ONCE A JUDGMENT ATTAINS
FINALITY, IT BECOMES IMMUTABLE AND UNALTERABLE. IT MAY NO LONGER BE MODIFIED IN
ANY RESPECT, EVEN IF THE MODIFICATION IS MEANT TO CORRECT WHAT IS PERCEIVED TO
BE AN ERRONEOUS CONCLUSION OF FACT OR LAW, AND REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE MODIFICATION
IS ATTEMPTED TO BE MADE BY THE COURT RENDERING IT OR BY THIS COURT.
Monday, September 14, 2015
Friday, September 11, 2015
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION:
In Torres v. Garchitorena, G.R. No.
153666, December 27, 2002, 394 SCRA 494, 508-509, the Supreme Court stated that
under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that which
must precede the criminal action and which requires a decision before a
final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action with which said
question is closely connected. The civil action must be instituted prior
to the institution of the criminal action.
Clearly, the civil action must precede
the filing of the criminal action for a Prejudicial Question to exist.
:yellow;mso-highlight:
yellow;mso-ansi-language:EN-PH;mso-fareast-language:EN-US;mso-bidi-language:
AR-SA'>Clearly, the civil action must precede the filing of the
criminal action for a Prejudicial Question to exist.
Tuesday, September 8, 2015
PROHIBITION:
The standard under Rule 65 for the issuance of
the writ of prohibition is "grave abuse of discretion" and not mere
"abuse of discretion." The difference is not a simple matter of
semantics. The writs governed by Rule 65 – certiorari, mandamus, and
prohibition – are extraordinary remedies designed to correct not mere errors of
judgment (i.e., in the appreciation of facts or interpretation of law) but
errors of jurisdiction (i.e., lack or excess of jurisdiction). Unlike the first
category of errors which the lower tribunal commits in the exercise of its
jurisdiction, the latter class of errors is committed by a lower tribunal
devoid of jurisdiction or, alternatively, for exercising jurisdiction in an
"arbitrary or despotic manner." By conflating "abuse of
discretion" with "grave abuse of discretion," the Court of
Appeals failed to follow the rigorous standard of Rule 65, diluting its office
of correcting only jurisdictional errors.
Monday, September 7, 2015
The
terms "electronic data message"
and "electronic document," as defined under the Electronic Commerce
Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission
cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional
equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as
electronic evidence. When congress drafted the law, it excluded the
earlier forms of technology like telegraph, telex, and telecopy (except computer-generated faxes) when
the law defined electronic data message.
Friday, September 4, 2015
ARREST:
IN THE ISSUANCE
OF A WARRANT OF ARREST, THE MANDATE OF THE CONSTITUTION IS FOR THE JUDGE TO
PERSONALLY DETERMINE THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE.
The words "personal
determination," was interpreted by the Supreme Court in Soliven
v. Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585, 14 November 1988, 167 SCRA 393,
406)
- the exclusive and personal responsibility
of the issuing judge to satisfy himself as to the existence of probable cause.
(a) personally
evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the
prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof,
issue a warrant of arrest; or
(b) if on the basis thereof, he finds no probable
cause, disregard the prosecutor's report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in determining its existence.
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