SPECIFIC DENIAL

It is basic in remedial law that a defendant in a civil case must apprise the trial court and the adverse party of the facts alleged by the complaint that he admits and of the facts alleged by the complaint that he wishes to place into contention. The defendant does the former either by stating in his answer that they are true or by failing to properly deny them. There are two ways of denying alleged facts: one is by general denial, and the other, by specific denial. (Sandiganbayan Records, Volume 17, p. 89)

In this jurisdiction, only a specific denial shall be sufficient to place into contention an alleged fact [Rollo (G.R. No. 169203), p. 356].  Under Section 10, ^]Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, a specific denial of an allegation of the complaint may be made in any of three ways, namely: (a) a defendant specifies each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit and, whenever practicable, sets forth the substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial; (b) a defendant who desires to deny only a part of an averment specifies so much of it as is true and material and denies only the remainder; and (c) a defendant who is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment made in the complaint states so, which has the effect of a denial (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No. 166859, April 12, 2011, BERSAMIN, J.). 

VALID SUBSTITION OF COUNSEL

Under Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and established jurisprudence, a valid substitution of counsel has the following requirements: (1) the filing of a written application for substitution; (2) the client’s written consent; (3) the consent of the substituted lawyer if such consent can be obtained; and, in case such written consent cannot be procured, (4) a proof of service of notice of such motion on the attorney to be substituted in the manner required by the Rules  [See Bernardo v. Court of Appeals (Special Sixth Division), G.R. No. 106153, July 14, 1997, 275 SCRA 413, 427, citing Yu v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 181, 189-190 (1985), citing Aban v. Enage, 120 SCRA 778 (1983) and Phil. Apparel Workers Union v. NLRC, 125 SCRA 391 (1983) cited in HEIRS OF FRANCISCO RETUYA et.al. vs. C. A., G.R. No.  163039, April 6, 2011, PERALTA, J.)

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A summary judgment under Rule 35 of the Rules of Court is a procedural technique that is proper only when there is no genuine issue as to the existence of a material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law (L-33983, January 27, 1983).  It is a method intended to expedite or promptly dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on record (Sandiganbayan Records, Volume 9, pp. 344-380, 394-417).

Upon a motion for summary judgment the court’s sole function is to determine whether there is an issue of fact to be tried, and all doubts as to the existence of an issue of fact must be resolved againstthe moving party. In other words, a party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, and any doubt as to the existence of such an issue is resolved against the movant.  Thus, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court should take that view of the evidence most favorable to the party against whom it is directed, giving that party the benefit of all favorable inferences (Sandiganbayan Records, Volume 9, pp. 344-380, 394-417)

The term genuine issue has been defined as an issue of fact that calls for the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue that is sham, fictitious, contrived, set up in bad faith, and patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. The court can determine this on the basis of the pleadings, admissions, documents, affidavits, and counter-affidavits submitted by the parties to the court. Where the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for a summary judgment cannot take the place of a trial [City of Manila v. Laguio, 455 SCRA 308 (2005)].

Well-settled is the rule that a party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact [Banco Espanol-Filipino v. Palanca, 37 Phil 921 (1918)].  Upon that party’s shoulders rests the burden to prove the cause of action, and to show that the defense is interposed solely for the purpose of delay. After the burden has been discharged, the defendant has the burden to show facts sufficient to entitle him to defend (Habana v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 129418, September 10, 1999).  Any doubt as to the propriety of a summary judgment shall be resolved against the moving party.

We need not stress that the trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and may do so only in cases where no genuine issue as to any material fact clearly exists between the parties.  The rule on summary judgment does not invest the trial courts with jurisdiction to try summarily the factual issues upon affidavits, but authorizes summary judgment only when it appears clear that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No. 166859, April 12, 2011, BERSAMIN, J.).

JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS

Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides:

         Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. – An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof.  The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.

          A party may make judicial admissions in (a) the pleadings; (b) during the trial, either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations; or (c) in other stages of the judicial proceeding (See Binarao v. Plus Builders, Inc., G.R. No. 154430, June 16, 2006, 491 SCRA 49, 54). It is well-settled that judicial admissions cannot be contradicted by the admitter who is the party himself (Id. citing Granada, et al. v. PNB, G.R. No. L-20745, September 2, 1966, 18 SCRA 1) and binds the person who makes the same, and absent any showing that this was made thru palpable mistake, no amount of rationalization can offset it (Id. citing Yuliongsiu  v. PNB, G.R. No. L-19227, February 17, 1968, 22 SCRA 585 cited in Landoil Resources Corporation vs. Al Rabiah Lighting Company, G.R. No. 174720, September 7, 2011, PERALTA, J.).

THE BURDEN OF PROOF MAY BE ON THE PLAINTIFF OR THE DEFENDANT

         The party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.  The burden of proof may be on the plaintiff or the defendant.  It is on the defendant if he alleges an affirmative defense which is not a denial of an essential ingredient in the plaintiff’s cause of action, but is one which, if established, will be a good defense – i.e., an “avoidance” of the claim.  Indeed, “in the final analysis, the party upon whom the ultimate burden lies is to be determined by the pleadings, not by who is the plaintiff or the defendant.”

            

            Burden of proof is the duty of any party to present evidence to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law, which is preponderance of evidence in civil cases.  The party, whether plaintiff or defendant, who asserts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof to obtain a favorable judgment.  Upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts, though in the course of trial, once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to the defendant to controvert the plaintiff's prima facie case; otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of the plaintiff.  It is the burden of evidence which shifts from party to party depending upon the exigencies of the case in the course of trial. x x x  The term prima facie evidence denotes evidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain the proposition it supports or to establish the facts. Prima facie means it is “sufficient to establish a fact or raise a presumption unless disproved or rebutted”(REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN EDUARDO   M. COJUANGCO, JR., ET AL., April 12, 2011, G.R. No. 166859, CARPIO MORALES, J.).

LIBERAL INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE RULES

The liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances.  While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice (Don Tino Realty and Development Corporation v. Florentino, 372 Phil. 882, 890-891 (1999) cited in Emerita Munoz vs. ATTY. VICTORIANO R. YABUT, JR. and SAMUEL GO CHAN, G.R. No.  142676, June 6, 2011, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.). 

LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE:

In Padillo v. Court of Appeals, (422 Phil. 334 (2001), we had occasion to explain this principle, to wit:

         

        Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More specifically, it means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. As a general rule, a decision on a prior appeal of the same case is held to be the law of the case whether that question is right or wrong, the remedy of the party deeming himself aggrieved being to seek a rehearing.( Id. at 351.)

          

         The concept of law of the case was further elucidated in the 1919 case of Zarate v. Director of Lands, (39 Phil. 747 (1919) to wit:

          

       A well-known legal principle is that when an appellate court has once declared the law in a case, such declaration continues to be the law of that case even on a subsequent appeal. The rule made by an appellate court, while it may be reversed in other cases, cannot be departed from in subsequent proceedings in the same case. The "Law of the Case," as applied to a former decision of an appellate court, merely expresses the practice of the courts in refusing to reopen what has been decided. Such a rule is "necessary to enable an appellate court to perform its duties satisfactorily and efficiently, which would be impossible if a question, once considered and decided by it, were to be litigated anew in the same case upon any and every subsequent appeal." Again, the rule is necessary as a matter of policy to end litigation. "There would be no end to a suit if every obstinate litigant could, by repeated appeals, compel a court to listen to criticisms on their opinions, or speculate of chances from changes in its members." x x x. (Id. at 749.)

          

            The law of the case doctrine applies in a situation where an appellate court has made a ruling on a question on appeal and thereafter remands the case to the lower court for further proceedings; the question settled by the appellate court becomes the law of the case at the lower court and in any subsequent appeal (Vios v. Pantangco, Jr., G.R. No. 163103, February 6, 2009, 578 SCRA 129, 143 cited in Eloisa L. Tolentino vs. Atty. Roy M. Loyola et al., G.R. No. 153809, July 27, 2011, EONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.). 

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: FINDINGS OF QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCIES

it is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one which is constitutionally-created, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce (Sanchez v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 127545, April 23, 2008, 552 SCRA 471, 489, citing Cuerdo v. Commission on Audit, No. L-84592, October 27, 1988, 166 SCRA 657, 661 further citing Tagum Doctors Enterprises v. Apsay, No. L-81188, August 30, 1988, 165 SCRA 154, 155-156.)  

Findings of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the COA, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence, ⁽Laysa v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 128134, October 18, 2000, 343 SCRA 520, 526) and the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion ⁽Sanchez v. Commission on Audit, supra note 14.)  x x x x  

There being no grave abuse of discretion in the findings and conclusions of the COA in this case, the Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from these long-settled rules. (Candelario L. Versoza vs. Guillermo s. Carague, G.R. No. 157838, February 7, 2012, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

A JUDICIAL COMPROMISE HAS THE FORCE AND EFFECT OF A JUDGMENT.

             A compromise agreement intended to resolve a matter already under litigation is a judicial compromise.  Having judicial mandate and entered as its determination of the controversy, such judicial compromise has the force and effect of a judgment.  It transcends its identity as a mere contract between the parties, as it becomes a judgment that is subject to execution in accordance with the Rules of Court. (Rañola v. Rañola, G.R. No. 185095, July 31, 2009, 594 SCRA 788, 794.)

AN ORDER GRANTING AN ACCUSED’S DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE IS A RESOLUTION OF THE CASE ON THE MERITS, AND IT AMOUNTS TO AN ACQUITTAL

       Generally, any further prosecution of the accused after an acquittal would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. (People v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 128587, 16 March 2007, 518 SCRA 393, 403.)

         

          It is settled that a judgment of acquittal cannot be recalled or withdrawn by another order reconsidering the dismissal of the case, (Catilo v. Abaya, 94 Phil. 1014 (1954) nor can it be modified except to eliminate something which is civil or administrative in nature (People v. Yelo, 83 Phil. 618 (1949); People v. Bautista,, 96 Phil. 43 (1954).  x x x One exception to the rule is when the prosecution is denied due process of law (Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 228 Phil. 42 (1986). Another exception is when the trial court commits grave abuse of discretion in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence (People v. Uy, 508 Phil. 637 (2005). If there is grave abuse of discretion, granting Goodland’s prayer is not tantamount to putting Co and Chan in double jeopardy.

           

            We have explained “grave abuse of discretion” to mean thus:

          

           An act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as committed in grave abuse of discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility. (Litton Mills, Inc. v. Galleon Trader, Inc., 246 Phil. 503, 509 (1988) cited in Goodland Company, Inc. vs. Abraham Co & Christine Chan, G. R. No. 196685, December 14, 2011, CARPIO, J.).

FAILURE TO APPEAR AT THE PROMULGATION OF JUDGMENT:

 The accused who failed to appear without justifiable cause shall lose the remedies available in the Rules against the judgment. However, within 15 days from promulgation of judgment, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state in his motion the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation, and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within 15 days from notice (Pascua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140243, December 14, 2000, 348 SCRA 197, 206). (PEOPLE vs. DE GRANO, G.R. No. 167710, June 5, 2009, 3rd Division, Peralta, J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN ARE CONCLUSIVE UPON THE SUPREME COURT

Well-entrenched is the rule that factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive upon this Court except where: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts and the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. (Ong v. People, G.R. No. 176546, September 25, 2009, 601 SCRA 47, 53, citing Suller v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 153686, July 22, 2003, 407 SCRA 201, 208.) (Virginia M. Guadines vs. Sandiganbayan and People of the Phils., G.R. No. 164891, June 6, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.:)

LACHES SHOULD BE CLEARLY PRESENT FOR THE SIBONGHANOY DOCTRINE TO APPLY

          In Regalado v. Go, the Court held that laches should be clearly present for the Sibonghanoy doctrine to apply, thus:

Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier,  it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.”

The ruling in People v. Regalario that was based on the landmark doctrine enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction by estoppel is the exception rather than the rule. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. In such controversies, laches should have been clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it. (Celia S. Vda. De Herrera vs. Emelita Bernardo and Crisanto Bernardo, G.R. No. 170251,  June 1, 2011, PERALTA, J.):

          

IN A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI, THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS AMPLE AUTHORITY TO RECEIVE NEW EVIDENCE AND PERFORM ANY ACT NECESSARY TO RESOLVE FACTUAL ISSUES

In Maralit v. Philippine National Bank (G.R. No. 163788, 24 August 2009, 596 SCRA 662) where petitioner Maralit questioned the appellate court's admission and appreciation of a belatedly submitted documentary evidence, the Supreme Court held that "[i]n a special civil action for certiorari, the Court of Appeals has ample authority to receive new evidence and perform any act necessary to resolve factual issues."

The Court explained further:

Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, states that, "The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings." (G.R. No. 163788, 24 August 2009, 596 SCRA 662, at 682)

             Likewise, in VMC Rural Electric Service Cooperative, Inc. v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 153144, 12 October 2006, 504 SCRA 336, 348-350, cited in Maralit v. Philippine National Bank, supra) the Court held:

[I]t is already settled that under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902 (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, amending for the purpose of Section Nine of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended, known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), the Court of Appeals -- pursuant to the exercise of its original jurisdiction over Petitions for Certiorari -- is specifically given the power to pass upon the evidence, if and when necessary, to resolve factual issues. As clearly stated in Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act 7902:

The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings.  x x x (SPOUSES ROGELIO MARCELO AND MILAGROS MARCELO, PETITIONERS, VS. LBC BANK, RESPONDENT, G.R. No. 183575, April 11, 2011, CARPIO, J.)

NOTICE OF HEARING IN A MOTION: THE THREE DAY NOTICE RULE IS NOT ABSOLUTE

Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court read:

SECTION 4. Hearing of motion. – Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.

Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.

SECTION 5. Notice of hearing. – The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.

SECTION 6. Proof of service necessary. – No written motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by the court without proof of service thereof.

The three-day notice rule is not absolute. A liberal construction of the procedural rules is proper where the lapse in the literal observance of a rule of procedure has not prejudiced the adverse party and has not deprived the court of its authority (E & L Mercantile, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 226 Phil. 299 (1986)). 

Indeed, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the Rules should be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. Rules of procedure are tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, and courts must avoid their strict and rigid application which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice (Strategic Alliance Development Corporation v. Radstock Securities Limited, G.R. Nos. 178158 and 180428, 4 December 2009).

            In Somera Vda. De Navarro v. Navarro, [76 Phil. 122 (1946)] the Court held that there was substantial compliance of the rule on notice of motions even if the first notice was irregular because no prejudice was caused the adverse party since the motion was not considered and resolved until after several postponements of which the parties were duly notified [1 J. Feria & M.C. Noche, Civil Procedure Annotated, 406 (2001)]

            Likewise, in Jehan Shipping Corporation v. National Food Authority, the Court held that despite the lack of notice of hearing in a Motion for Reconsideration, there was substantial compliance with the requirements of due process where the adverse party actually had the opportunity to be heard and had filed pleadings in opposition to the motion. The Court held:

The Supreme Court has indeed held time and again, that under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, mandatory is the requirement in a motion of a notice of hearing, which is rendered defective by failure to comply with the said requirement.

As a rule, a motion without a notice of hearing is considered pro forma and does not affect the reglementary period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading.

As an integral component of the procedural due process, the three-day notice required by the Rules is not intended for the benefit of the movant. Rather, the requirement is for the purpose of avoiding surprises that may be sprung upon the adverse party, who must be given time to study and meet the arguments in the motion before a resolution of the court. Principles of natural justice demand that the right of a party should not be affected without giving it an opportunity to be heard.

The test is the presence of opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study the motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based. x x x

A close perusal of the records reveal that the trial court gave petitioner ten days within which to comment on respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner filed its Opposition to the Motion on November 26, 2001. In its 14-page Opposition, it not only pointed out that the Motion was defective for not containing a notice of hearing and should then be dismissed outright by the court; it also ventilated its substantial arguments against the merits of the Motion and of the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. Notably, its arguments were recited at length in the trial court’s January 8, 2002 Joint Resolution. Nevertheless, the court proceeded to deny the Motions on the sole ground that they did not contain any notice of hearing.

The requirement of notice of time and hearing in the pleading filed by a party is necessary only to apprise the other of the actions of the former.

In Fausto Preysler, Jr. vs. Manila Southcoast Development Corporation, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to comply with the three-day notice rule. However, the Court of Appeals overlooked the fact that although respondent received petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration six days after the scheduled hearing on 26 February 2004, the said hearing was reset three (3) times with due notice to the parties. Thus, it was only on 6 August 2004, or more than five months after respondent received a copy of petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, that the motion was heard by the RTC. Clearly, respondent had more than sufficient time to oppose petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. In fact, respondent did oppose the motion when it filed its Motion to Dismiss dated 9 August 2004. In view of the circumstances of this case, we find that there was substantial compliance with procedural due process. Instead of dismissing petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration based merely on the alleged procedural lapses, the RTC should have resolved the motion based on the merits. 

Under the circumstances of the present case, the purpose of a notice of hearing was served (Id. at 788-790). (Emphasis supplied)

Section 4 of Rule 15 provides that "[e]very written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of the hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice."

Thus, the date of the hearing should be at least three days after receipt of the notice of hearing by the other parties. In this case, the petitioner’s Omnibus Motion was set for hearing on 12 November 2004.

Thus, to comply with the notice requirement, respondent should have received the notice of the hearing at least three days before 12 November 2004, which is 9 November 2004. Clearly, respondent’s receipt on 9 November 2004 (Tuesday) of the notice of hearing of the Omnibus Motion which was set to be heard on 12 November 2004 (Friday), was within the required minimum three-days’ notice.

As explained by Retired Justice Jose Y. Feria in his book, Civil Procedure Annotated, when the notice of hearing should be given:

The ordinary motion day is Friday. Hence, the notice should be served by Tuesday at the latest, in order that the requirement of the three days may be complied with.

If notice be given by ordinary mail, it should be actually received by Tuesday, or if not claimed from the post office, the dat(Emphasis supplied) e of the first notice of the postmaster should be at least five (5) days before Tuesday [1 J. Feria & M.C. Noche, Civil Procedure Annotated, 405-406 (2001)]. (FAUSTO R. PREYSLER, JR. vs. MANILA SOUTHCOAST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, G.R. No. 171872, June 28, 2010, CARPIO, J.)

NEW RULE ON SERVICE OF SUMMONS ON FOREIGN JURIDICAL ENTITIES.

AM. No. 11-3-6-SC

AMENDMENT OF SECTION 12, RULE 14 •
OF THE RULES OF COURT ON SERVICE UPON
FOREIGN PRIVATE JURIDICAL ENTITY

Section 12, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court is hereby amended to read
as follows:

"SEC. 12. Service upon foreign private juridical entity. —
When the defendant is a foreign private juridical entity which
has transacted business in the Philippines, service may be made
on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that
purpose, or, i f there be no such agent, on the government
official designated by law to that effect, or on any of its officers
or agents within the Philippines.

If the foreign private juridical entity is not registered in
the Philippines or has no resident agent, service may, with leave
of court, be effected out of the Philippines through any of the
following means:

a) B y personal service coursed through the
appropriate court in the foreign country with the
assistance of the Department of Foreign Affairs;

b) B y publication once in a newspaper of general
circulation in the country where the defendant may be
found and by serving a copy of the summons and the
court order by-registered mail at the last known address
of the defendant;

c) B y facsimile or any recognized electronic
means that could generate proof of service; or

d) B y such other means as the court may in its
discretion direct."

This rule shall take effect fifteen (15) days after publication in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.

March 15, 2011