIS ISSUE OR TO MOVE FOR THE QUASHAL OF THE INFORMATION AGAINST HIM ON THIS GROUND BEFORE ARRAIGNMENT.

Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error.  It will not even negate the validity of the conviction of the accused.  True, the Bill of Rights under the present Constitution provides in part:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

However, a settled exception to the right guaranteed by the above-stated provision is that of an arrest made during the commission of a crime, which does not require a previously issued warrant.  Such warrantless arrest is considered reasonable and valid under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:

Sec. 5.  Arrest without warrant; when lawful.   a peace office of a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a)  When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that two (2) elements must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. (ABRAHAM MICLAT JR. VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILS., G.R. NO. 176077, AUGUST 31, 2011, PERALTA, J.).

EXEMPTION OF COOPERATIVES FROM PAYMENT OF COURT AND SHERIFF’S FEES NO LONGER STANDS

On 11 February 2010, the Supreme Court En Banc issued a Resolution in A.M. No. 08-2-01-0, (Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for Payment of Legal Fees, A.M. No. 08-2-01-0, 11 February 2010, 612 SCRA 193) which denied the petition of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for recognition of its exemption from payment of legal fees imposed under Section 22 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.

In the GSIS case, the Supreme Court citing Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 361 Phil. 73 (1999) stressed that the 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary; took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure; and held that the power to promulgate these Rules is no longer shared by the Court with Congress, more so, with the Executive. 

In a decision dated 26 February 2010 in Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Cabato-Cortes, G.R. No. 165922, 26 February 2010, 613 SCRA 733.) the Supreme Court reiterated its ruling in the GSIS case when it denied the petition of the cooperative to be exempted from the payment of legal fees under Section 7(c) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court relative to fees in petitions for extra-judicial foreclosure.  On 10 March 2010, relying again on the GSIS ruling, the Court En Banc issued a resolution clarifying that the National Power Corporation is not exempt from the payment of legal fees. (In Re:  Exemption of the National Power Corporation from Payment of Filing/Docket Fees, A.M. No. 05-10-20-SC, 10 March 2010).  With the foregoing categorical pronouncements of the Supreme Court, it is evident that the exemption of cooperatives from payment of court and sheriff’s fees no longer stands.  Cooperatives can no longer invoke Republic Act No. 6938, as amended by Republic Act No. 9520, as basis for exemption from the payment of legal fees (IN THE MATTER OF CLARIFICATION OF EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF ALL COURT AND SHERIFF FEES OF COOPERATIVES DULY REGISTERED IN ACCORDANCE WITH R.A. NO. 9520 VS. PERPETUAL HELP COMMUNITY COOPERATIVE, A.M. NO. 12-2-03-0, MARCH 13, 2012, PEREZ, J.).