RES GESTAE PRINCIPLE, AN EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE

Res gestae refers to statements made by the participants or the victims of, or the spectators to, a crime immediately before, during, or after its commission. These statements are a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion, without any opportunity for the declarant to fabricate a false statement. 

An important consideration is whether there intervened, between the occurrence and the statement, any circumstance calculated to divert the mind and thus restore the mental balance of the declarant; and afford an opportunity for deliberation .

For spontaneous statements to be admitted in evidence, the following must concur: 1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; 2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and 3) the statements concerned the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances (Marturillas v. People, G.R. No. 163217, April 18, 2006, 487 SCRA 273, 308-309).

In People vs. Fallones, the Supreme Court held that the principle of res gestae applies. Thus:

Fallones’ act of forcing himself into Alice is a startling event. And Amalia happened to be just outside his house when she heard Alice cry out “tama na, tama na!”  When Fallones opened the door upon Amalia’s incessant knocking, Alice came out from behind him, uttering “Amalia, may napkin na binigay si Romy o.”  The admissibility of Alice’s spontaneous statements rests on the valid assumption that they were spoken under circumstances where there had been no chance to contrive.[Id.]  It is difficult to lie in an excited state and the impulsiveness of the expression is a guaranty of trustworthiness (Capila v. People, G.R. No. 146161, July 17, 2006, 495 SCRA 276, 281-282  x x x x

For his defense, Fallones claimed that the members of Alice’s family pressured her into pointing to him as her abuser.  But he has been unable to establish any possible ill-motive that could prompt Alice’s family into charging him falsely.  Indeed, Fallones admitted at the trial that there had been no animosity between Alice’s family and him.  

      Fallones argues that Alice’s actuations after the incident negate rape, invoking the Court’s ruling in People v. Dela Cruz, 388 Phil. 678 (2000).  But the circumstances of the latter case are far too different from those existing in the present case.  In Dela Cruz, although the victim was seven years old when the supposed rape took place, she was not mentally retarded.  Further, she was already 19 years old when she reported the incident 12 years after it happened.  Besides, the medical findings revealed that her hymen remained intact. Thus, the Court did not believe that she had been raped when she was seven.

In sum, the testimony of the witnesses, the physical evidence, the medico-legal finding, and the psychologist’s report all establish that Fallones raped Alice. The defense offered no witness or evidence of Fallones’ innocence other than his bare denial. Again, the Court will not disturb the RTC’s findings and conclusion being the first-hand observer of the witnesses’ attitude and behavior during trial. The defense counsel was unsuccessful in impeaching Amalia during cross-examination. In fine, the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.Alice is dead but, as Shakespeare wrote in his Sonnets—The Winter’s Tale, "the silence often of pure innocence persuades when speaking fails" (Bartlett’s Familiar Quotations" by John Bartlett, p. 222, par. 22). (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMY FALLONES y LABANA, G.R. No. 190341, March 16, 2011, ABAD, J.).

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JAYSON IVLER CASE: PRIOR CONVICTION OR ACQUITTAL FOR RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE BARS SUBSEQUENT PROSECUTION FOR THE SAME QUASI-OFFENSE

In Jayson Ivler Y Aguilar vs. Hon. Maria Rowena Modesto-San Pedro, the Supreme Court sufficiently explained that the doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting with People v. Diaz, [94 Phil. 715 (1954)] decided in 1954.

There, a full Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of a case for "damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because a prior case against the same accused for "reckless driving," arising from the same act upon which the first prosecution was based, had been dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same legal question was brought before the Court, that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of the consequences alleged for both charges, the Court unfailingly and consistently answered in the affirmative in People v. Belga [100 Phil. 996 (1957) (barring subsequent prosecutions for physical injuries thru reckless imprudence and damage to property thru reckless imprudence following an acquittal for "reckless imprudence with physical injury")] (promulgated in 1957 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.), Yap v. Lutero [105 Phil. 1307 (1959) (Unrep.) (barring subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries" following an acquittal for "reckless driving")] (promulgated in 1959, unreported, per Concepcion, J.), People v. Narvas [107 Phil. 737 (1960) (barring subsequent prosecution for "damage to property thru reckless imprudence" following a conviction for "multiple slight and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence.")] (promulgated in 1960 by the Court en banc, per Bengzon J.), People v. Silva [No. L-15974, 30 January 1962, 4 SCRA 95 (barring subsequent prosecution for "homicide thru reckless imprudence" following an acquittal for "slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence").] (promulgated in 1962 by the Court en banc, per Paredes, J.), People v. Macabuhay [123 Phil. 48 (1966) (barring subsequent prosecution for "damage to property thru reckless imprudence" following an acquittal for two counts of "slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence.")] (promulgated in 1966 by the Court en banc, per Makalintal, J.), People v. Buan [131 Phil. 498 (1968) (barring subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless imprudence" following an acquittal for "slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence").] (promulgated in 1968 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.B.L., acting C. J.), Buerano v. Court of Appeals [200 Phil. 486 (1982) (reversing a subsequent conviction for "damage to property thru reckless imprudence" following a conviction for "slight and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence").] (promulgated in 1982 by the Court en banc, per Relova, J.), and People v. City Court of Manila [206 Phil. 555 (1983) (barring subsequent prosecution for "homicide thru reckless imprudence" following a conviction for "serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence").] (promulgated in 1983 by the First Division, per Relova, J.). These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.

The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where, in barring a subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because of the accused’s prior acquittal of "slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," with both charges grounded on the same act, the Court explained: [131 Phil. 498, 500 (1968).]

Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions. x x x (Emphasis supplied) x x x x x

Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely extended to its logical conclusion the reasoning of Quizon.      x x x x Hence, the Supreme Court found merit in petitioner’s submission that the lower courts erred in refusing to extend in his favor the mantle of protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause.

A more fitting jurisprudence could not be tailored to petitioner’s case than People v. Silva, No. L-15974, 30 January 1962, 4 SCRA 95, a Diaz progeny. There, the accused, who was also involved in a vehicular collision, was charged in two separate Informations with "Slight Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence" and "Homicide with Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence." Following his acquittal of the former, the accused sought the quashal of the latter, invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause. The trial court initially denied relief, but, on reconsideration, found merit in the accused’s claim and dismissed the second case.  x x x x

Ergo, the Supreme Court granted the petition and DISMISSED the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy (JASON IVLER y AGUILAR vs. HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, G.R. No. 172716, November 17, 2010, CARPIO, J.). 

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THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY DISMISSED THE SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI, WHICH QUESTIONED THE RTC’S GRANT OF BAIL TO RESPONDENT, FOR HAVING BEEN FILED IN THE NAME OF THE OFFENDED PARTIES AND WITHOUT THE OSG’S INTERVENTION.

The grant of bail or its denial has no impact on the civil liability of the accused that depends on conviction by final judgment.  Ergo, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the special civil action for certiorari, which questioned the RTC’s grant of bail to respondent, for having been filed in the name of the offended parties and without the OSG’s intervention.

the question of granting bail to the accused is but an aspect of the criminal action, preventing him from eluding punishment in the event of conviction. The grant of bail or its denial has no impact on the civil liability of the accused that depends on conviction by final judgment.

While in Narciso v. Sta. Romana-Cruz, 385 Phil. 208 (2000), the Supreme Court allowed the offended party to challenge before it the trial court's order granting bail. Nonetheless, in that case, the trial court gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting bail without conducting any hearing at all.  Thus, to disallow the appeal on the basis of lack of intervention of the OSG would "leave the private complainant without any recourse to rectify the public injustice." (People v. Calo, G.R. No. 88531, June 18, 1990, 186 SCRA 620, 624).

On the contrary, the Supreme Court in Burgos vs. Court of Appeals, emphatically stated that since respondent Co has already been arraigned, the trial and judgment, with award for civil liability when warranted, could proceed even in his absence.

This is true because the trial court took time to hear the parade of witnesses that the prosecution presented before reaching the conclusion that the evidence of guilt of respondent Co was not strong.  Ergo, the CA correctly dismissed the special civil action of certiorari, which questioned the RTC’s grant of bail to respondent Co, for having been filed in the name of the offended parties and without the OSG’s intervention (BURGOS vs. CA, G.R. No. 169711, February 08, 2010, ABAD, J.).