JUSTICE ROBERTO ABAD: EFFECT OF STRIKING THE TESTIMONY OF A LONE WITNESS

when the plaintiff’s lone witness died due to illness before the adverse witness could cross-examine him, the striking out of the former’s testimony altogether wiped out the required authentication for those exhibits: Since the Estate presented its documentary exhibits and had the same authenticated through Myron’s testimony, it stands to reason that the striking out of the latter’s testimony altogether wiped out the required authentication for those exhibits. They become inadmissible unless the RTC, in its discretion, reopens the trial upon a valid ground and permits the Estate to rectify its mistakes” (SPOUSES DELA CRUZ vs. PAPA IV, G.R. No. 185899, December 8, 2010, ABAD, J.). 

JUSTICE ROBERTO ABAD: THE PRESENCE OF THE ACCUSED IS NOT REQUIRED FOR THE VALIDITY OF THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION.

In Alfredo Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court held that there is no reason which exists for suspending or interrupting the conduct of the forfeiture proceedings before the Sandiganbayan.  It stated that it cannot subscribe to the Romualdezes’ claim that they are entitled to a new preliminary investigation since they had no opportunity to take part in the one held in 1991, in OMB-0-91-0820. The High Court aptly pointed out that:

Respondents admit that the subpoena for that investigation had been sent to their last known residence at the time it was conducted. The Republic also categorically insists that the appropriate subpoena had been served on the Romualdezes. Accordingly, the Ombudsman could not be faulted for proceeding with the investigation of the Romualdezes’ cases when they did not show up despite notice being sent to them at their last known residence.

The New Rules on Criminal Procedure "does not require as a condition sine qua non to the validity of the proceedings [in the preliminary investigation] the presence of the accused for as long as efforts to reach him were made, and an opportunity to controvert the evidence of the complainant is accorded him.

The obvious purpose of the rule is to block attempts of unscrupulous respondents to thwart the prosecution of offenses by hiding themselves or by employing dilatory tactics" (Mercado v. Court of Appeals, 315 Phil. 657, 662 (1995). In sum, there is no reason for suspending or interrupting the conduct of the forfeiture proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. (ALFREDO T. ROMUALDEZ vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 16160, July 13, 2010, ABAD, J.).

JUSTICE ROBERTO ABAD: A SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS APT WHEN THE ESSENTIAL FACTS OF THE CASE ARE UNCONTESTED OR THE PARTIES DO NOT RAISE ANY GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT.

A summary judgment is apt when the essential facts of the case are uncontested or the parties do not raise any genuine issue of fact. (Rivera v. Solidbank Corporation, G.R. No. 163269, April 19, 2006, 487 SCRA 512, 535, cited in Bitanga v. Pyramid Construction Engineering Corporation, G.R. No. 173526, August 28, 2008, 563 SCRA 544, 560).

In Bank of Philippine Islands vs. Spouses Norman and Angelina Yu, the Supreme Court explained that to resolve the issue of the excessive charges allegedly incorporated into the auction bid price, the RTC simply had to look at a) the pleadings of the parties; b) the loan agreements, the promissory note, and the real estate mortgages between them; c) the foreclosure and bidding documents; and d) the admissions and other disclosures between the parties during pre-trial. Since the parties admitted not only the existence, authenticity, and genuine execution of these documents but also what they stated, the trial court did not need to hold a trial for the reception of the evidence of the parties.

Be that as it may, BPI contends that a summary judgment was not proper given the following issues that the parties raised: 1) whether or not the loan agreements between them were valid and enforceable; 2) whether or not the Yus have a cause of action against BPI; 3) whether or not the Yus are proper parties in interest; 4) whether or not the Yus are estopped from questioning the foreclosure proceeding after entering into a compromise agreement with Magnacraft; 5) whether or not the penalty charges and fees and expenses of litigation and publication are excessive; and 6) whether or not BPI violated the Truth in Lending Act. (RULES OF COURT, Rule 35, Sec. 5).

But, the Supreme Court held that these are issues that could be readily resolved based on the facts established by the pleadings and the admissions of the parties. (A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, Guidelines to be Observed by Trial Court Judges and Clerks of Court in Conduct of Pre-trial and Use of Deposition-Discovery Measures, August 16, 2004).  Indeed, BPI has failed to name any document or item of fact that it would have wanted to adduce at the trial of the case. A trial would have been such a great waste of time and resources. Otherwise stated, a summary judgment is apt when the essential facts of the case are uncontested or the parties do not raise any genuine issue of fact. (BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, INC., vs. SPS. NORMAN AND ANGELINA YU, G.R. No. 184122, January 20, 2010, ABAD, J.).

JUSTICE ROBERTO ABAD: THE FILIAL PRIVILEGE RULE APPLIES ONLY TO “DIRECT” ASCENDANTS AND DESCENDANTS, A FAMILY TIE CONNECTED BY A COMMON ANCESTRY - A STEPDAUGHTER HAS NO COMMON ANCESTRY BY HER STEPMOTHER.

              Under Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence “No person may be compelled to testify against his parents, other direct ascendants, children or other direct descendants.”

              The afore-quoted rule is an adaptation from a similar provision in Article 315 of the Civil Code that applies only in criminal cases. But those who revised the Rules of Civil Procedure chose to extend the prohibition to all kinds of actions, whether civil, criminal, or administrative, filed against parents and other direct ascendants or descendants.

              In Emma Lee vs. Court of Appeals, the person (TIU) who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the stepmother of petitioner Emma Lee. The Supreme Court declared that the privilege cannot apply to them because the rule applies only to “direct” ascendants and descendants, a family tie connected by a common ancestry.  A stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her stepmother.

               Relative thereto, Article 965 of the New Civil Code provides: “The direct line is either descending or ascending. The former unites the head of the family with those who descend from him. The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends.” Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner Emma Lee. (EMMA K. LEE vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 177861, July 13, 2010, ABAD, J.).

JUSTICE ROBERTO ABAD: IT IS NOT NECESSARY THAT THE PERSON IN CHARGE OF THE DEFENDANT’S REGULAR PLACE OF BUSINESS BE SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED TO RECEIVE THE SUMMONS. IT IS ENOUGH THAT HE APPEARS TO BE IN CHARGE (EXCEPTION TO THE RULE ON SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF SUMMONS)

In Gentle Supreme Philippines, Inc. vs. Ricardo Consulta, the Supreme Court explained that in order to have a valid substituted service of summons, it is not necessary that the person in charge of the defendant’s regular place of business be specifically authorized to receive the summons. It is enough that he appears to be in charge.  Thus:

 There was valid substituted service of summons on Mr. Consulta at his place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

According to the sheriff’s return, which is prima facie evidence of the facts it states, he served a copy of the complaint on Canave, an authorized representative of both Consulta and Sarayba. Besides Consulta’s bare allegations, he did not present evidence to rebut the presumption of regularity on the manner that the sheriff performed his official duty. Nor did Consulta present clear and convincing evidence that Canave was not competent to receive the summons and the attached documents for him (Guanzon v. Arradaza, G.R. No. 155392, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 309, 318, citing Aboitiz International Forwarders, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142272, May 2, 2006, 488 SCRA 492, 506-507; Rubia v. Government Service Insurance System, 476 Phil. 623, 635 (2004); Spouses Madrigal v. Court of Appeals, 377 Phil. 345, 352 (1999).

In fact, in his petition for annulment of judgment, Consulta said that CTC had been apprised of the civil action through Canave.  In other words, Canave was a person charged with authority to receive court documents for the company as well as its officers who held office in that company. Absent contrary evidence, the veracity of the return’s content and its effectiveness stand. In fine, the Supreme Court has ruled that "it is not necessary that the person in charge of the defendant’s regular place of business be specifically authorized to receive the summons. It is enough that he appears to be in charge (Guanzon v. Arradaza, supra note 19, citing Gochangco v. CFI of Negros Occidental, 241 Phil. 48, 61 (1988).  In this case, Canave, a secretary whose job description necessarily includes receiving documents and other correspondence, would have the semblance of authority to accept the court documents.

It is true that this Court emphasized the importance of strict and faithful compliance in effecting substituted service. (See Robinson v. Miralles, G.R. No. 163584, December 12, 2006, 510 SCRA 678, 684, citing Paluwagan ng Bayan Savings Bank v. King, 254 Phil. 56, 58 (1989), [citing Arevalo v. Quilatan, 202 Phil. 256, 261 (1982) and Keister v. Judge Navarro, supra note 12, at 573]).  It must, however, be reiterated that when the rigid application of rules becomes a conduit for escaping one’s responsibility, the Court will intervene to set things right according to the rules (Robinson v. Miralles; Arevalo v. Quilatan; and Keister v. Judge Navarro). 

Further, Consulta does not deny a) that summons had been properly served on Sarayba, his vice-president, through Canave at the company’s office; b) that the summons on him was served on the same occasion also through Canave; c) that the sheriff had succeeded in garnishing his company’s bank deposits; and d) that his company subsequently made an offer to settle the judgment against it. The Court is not dumb as to believe that Consulta became aware of the suit only when the sheriff served a notice of execution sale covering his house and lot. (GENTLE SUPREME PHILIPPINES, INC., vs. RICARDO F. CONSULTA, G.R. No. 183182, September 1, 2010, ABAD, J.).