RES JUDICATA

The guiding principle of the doctrine of res judicata was formulated by Vice Chancellor Wigram in an English case circa 1843, thus:

xxx that where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a court of competent jurisdiction, the court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time. (Henderson v. Henderson, 3 Hare 100, pp. 114-115).

The doctrine is also known as estoppel per rem judicatam and involves both cause of action estoppel and issue estoppel. The purpose of the doctrine is two-fold - to prevent unnecessary proceedings involving expenses to the parties and wastage of the court's time which could be used by others, and to avoid stale litigations as well as to enable the defendant to know the extent of the claims being made arising out of the same single incident. (S. Sime, A Practical Approach To Civil Procedure, (1994 Ed.), Blackstone Press Ltd., London, p. 391).

Under the doctrine of res judicata, therefore, a final judgment or decree on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits and on all points and matters determined in the previous suit. (Dela Cruz v. Joaquin, G.R. No. 162788, July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA 576).

For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be between the first and second actions identity of parties, identity of the subject matter, and identity of cause of action. (Custodio v. Corrado, G.R. No. 146082, July 30, 2004, 435 SCRA 500).

The foundation principle upon which the doctrine rests is that the parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once; that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate.  (Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101115, August 22, 2002, 387 SCRA 549 cited in CATALINA BALAIS-MABANAG, assisted by her husband, ELEUTERIO MABANAG, vs. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY, CONCEPCION D. ALCARAZ, and RAMONA PATRICIA ALCARAZ, G.R. No. 153142 : March 29, 2010, BERSAMIN, J.).

CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR TIME IS CONSIDERED A SUBMISSION TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint, while jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is acquired either through the service of summons upon them in the manner required by law or through their voluntary appearance in court and their submission to its authority (Perkin Elmer Singapore Pte Ltd. v. Dakila Trading Corporation, G.R. No. 172242, August 14, 2007, 530 SCRA 170, 186).

A party who makes a special appearance in court challenging the jurisdiction of said court based on the ground of invalid service of summons is not deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court (United Coconut Planters Bank v. Ongpin, G.R. No. 146593, October 26, 2001, 368 SCRA 464, 470). 

In Go vs. Cordero, however, the Supreme Court clarified that although the Motion to Dismiss filed by Robinson specifically stated as one (1) of the grounds the lack of "personal jurisdiction," it must be noted that he had earlier filed a Motion for Time to file an appropriate responsive pleading even beyond the time provided in the summons by publication.  Such motion did not state that it was a conditional appearance entered to question the regularity of the service of summons, but an appearance submitting to the jurisdiction of the court by acknowledging the summons by publication issued by the court and praying for additional time to file a responsive pleading.  Consequently, Robinson having acknowledged the summons by publication and also having invoked the jurisdiction of the trial court to secure affirmative relief in his motion for additional time, he effectively submitted voluntarily to the trial court’s jurisdiction. He is now estopped from asserting otherwise, even before this Court (See Dole Philippines, Inc. (Tropifresh Division) v. Quilala, G.R. No. 168723, July 9, 2008, 557 SCRA 433, 437-438 cited in ALLAN C. GO, vs. MORTIMER F. CORDERO, G.R. No. 164703, May 4, 2010, VILLARAMA, JR., J.). 

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Essentially, a writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty (Moncupa v. Enrile, 225 Phil. 191, 197 (1986). Rule 102 of the 1997 Rules of Court sets forth the procedure to be followed in the issuance of the writ. The Rule provides:

 “SECTION 1. To what habeas corpus extends. – Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.

SEC 2. Who may grant the writ. – The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, or any member thereof, on any day and at any time, or by the Court of Appeals or any member thereof in the instances authorized by law, and if so granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, and may be made returnable before the court or any member thereof, or before a Court of First Instance, or any judge thereof for hearing and decision on the merits. It may also be granted by a Court of First Instance, or a judge thereof, on any day and at any time, and returnable before himself, enforceable only within his judicial district.

x x x x

SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. – If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment” (emphasis supplied).

The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a person's detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application (Go, Sr. v. Ramos, G.R. No. 167569, 4 September 2009, 598 SCRA 266, 301).

Plainly stated, the writ obtains immediate relief for those who have been illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause. The writ, however, should not be issued when the custody over the person is by virtue of a judicial process or a valid judgment.  

The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual seeking such relief is illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint. If an individual's liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. (In Re: The Writ of Habeas Corpus for Reynaldo De Villa, G.R. No. 158802, 17 November 2004, 442 SCRA 706, 719).

Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. (Veluz v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 169482, 29 January 2008, 543 SCRA 63, 67-68).

In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a particular person is legally held. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. (Ibid).

Finally, in passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first inquire into whether the petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will proceed only where such restraint exists. If the alleged cause is thereafter found to be unlawful, then the writ should be granted and the petitioner discharged. Needless to state, if otherwise, again the writ will be refused.  (Ibid).  

In fine, while habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance and it must be clear to the judge to whom the petition is presented that, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled to the writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant or the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed. (NURHIDA JUHURI AMPATUAN vs. JUDGE VIRGILIO V. MACARAIG, G.R. No. 182497, June 29, 2010, PEREZ, J.).

ERRORS OF JUDGMENT BEYOND THE PROVINCE OF A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI:

When a court, tribunal, or officer has jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter of the dispute, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is an exercise of that jurisdiction. Consequently, all errors committed in the exercise of said jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment.

Under prevailing procedural rules and jurisprudence, errors of judgment are not proper subjects of a special civil action for certiorari (Sebastian v. Morales, 445 Phil. 595, 608 (2003).  If every error committed by the trial court or quasi-judicial agency were to be the proper subject of a special civil action for certiorari, then trial would never end and the dockets of appellate courts would be clogged beyond measure.

For this reason, where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision, not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision, the same is beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari. (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 456 Phil. 755, 787 (2003). Thus, if the petitioners filed the instant special civil action for certiorari, instead of appeal via a petition for review, the petition should be dismissed. (ARTISTICA CERAMICA, INC. vs. CIUDAD DEL CARMEN HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATION, INC., G.R. Nos. 167583-84, June 16, 2010, PERALTA, J.).

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS: THE ORDER OF PREFERENCE IN THE APPOINTMENT OF AN ADMINISTRATOR OF AN ESTATE DOES NOT RULE OUT THE APPOINTMENT OF CO-ADMINISTRATORS

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the order of preference in the appointment of an administrator of an estate:

“SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select” (emphasis supplied).

However, the order of preference is not absolute for it depends on the attendant facts and circumstances of each case (See Uy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 167979, March 16, 2006, 484 SCRA 699; Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101512, August 7, 1992, 212 SCRA 413; Capistrano v. Nadurata, 46 Phil. 726 (1922).

Relative thereto, jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an administrator lies in the sound discretion of the trial court. Thus:

In the case of Uy v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court upheld the appointment by the trial court of a co-administration between the decedent’s son and the decedent’s brother, who was likewise a creditor of the decedent’s estate.

In the same vein, the Supreme Court declared in Delgado Vda. de De la Rosa v. Heirs of Marciana Rustia Vda. de Damian, G.R. No. 155733, January 27, 2006, 480 SCRA 334, 360 that in the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed. The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators, especially in cases where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estates.

Applying the aforementioned pronouncements, the Supreme Court in the settlement of the intestate estate of Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay stated that the attendant facts and circumstances of the case necessitate, at the least, a joint administration by both respondent and Emilio III of their grandmother’s, Cristina’s, estate. It explained that the subject estate in  the case calls to the succession other putative heirs, including another illegitimate grandchild of Cristina and Federico, Nenita Tañedo, but who was likewise adopted by Federico, and the two (2) siblings of respondent Isabel, Margarita and Emilio II. In all, considering the conflicting claims of the putative heirs, and the unliquidated conjugal partnership of Cristina and Federico which forms part of their respective estates, the Supreme Court was impelled to move in only one direction, i.e., joint administration of the subject estate. (IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF CRISTINA AGUINALDO-SUNTAY vs. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, G.R. No. 183053, June 16, 2010, NACHURA, J.)

CHANGE OF THEORY ON APPEAL NOT ALLOWED

As a rule, a party who deliberately adopts a certain theory upon which the case is tried and decided by the lower court will not be permitted to change the theory on appeal. (Lianga Lumber Co. v. Lianga Timber Co., Inc., No. L-38685, March 31, 1977, 76 SCRA 197).

In other words, points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time at such late stage. It would be unfair to the adverse party who would have no opportunity to present further evidence material to the new theory, which it could have done had it been aware of it at the time of the hearing before the trial court. (China Airlines Ltd. v. CA, et al., G.R. Nos. 45985 & 46036, May 18, 1990, 185 SCRA 449).

Accordingly, to permit the petitioners in a case to change their theory on appeal would thus be unfair to the respondent and offend the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process (Siredy Enterprises, Inc. v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 129039, September 17, 2002, 389 SCRA 34 cited in SPOUSES ERNESTO and VICENTA TOPACIO vs. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS and MORTGAGE BANK, G.R. No. 157644, November 17, 2010, BRION J.). 

RES JUDICATA: BAR BY PRIOR JUDGMENT

Under the rule of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all later suits and on all points and matters determined in the previous suit. The term literally means a "matter adjudged, judicially acted upon, or settled by judgment (Dela Cruz v. Joaquin, G.R. No. 162788, July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA 576, 589).  The principle bars a subsequent suit involving the same parties, subject matter, and cause of action. The rationale for the rule is that "public policy requires that controversies must be settled with finality at a given point in time.

The doctrine of res judicata embraces two (2) concepts: the first is "bar by prior judgment" under paragraph (b) of Rule 39, Section 47 of the Rules of Court, and the second is "conclusiveness of judgment" under paragraph (c) thereof.

Res judicata applies in the concept of "bar by prior judgment" if the following requisites concur: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (3) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (4) there must be, between the first and the second action, identity of parties, of subject matter and of causes of action. (Superior Commercial Enterprises, Inc. v. Kunnan Enterprises Ltd., et al., G.R. 169974, April 20, 2010 cited in SPOUSES ERNESTO and VICENTA TOPACIO vs. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS and MORTGAGE BANK, G.R. No. 157644, November 17, 2010, BRION J.).