PROCEEDINGS FOR CONTEMPT ARE SUI GENERIS, IN NATURE CRIMINAL, BUT MAY BE RESORTED TO IN CIVIL AS WELL AS CRIMINAL ACTIONS, AND INDEPENDENTLY OF ANY ACTION.

   They are of two classes, the criminal or punitive, and the civil or remedial. A criminal contempt consists in conduct that is directed against the authority and dignity of a court or of a judge acting judicially, as in unlawfully assailing or discrediting the authority and dignity of the court or judge, or in doing a duly forbidden act. A civil contempt consists in the failure to do something ordered to be done by a court or judge in a civil case for the benefit of the opposing party therein. (Perkins v. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil. 271.) x x x x Where the dominant purpose is to enforce compliance with an order of a court for the benefit of a party in whose favor the order runs, the contempt is civil; where the dominant purpose is to vindicate the dignity and authority of the court, and to protect the interests of the general public, the contempt is criminal. Indeed, the criminal proceedings vindicate the dignity of the courts, but the civil proceedings protect, preserve, and enforce the rights of private parties and compel obedience to orders, judgments and decrees made to enforce such rights. (LORENZO SHIPPING CORPORATION ET AL. VS. DISTRIBUTION BUTTON MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES ET AL., G.R. NO. 155849, AUGUST 31, 2011, BERSAMIN, J.). 

CONTEMPT OF COURT

It is the willful disregard or disobedience of a public authority. In its broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body. In its restricted and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of a court. The phrase contempt of court is generic, embracing within its legal signification a variety of different acts.The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and need not be specifically granted by statute. x x x x

           

         Contempt of court is of two kinds, namely: direct contempt, which is committed in the presence of or so near the judge as to obstruct him in the administration of justice; and constructive or indirect contempt, which consists of willful disobedience of the lawful process or order of the court. (Narcida v. Bowen, 22 Phil. 365.). The punishment for the first is generally summary and immediate, and no process or evidence is necessary because the act is committed in facie curiae. The inherent power of courts to punish contempt of court committed in the presence of the courts without further proof of facts and without aid of a trial is not open to question, considering that this power is essential to preserve their authority and to prevent the administration of justice from falling into disrepute; such summary conviction and punishment accord with due process of law. There is authority for the view, however, that an act, to constitute direct contempt punishable by summary proceeding, need not be committed in the immediate presence of the court, if it tends to obstruct justice or to interfere with the actions of the court in the courtroom itself. Also, contemptuous acts committed out of the presence of the court, if admitted by the contemnor in open court, may be punished summarily as a direct contempt although it is advisable to proceed by requiring the person charged to appear and show cause why he should not be punished when the judge is without personal knowledge of the misbehavior and is informed of it only by a confession of the contemnor or by testimony under oath of other persons. In contrast, the second usually requires proceedings less summary than the first. The proceedings for the punishment of the contumacious act committed outside the personal knowledge of the judge generally need the observance of all the elements of due process of law, that is, notice, written charges, and an opportunity to deny and to defend such charges before guilt is adjudged and sentence imposed. Plainly, therefore, the word summary with respect to the punishment for contempt refers not to the timing of the action with reference to the offense but to the procedure that dispenses with the formality, delay, and digression that result from the issuance of process, service of complaint and answer, holding hearings, taking evidence, listening to arguments, awaiting briefs, submission of findings, and all that goes with a conventional court trial. (LORENZO SHIPPING CORPORATION ET AL. VS. DISTRIBUTION BUTTON MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES ET AL., G.R. NO. 155849, AUGUST 31, 2011, BERSAMIN, J.).

            

       in-court contempts and out-of-court contempts: A distinction between in-court contempts, which disrupt court proceedings and for which a hearing and formal presentation of evidence are dispensed with, and out-of-court contempts, which require normal adversary procedures, is drawn for the purpose of prescribing what procedures must attend the exercise of a court’s authority to deal with contempt. The distinction does not limit the ability of courts to initiate contempt prosecutions to the summary punishment of in-court contempts that interfere with the judicial process. (Young v. United States, 481 US 787.). (LORENZO SHIPPING CORPORATION ET AL. VS. DISTRIBUTION BUTTON MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 155849, AUGUST 31, 2011, BERSAMIN, J.).

            

        

JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL:

It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a judgment of acquittal shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.(Id.) When the exoneration is merely due to the failure to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the court should award the civil liability in favor of the offended party in the same criminal action. (Id.)  In other words, the “extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil [liability] might arise did not exist.” (Calalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74613, February 27, 1991, 194 SCRA 514, 523-524.)  In Banal v. Tadeo, Jr., 240 Phil. 326, 331 (1987), the Supreme Court elucidated on the civil liability of the accused despite his exoneration in this wise:

While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another.  Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law. x x x 

Simply stated, civil liability arises when one, by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, causes damage to another.  Hence, for petitioner to be civilly liable to spouses Alonto, it must be proven that the acts he committed had caused damage to the spouses. (FELIXBERTO A. ABELLANA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILS. ET AL., G.R. NO. 174654, AUGUST 17, 2011, DEL CASTILLO, J.). 

AS A GENERAL RULE, AN ORDER GRANTING THE ACCUSED’S DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE AMOUNTS TO AN ACQUITTAL.

There are certain exceptions, however, as when the grant thereof would not violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. For instance, this Court ruled that when there is a finding that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence, its judgment is considered void, as this Court ruled in People v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 128587, 16 March 2007, 518 SCRA 393.) By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review dismissal orders of trial courts granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence. This may be done via the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 based on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal order, being considered void judgment, does not result in jeopardy. Thus, when the order of dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate court in an original special civil action via certiorari, the right of the accused against double jeopardy is not violated. In the instant case, having affirmed the CA finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court when it granted the accused’s demurrer to evidence, the Supreme Curt  deem its consequent order of acquittal void (HON. JUDGE JESUS B. MUPAS VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILS., ET AL.G.R. NO. 189365, OCTOBER 12, 2011, SERENO, J.). 

2012 Special Pre-Bar Lecture in Remedial Law

Good day!

          We are glad to inform you that Prof. Christian “Kit” Villasis will be holding a Special Pre-Bar Lecture covering the doctrinal pronouncements of Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and latest Supreme Court decisions until April 2012 on September 20-21 at the Audio Visual Room (AVR), EAC building V, Emilio Aguinaldo College (EAC), United Nations avenue corner San Marcelino Street, Ermita, Manila. 

          The two-day lecture will be for P1,000, inclusive of a review material on the Latest Jurisprudential Developments in Remedial Law. Limited reserved slots only. Enroll now! Reservation period is from September 3 to 17.  Law students and undergraduates are welcome to enroll.

For reservations, you can reply to this e-mail or contact the numbers 0906-2784262 or 0922-8988626. You may also call 470-8163 and look for Mr. Jowel or Ms. Madel. 

          Meanwhile, you can check your e-mails for the Remedial Law Review Material that Prof. Villasis initially sent to you.

          Thank you very much. More power and best regards!