APPEAL: APPLICATION OF THE FRESH PERIOD RULE (NEYPES DOCTRINE)

As early as 2005, the Supreme Court categorically declared in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005, 469 SCRA 633 that by virtue of its power to amend, repeal and create new procedural rules in all courts, the High Court is allowing a fresh period of 15 days within which to file a notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing or denying a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. This would standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus, the Court stated:

“To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. xxxx

Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court.

The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.

x x x x  To recapitulate, a party-litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Courts decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the final order) denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.”   

With the advent of the "fresh period rule," parties who availed themselves of the remedy of motion for reconsideration are now allowed to file a notice of appeal within fifteen days from the denial of that motion.

The fresh period rule is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court which states that the appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word or signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another.  It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of or in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the final order.

x x x x

The fresh period rule finally eradicates the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted from receipt of notice of judgment or from receipt of notice of final order appealed from.

 Taking bearings from Neypes, in Sumaway v. Urban Bank, Inc., the Supreme Court set aside the denial of a notice of appeal which was purportedly filed five days late. With the fresh period rule, the 15-day period within which to file the notice of appeal was counted from notice of the denial of the therein petitioners motion for reconsideration.

This was followed in Elbia v. Ceniza, wherein the Supreme Court applied the principle granting a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or resolution.

Thereafter, in First Aqua Sugar Traders, Inc. v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, it held that a party-litigant may now file his notice of appeal either within fifteen days from receipt of the original decision or within fifteen days from the receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration.  

In De los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat, the Supreme Court also applied the same principle of fresh period rule, expostulating that procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of procedure in order that courts may be able to administer justice. Procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statutes. The "fresh period rule" is irrefragably procedural, prescribing the manner in which the appropriate period for appeal is to be computed or determined and, therefore, can be made applicable to actions pending upon its effectivity, without danger of violating anyone else rights. (SUMIRAN vs. DAMASO, G.R. No. 162518, August, 19, 2009, Third Division, Peralta, J.).