SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS: THE ORDER OF PREFERENCE IN THE APPOINTMENT OF AN ADMINISTRATOR OF AN ESTATE DOES NOT RULE OUT THE APPOINTMENT OF CO-ADMINISTRATORS

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the order of preference in the appointment of an administrator of an estate:

“SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select” (emphasis supplied).

However, the order of preference is not absolute for it depends on the attendant facts and circumstances of each case (See Uy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 167979, March 16, 2006, 484 SCRA 699; Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101512, August 7, 1992, 212 SCRA 413; Capistrano v. Nadurata, 46 Phil. 726 (1922).

Relative thereto, jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an administrator lies in the sound discretion of the trial court. Thus:

In the case of Uy v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court upheld the appointment by the trial court of a co-administration between the decedent’s son and the decedent’s brother, who was likewise a creditor of the decedent’s estate.

In the same vein, the Supreme Court declared in Delgado Vda. de De la Rosa v. Heirs of Marciana Rustia Vda. de Damian, G.R. No. 155733, January 27, 2006, 480 SCRA 334, 360 that in the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed. The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators, especially in cases where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estates.

Applying the aforementioned pronouncements, the Supreme Court in the settlement of the intestate estate of Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay stated that the attendant facts and circumstances of the case necessitate, at the least, a joint administration by both respondent and Emilio III of their grandmother’s, Cristina’s, estate. It explained that the subject estate in  the case calls to the succession other putative heirs, including another illegitimate grandchild of Cristina and Federico, Nenita Tañedo, but who was likewise adopted by Federico, and the two (2) siblings of respondent Isabel, Margarita and Emilio II. In all, considering the conflicting claims of the putative heirs, and the unliquidated conjugal partnership of Cristina and Federico which forms part of their respective estates, the Supreme Court was impelled to move in only one direction, i.e., joint administration of the subject estate. (IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF CRISTINA AGUINALDO-SUNTAY vs. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, G.R. No. 183053, June 16, 2010, NACHURA, J.)