Generally, any further prosecution of the accused
after an acquittal would violate the constitutional proscription on double
jeopardy. (People v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 128587, 16 March 2007, 518 SCRA
393, 403.)
It
is settled that a judgment of acquittal cannot be recalled or withdrawn by
another order reconsidering the dismissal of the case, (Catilo v. Abaya, 94
Phil. 1014 (1954) nor can it be modified except to eliminate something
which is civil or administrative in nature (People v. Yelo, 83
Phil. 618 (1949); People v. Bautista,,
96 Phil. 43 (1954). x x x One exception to the rule is when the prosecution is denied due
process of law (Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 228 Phil. 42
(1986). Another exception is when
the trial court commits grave abuse of discretion in dismissing a criminal case
by granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence (People v. Uy, 508
Phil. 637 (2005). If there is grave abuse of discretion, granting
Goodland’s prayer is not tantamount to putting Co and Chan
in double jeopardy.
We
have explained “grave abuse of discretion” to mean thus:
An
act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as committed in grave abuse
of discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise
of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at
all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility. (Litton
Mills, Inc. v. Galleon Trader, Inc., 246 Phil. 503, 509 (1988) cited in Goodland Company,
Inc. vs. Abraham Co & Christine Chan, G. R. No. 196685, December 14, 2011, CARPIO,
J.).
No comments:
Post a Comment
Note: Only a member of this blog may post a comment.