DEMAND IS NOT REQUIRED PRIOR TO THE FILING OF REPLEVIN ACTION:

For a writ of replevin to issue, all that the applicant must do is to file an affidavit and bond, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules, which states:

Sec. 2. Affidavit and bond: The applicant must show by his own affidavit or that of some other person who personally knows the facts:

(a)      That the applicant is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or is entitled to the possession thereof;

(b)      That the property is wrongfully detained by the adverse party, alleging the cause of detention thereof according to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief;

(c)      That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine pursuant to law, or seized under a writ of execution or preliminary attachment, or otherwise placed under custodia legis, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure or custody; and

(d) The actual market value of the property.

The applicant must also give a bond, executed to the adverse party in double the value of the property as stated in the affidavit aforementioned for the return of the property to the adverse party if such return be adjudged, and for the payment to the adverse party of such sum as he may recover from the applicant in the action” (emphjasis supplied). 

          The Supreme Court see nothing in these provisions which requires the applicant to make a prior demand on the possessor of the property before he can file an action for a writ of replevin. Thus, prior demand is not a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin. More importantly, Navarro is no longer in the position to claim that a prior demand is necessary, as he has already admitted in his Answers that he had received the letters that Karen Go sent him, demanding that he either pay his unpaid obligations or return the leased motor vehicles.  Navarro’s position that a demand is necessary and has not been made is therefore totally unmeritorious. (ROGER V. NAVARRO, vs. HON. JOSE L. ESCOBIDO, G.R. No.  153788, November 27, 2009, BRION, J.).

EJECTMENT SUIT CANNOT BE ABATED OR SUSPENDED BY THE MERE FILING OF ANOTHER ACTION RAISING OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTY AS AN ISSUE:

As a general rule, an ejectment suit cannot be abated or suspended by the mere filing of another action raising ownership of the property as an issue. The Court has, in fact, affirmed this rule in the following precedents:

1. Injunction suits instituted in the RTC by defendants in ejectment actions in the municipal trial courts or other courts of the first level (Nacorda v. Yatco, 17 SCRA 920 [1966]) do not abate the latter; and neither do proceedings on consignation of rentals (Lim Si v. Lim, 98 Phil. 868 [1956], citing Pue, et al. v. Gonzales, 87 Phil. 81 [1950]).

2. An "accion publiciana" does not suspend an ejectment suit against the plaintiff in the former (Ramirez v. Bleza, 106 SCRA 187 [1981]).

3. A "writ of possession case" where ownership is concededly the principal issue before the Regional Trial Court does not preclude nor bar the execution of the judgment in an unlawful detainer suit where the only issue involved is the material possession or possession de facto of the premises (Heirs of F. Guballa, Sr. v. C.A., et al.; etc., 168 SCRA 518 [1988]).

4. An action for quieting of title to property is not a bar to an ejectment suit involving the same property (Quimpo v. de la Victoria, 46 SCRA 139 [1972]).

5. Suits for specific performance with damages do not affect ejectment actions (e.g., to compel renewal of a lease contract) (Desamito v. Cuyegkeng, 18 SCRA 1184 [1966]; Rosales v. CFI, 154 SCRA 153 [1987]; Commander Realty, Inc. v. C.A., 161 SCRA 264 [1988]).

6. An action for reformation of instrument (e.g., from deed of absolute sale to one of sale with pacto de retro) does not suspend an ejectment suit between the same parties (Judith v. Abragan, 66 SCRA 600 [1975]).

7. An action for reconveyance of property or "accion reivindicatoria" also has no effect on ejectment suits regarding the same property (Del Rosario v. Jimenez, 8 SCRA 549 [1963]; Salinas v. Navarro, 126 SCRA 167; De la Cruz v. C.A., 133 SCRA 520 [1984]); Drilon v. Gaurana, 149 SCRA 352 [1987]; Ching v. Malaya, 153 SCRA 412 [1987]; Philippine Feeds Milling Co., Inc. v. C.A., 174 SCRA 108; Dante v. Sison, 174 SCRA 517 [1989]; Guzman v. C.A. [annulment of sale and reconveyance], 177 SCRA 604 [1989]; Demamay v. C.A., 186 SCRA 608 [1990]; Leopoldo Sy v. C.A., et al., [annulment of sale and reconveyance], G.R. No. 95818, Aug. 2, 1991).

8. Neither do suits for annulment of sale, or title, or document affecting property operate to abate ejectment actions respecting the same property (Salinas v. Navarro [annulment of deed of sale with assumption of mortgage and/or to declare the same an equitable mortgage], 126 SCRA 167 [1983]; Ang Ping v. RTC [annulment of sale and title], 154 SCRA 153 [1987]; Caparros v. C.A. [annulment of title], 170 SCRA 758 [1989]; Dante v. Sison [annulment of sale with damages], 174 SCRA 517; Galgala v. Benguet Consolidated, Inc. [annulment of document], 177 SCRA 288 [1989]).

Only in rare instances is suspension allowed to await the outcome of a pending civil action. In Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendaño (G.R. No. L-40437, September 27, 1977, 79 SCRA 135) and Amagan v. Marayag, (383 Phil. 486, 489 {2000}), we ordered the suspension of the ejectment proceedings on considerations of equity. We explained that the ejectment of petitioners therein would mean a demolition of their house and would create confusion, disturbance, inconvenience, and expense. Needlessly, the court would be wasting much time and effort by proceeding to a stage wherein the outcome would at best be temporary but the result of enforcement would be permanent, unjust and probably irreparable. Given these factual antecedents, the instant case hardly falls within the exception cited in Vda. de Legaspi and Amagan as the resolution of the ejectment suit will not result in the demolition of the leased premises (SAMONTE vs. CENTURY SAVINGS BANK, G.R. No. 176413, November 25, 2009, Third Division, Nachura, J.). 

EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL OF DECISIONS IN EJECTMENT CASES: RESIDUAL JURISDICTION TO ORDER EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL:

Rule 42 of the Rules of Court governs the appeal of a decision of the RTC rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; the appeal is made by filing a petition for review with the CA. Despite the filing of a petition with the CA, however, Rule 42 grants the RTC residual jurisdiction to order execution pending appeal, so long as (1) the CA has not yet given due course to the petition, and (2) the requirements of Section 2, Rule 39 are observed.  The relevant portion of Section 8, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court states:

Section 8. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof — (a) x x x

However, before the Court of Appeals gives due course to the petition, the Regional Trial Court may issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal.

x x x x

      Under Section 6, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, the CA can give due course to a petition for review when it finds prima facie that the lower court has committed an error of fact or law that will warrant a reversal or modification of the appealed decision. This initial determination by the CA can take place only when the proper pleadings have actually been filed before the CA, enabling it to study the facts of the case and the alleged errors of the assailed ruling.  In other words, the CA can give due course to an appeal of the RTC decision only (1) after the filing of a petition for review, and (2) upon the filing of the comment or other pleading required by the CA, or the expiration of the period for the filing thereof without such comment or pleading having been submitted (ALPA-PCM INC., VS. VINCENT BULASAO, ET AL., G.R. NO. 197124, MARCH 19, 2012, BRION, J.).

EQUITY OF REDEMPTION VS. RIGHT OF REDEMPTION

In relation to mortgage, the right of redemption exists in extra-judicial foreclosure; while equity of redemption exists only in judicial foreclosure. In extrajudicial foreclosure, the mortgagor may exercise his right of redemption within 1 year from the registration of the sale in the Office of the Registry of Deeds; while in judicial foreclosure, the mortgagor may exercise his equity of redemption during the period of not less than 90 days nor more than 120 days from entry of judgment of foreclosure or even after the foreclosure sale but before the judicial confirmation of the sale. There is no right of redemption in judicial foreclosure of mortgage, except only if the mortgagee is the Philippine National Bank or any banking institution. Thus, in judicial foreclosure of mortgage where the mortgagee is the Philippine National Bank or any banking institution, there exist both equity of redemption and right of redemption. (Huerta Alba Resort v. CA, GR No. 128567, September 1, 2000). 

AN ACTING APPOINTEE HAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION TO FILE A PETITION FOR QUO WARRANTO AGAINST THE NEW APPOINTEE:

Quo warranto is a remedy to try disputes with respect to the title to a public office. Generally, quo warranto proceedings are commenced by the Government as the proper party-plaintiff. However, under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, an individual may commence such action if he claims to be entitled to the public office allegedly usurped by another. The Supreme Court stressed that the person instituting the quo warranto proceedings in his own behalf must show that he is entitled to the office in dispute; otherwise, the action may be dismissed at any stage. Emphatically, Section 6, Rule 66 requires the petitioner to  state in  the  petition his right to the public office and the respondent's unlawful possession of the disputed position. As early as 1905, the Court already held that for a petition for quo warranto to be successful, the suing private individual must show a clear right to the contested office. His failure to establish this right warrants the dismissal of the suit for lack of cause of action; it is not even necessary to pass upon the right of the defendant who, by virtue of his appointment, continues in the undisturbed possession of his office. Since the petitioner merely holds an acting appointment (and an expired one at that), he clearly does not have a cause of action to maintain the present petition. (HON. LUIS MARIO M. GENERAL, COMMISSIONER, NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION,VS. HON. ALEJANDRO S. URRO ET AL., G.R. NO. 191560, MARCH 29, 2011, BRION, J.). 

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS AN ORDER GRANTED AT ANY STAGE OF AN ACTION PRIOR TO JUDGMENT OF FINAL ORDER, REQUIRING A PARTY, COURT, AGENCY, OR PERSON TO REFRAIN FROM A PARTICULAR ACT OR ACTS.

It is a preservative remedy to ensure the protection of a party’s substantive rights or interests pending the final judgment in the principal action. A plea for an injunctive writ lies upon the existence of a claimed emergency or extraordinary situation which should be avoided for otherwise, the outcome of a litigation would be useless as far as the party applying for the writ is concerned.  At times referred to as the “Strong Arm of Equity,” the Suprteme Court has consistently ruled that there is no power the exercise of which is more delicate and which calls for greater circumspection than the issuance of an injunction. It should only be extended in cases of great injury where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in damages;  “in cases of extreme urgency; where the right is very clear; where considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly in complainant’s favor; where there is a willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiff’s right against his protest and remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one, and where the effect of the mandatory injunction is rather to reestablish and maintain a preexisting continuing relation between the parties, recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant, than to establish a new relation.” For the writ to issue, two requisites must be present, namely, the existence of the right to be protected, and that the facts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right. It is necessary that one must show an unquestionable right over the premises. Thus, the following requisites must be proved before a writ of preliminary injunction, be it mandatory or prohibitory, will issue:

(1)      The applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, that is a right in esse;

(2)      There is a material and substantial invasion of such right;

(3)     There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and

 (4)       No other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.

                  x x x  It bears stressing that an injunction is not a remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or future rights; it will not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise, or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action. There must exist an actual right. Verily, petitioner cannot lay claim to an actual, clear and positive right based on an expired service contract.Moreover, well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that no court can compel a party to agree to a contract through the instrumentality of a writ of preliminary injunction (Thunder Security and Investigation Agency/Lourdes M. Lasala  vs. National Food Authority (NFA) & NFA Regional Bids and Awards Committee (Region 1), G.R. No. 182042, July 27, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

GROUNDS FOR PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT:

The circumstances under which a writ of preliminary attachment may be issued are set forth in Section 1, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

SEC. 1. Grounds upon which attachment may issue. — At the commencement of the action or at any time before entry of judgment, a plaintiff or any proper party may have the property of the adverse party attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered in the following cases:

(a) In an action for the recovery of a specified amount of money or damages, other than moral and exemplary, on a cause of action arising from law, contract, quasi-contract, delict or quasi-delict against a party who is about to depart from the Philippines with intent to defraud his creditors;

(b) In an action for money or property embezzled or fraudulently misapplied or converted to his own use by a public officer, or an officer of a corporation or an attorney, factor, broker, agent, or clerk, in the course of his employment as such, or by any other person in a fiduciary capacity, or for a willful violation of duty;

(c) In an action to recover the possession of personal property unjustly or fraudulently taken, detained, or converted, when the property, or any part thereof, has been concealed, removed, or disposed of to prevent its being found or taken by the applicant or an authorized person;

(d) In an action against a party who has been guilty of a fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought, or in the performance thereof;

(e) In an action against a party who has removed or disposed of his property, or is about to do so, with intent to defraud his creditors;

(f) In an action against a party who resides out of the Philippines, or on whom summons may be served by publication.

           

The purposes of preliminary attachment are: (1) to seize the property of the debtor in advance of final judgment and to hold it for purposes of satisfying said judgment, as in the grounds stated in paragraphs (a) to (e) of Section 1, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court; or (2) to acquire jurisdiction over the action by actual or constructive seizure of the property in those instances where personal or substituted service of summons on the defendant cannot be effected, as in paragraph (f) of the same provision (PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK vs. JOSEPH ANTHONY M. ALEJANDRO, G.R. No. 175587, September 21, 2007, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.).

CHANGE OF SEX AND NAME:

                Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

                As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, the Supreme Court has held that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow. The trial courts grant of respondent’s change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondent’s change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, the Supreme Court found merit in respondent’s change of name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JENIFFER CAGANDAHAN, G.R. No. 166676, September 12, 2008, Second Division, Quisumbing, J.).

THE REMEDY OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS:

Essentially, a writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty. (Moncupa v. Enrile, 225 Phil. 191, 197 (1986).  Rule 102 of the 1997 Rules of Court sets forth the procedure to be followed in the issuance of the writ. x x x  The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a person's detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application. (Go, Sr. v. Ramos, G.R. No. 167569, 4 September 2009, 598 SCRA 266, 301).

Plainly stated, the writ obtains immediate relief for those who have been illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause. The writ, however, should not be issued when the custody over the person is by virtue of a judicial process or a valid judgment.  The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual seeking such relief is illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint. If an individual's liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. (In Re: The Writ of Habeas Corpus for Reynaldo De Villa, G.R. No. 158802, 17 November 2004, 442 SCRA 706, 719).

Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. (Veluz v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 169482, 29 January 2008, 543 SCRA 63, 67-68).

In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a particular person is legally held. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first inquire into whether the petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will proceed only where such restraint exists. If the alleged cause is thereafter found to be unlawful, then the writ should be granted and the petitioner discharged. 

Needless to state, if otherwise, again the writ will be refused. While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance and it must be clear to the judge to whom the petition is presented that, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled to the writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant or the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed (NURHIDA JUHURI AMPATUAN vs. JUDGE VIRGILIO V. MACARAIG, G.R. No. 182497, June 29, 2010, PEREZ, J.). 

GUARDIANSHIP:

          Under Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court, persons who, though of sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes are incapable of taking care of themselves and their property without outside aid, are considered as incompetents who may properly be placed under guardianship. x x x x  

           The RTC and the CA both found that Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and her properties without outside aid due to her ailments and weak mind. Lulu is an incompetent and she requires the appointment of a judicial guardian over her person and property. x x x x  The Supreme Court found no compelling reason to reverse the trial and appellate courts finding as to the propriety of respondent's appointment as the judicial guardian of Lulu. Therefore, it affirmed her appointment as such. Consequently, respondent is tasked to care for and take full custody of Lulu, and manage her estate as well (HERNANDEZ vs. SANTOS, G.R. No. 166470, August 7, 2009, First Division, Corona, J.).

IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS, SUCH AS THE PROCEEDING FOR SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE, THE PERIOD OF APPEAL FROM ANY DECISION OR FINAL ORDER RENDERED THEREIN IS 30 DAYS, A NOTICE OF APPEAL AND A RECORD ON APPEAL BEING REQUIRED.

Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Modes of appeal

(a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.  No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require.  In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner. 

            

      The appeal period may only be interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. Once the appeal period expires without an appeal being perfected, the decision or order becomes final, thus:

                        

                        In special proceedings, such as the instant proceeding for settlement of estate, the period of appeal from any decision or final order rendered therein is thirty (30) days, a notice of appeal and a record on appeal being required. The appeal period may only be interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration.  Once the appeal period expires without an appeal or a motion for reconsideration or new trial being perfected, the decision or order becomes final. (Testate Estate of Maria Manuel Vda. de Biascan v. Biascan, 401 Phil. 49, 58 (2000). This Court has invariably ruled that perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional. (Rigor v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 167400, 30 June 2006, 494 SCRA 375, 382.) (Rene B. Pascual vs. Jaime M. Robles, G.R. No. 182645, December 4, 2009, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.).

DISTINCTION BETWEEN JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT:

Simply stated, what distinguishes a judgment on the pleadings from a summary judgment is the presence of issues in the Answer to the Complaint.  When the Answer fails to tender any issue, that is, if it does not deny the material allegations in the complaint or admits said material allegations of the adverse party’s pleadings by admitting the truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal with them at all, a judgment on the pleadings is appropriate. On the other hand, when the Answer specifically denies the material averments of the complaint or asserts affirmative defenses, or in other words raises an issue, a summary judgment is proper provided that the issue raised is not genuine. “A ‘genuine issue’ means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived or which does not constitute a genuine issue for trial.” (EUGENIO BASBAS ET AL.. VS. BEATA SAYSON, G.R. NO. 172660, AUGUST 24, 2011, DEL CASTILLO, J.). 

A CASE BECOMES MOOT AND ACADEMIC ONLY WHEN THERE IS NO MORE ACTUAL CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE PARTIES OR NO USEFUL PURPOSE CAN BE SERVED IN PASSING UPON THE MERITS OF THE CASE [Tantoy, Sr. v. Abrogar, G.R. No. 156128, 9 May 2005, 458 SCRA 301, 305].

The instant case is not moot and academic, despite the petitioner’s separation from government service.   Even if the most severe of administrative sanctions - that of separation from service - may no longer be imposed on the petitioner, there are other penalties which may be imposed on her if she is later found guilty of administrative offenses charged against her, namely, the disqualification to hold any government office and the forfeiture of benefits. (Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr., OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS. ULDARICO P. ANDUTAN, JR., G.R. NO. 16467, JULY 27, 2011, BRION, J.).  

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: MOOT AND ACADEMIC CASE

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value” x x x x (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas vs. Orient Commercial Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 148483, June 29, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: PAYMENT OF DOCKET AND OTHER FEES WITHIN THIS PERIOD IS MANDATORY FOR THE PERFECTION OF THE APPEAL. OTHERWISE, THE RIGHT TO APPEAL IS LOST. (Section 4, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended).

This is so because a court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action only upon the payment of the correct amount of docket fees regardless of the actual date of filing of the case in court.  The payment of appellate docket fees is not a mere technicality of law or procedure.  It is an essential requirement, without which the decision or final order appealed from becomes final and executory as if no appeal was filed. The Supreme Court held in one case that the CA correctly dismissed the appeal where the docket fees were not paid in full within the prescribed period of fifteen (15) days but were paid forty-one (41) days late due to inadvertence, oversight, and pressure of work. (Guevarra v. Court of Appeals, No. L-43714, January 15, 1988, 157 SCRA 32. )  In another case, the High Court ruled that no appeal was perfected where half of the appellate docket fee was paid within the prescribed period, while the other half was tendered after the period within which payment should have been made. Evidently, where the appellate docket fee is not paid in full within the reglementary period, the decision of the trial court becomes final and no longer susceptible to an appeal.  For once a decision becomes final, the appellate court is without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. x x x x With regard to petitioner’s plea for a liberal treatment of the rules in order to promote substantial justice, the Court finds the same to be without merit.  It is true that the rules may be relaxed for persuasive and weighty reasons to relieve a litigant from an injustice commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedures. However, it must be stressed that procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have prejudiced a party’s substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed.  In this case, petitioner has not shown any reason such as fraud, accident, mistake, excusable negligence, or a similar supervening casualty which should justify the relaxation of the rules.  The explanation advanced by petitioner’s counsel that the failure to pay the appellate docket and other legal fees within the prescribed period was due to his extremely heavy workload and by excusable inadvertence did not convince the Supreme Court (D.M. Wenceslao and Associates, Inc. vs. City of Paranaque, G.R. No. 170728, August 31, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

HANDWRITING EXPERTS ARE USUALLY HELPFUL IN THE EXAMINATION OF FORGED DOCUMENTS BECAUSE OF THE TECHNICAL PROCEDURE INVOLVED IN ANALYZING THEM, BUT RESORT TO THESE EXPERTS IS NOT MANDATORY OR INDISPENSABLE TO THE EXAMINATION OR THE COMPARISON OF HANDWRITINGS.

A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies of handwriting experts, because the judge must conduct an examination of the questioned signature in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity.  The opinions of handwriting experts are not binding upon courts, especially when the question involved is mere handwriting similarity or dissimilarity, which can be determined by a visual comparison of specimens of the questioned signatures with those of the currently existing ones.  Moreover, Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court likewise explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to make a comparison of the disputed handwriting “with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.” (Pontaoe v. Pontaoe, G.R. No. 159585, April 22, 2008). 

HIERARCHY OF EVIDENTIARY VALUES:

In the hierarchy of evidentiary values, proof beyond reasonable doubt is at the highest level, followed by clear and convincing evidence, then by preponderance of evidence, and lastly by substantial evidence, in that order (Manalo v. Roldan-Confessor, G.R. No. 102358, 19 November 1992 cited in SHERYL C. DELA CRUZ VS. PAMELA P. MALUNAO, A.M. NO. P-11-3019, MARCH 20, 2012, PER CURIAM)

THE BURDEN OF PROOF MAY BE ON THE PLAINTIFF OR THE DEFENDANT:

The party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.  The burden of proof may be on the plaintiff or the defendant.  It is on the defendant if he alleges an affirmative defense which is not a denial of an essential ingredient in the plaintiff’s cause of action, but is one which, if established, will be a good defense – i.e., an “avoidance” of the claim.  Indeed, “in the final analysis, the party upon whom the ultimate burden lies is to be determined by the pleadings, not by who is the plaintiff or the defendant.”

            

           Burden of proof is the duty of any party to present evidence to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law, which is preponderance of evidence in civil cases.  The party, whether plaintiff or defendant, who asserts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof to obtain a favorable judgment.  Upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts, though in the course of trial, once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to the defendant to controvert the plaintiff's prima facie case; otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of the plaintiff.  It is the burden of evidence which shifts from party to party depending upon the exigencies of the case in the course of trial. x x x  The term prima facie evidence denotes evidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain the proposition it supports or to establish the facts. Prima facie means it is “sufficient to establish a fact or raise a presumption unless disproved or rebutted” (REPUBLIC vs. SANDIGANBAYAN EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., ET AL., April 12, 2011, G.R. No. 166859, CARPIO MORALES, J.).

HEARSAY EVIDENCE:

It has indeed been held that hearsay evidence whether objected to or not cannot be given credence for having no probative value. This principle, however, has been relaxed in cases where, in addition to the failure to object to the admissibility of the subject evidence, there were other pieces of evidence presented or there were other circumstances prevailing to support the fact in issue. In Top-Weld Manufacturing, Inc. v. ECED S.A., the Suprerme Court held:

“Hearsay evidence alone may be insufficient to establish a fact in an injunction suit (Parker v. Furlong, 62 P. 490) but, when no objection is made thereto, it is, like any other evidence, to be considered and given the importance it deserves. (Smith v. Delaware & Atlantic Telegraph & Telephone Co., 51 A 464). Although we should warn of the undesirability of issuing judgments solely on the basis of the affidavits submitted, where as here, said affidavits are overwhelming, uncontroverted by competent evidence and not inherently improbable, we are constrained to uphold the allegations of the respondents regarding the multifarious violations of the contracts made by the petitioner (HEIRS OF POLICRONIO URETA, SR. ET AL. VS. HIERS OF LIBERATO M. URETA,  ET AL., G.R. NO. 165748; HIERS OF LIBERATO M. URETA, ET AL. VS. HEIRS OF POLICRONIO URETA, SR. ET AL.  G.R. NO. 165930, SEPTEMBER 14, 2011 , MENDOZA, J.). -

THE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR LIES WITHIN THE DISCRETION OF THE COURT.

In Heirs of Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo v. Lacuata-Gabriel, G.R. No. 162934, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 747, 759-760, it was stated that:

“It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior or preferred right of certain persons to the appointment of administrator under Section 1, Rule 81, as well as the statutory provisions as to causes for removal of an executor or administrator under section 653 of Act No. 190, now Section 2, Rule 83, do not apply to the selection or removal of special administrator. x x x As the law does not say who shall be appointed as special administrator and the qualifications the appointee must have, the judge or court has discretion in the selection of the person to be appointed, discretion which must be sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary to reason, justice or equity. (Emphasis supplied; citation omitted.)

This principle was reiterated in the Ocampo case, where the Supreme Court ruled that: “While the RTC considered that respondents were the nearest of kin to their deceased parents in their appointment as joint special administrators, this is not a mandatory requirement for the appointment. It has long been settled that the selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators. The probate court may appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules at its discretion, such that the need to first pass upon and resolve the issues of fitness or unfitness and the application of the order of preference under Section 6 of Rule 78, as would be proper in the case of a regular administrator, do not obtain. As long as the discretion is exercised without grave abuse, and is based on reason, equity, justice, and legal principles, interference by higher courts is unwarranted (Emphasis supplied.)

While the trial court has the discretion to appoint anyone as a special administrator of the estate, such discretion must be exercised with reason, guided by the directives of equity, justice and legal principles. It may, therefore, not be remiss to reiterate that the role of a special administrator is to preserve the estate until a regular administrator is appointed. As stated in Sec. 2, Rule 80 of the Rules:

Section 2. Powers and duties of special adminsitrator. — Such special administrator shall take possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the executors or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose may commence and maintain suits as administrator. He may sell only such perishable and other property as the court orders sold. A special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the deceased unless so ordered by the court.

Given this duty on the part of the special administrator, it would, therefore, be prudent and reasonable to appoint someone interested in preserving the estate for its eventual distribution to the heirs. Such choice would ensure that such person would not expose the estate to losses that would effectively diminish his or her share. While the court may use its discretion and depart from such reasoning, still, there is no logical reason to appoint a person who is a debtor of the estate and otherwise a stranger to the deceased. To do so would be tantamount to grave abuse of discretion. (DIOSDADO MANUNGAS VS. MARGARITA AVILA LORETO & FLORENCIA AVILA PARRENO, G.R. NO. 193161, AUGUST 22, 2011, VELASCO, JR., J.).

NOTHING PREVENTS THE HEIRS FROM EXERCISING THEIR RIGHT TO TRANSFER OR DISPOSE OF THE PROPERTIES THAT CONSTITUTE THEIR LEGITIMES, EVEN ABSENT THEIR DECLARATION OR ABSENT THE PARTITION OR THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE.

x x x In order to reach a final determination of the matters concerning the estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos – that is, the accounting and the recovery of ill-gotten wealth – the present case must be maintained against Imelda Marcos and herein respondent Ferdinand “Bongbong” R. Marcos, Jr., as executors of the Marcos estate pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. According to this provision, actions may be commenced to recover from the estate, real or personal property, or an interest therein, or to enforce a lien thereon; and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against the executors.  Under the rules of succession, the heirs instantaneously became co-owners of the Marcos properties upon the death of the President. The property rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted to another through the decedent’s death. In this concept, nothing prevents the heirs from exercising their right to transfer or dispose of the properties that constitute their legitimes, even absent their declaration or absent the partition or the distribution of the estate. (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MA. IMELDA “IMEE” R. MARCOS-MANOTOC, G. R. NO. 171701, FEBRUARY 8, 2012, SERENO, J.).

PROCEEDINGS FOR CONTEMPT ARE SUI GENERIS, IN NATURE CRIMINAL, BUT MAY BE RESORTED TO IN CIVIL AS WELL AS CRIMINAL ACTIONS, AND INDEPENDENTLY OF ANY ACTION.

   They are of two classes, the criminal or punitive, and the civil or remedial. A criminal contempt consists in conduct that is directed against the authority and dignity of a court or of a judge acting judicially, as in unlawfully assailing or discrediting the authority and dignity of the court or judge, or in doing a duly forbidden act. A civil contempt consists in the failure to do something ordered to be done by a court or judge in a civil case for the benefit of the opposing party therein. (Perkins v. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil. 271.) x x x x Where the dominant purpose is to enforce compliance with an order of a court for the benefit of a party in whose favor the order runs, the contempt is civil; where the dominant purpose is to vindicate the dignity and authority of the court, and to protect the interests of the general public, the contempt is criminal. Indeed, the criminal proceedings vindicate the dignity of the courts, but the civil proceedings protect, preserve, and enforce the rights of private parties and compel obedience to orders, judgments and decrees made to enforce such rights. (LORENZO SHIPPING CORPORATION ET AL. VS. DISTRIBUTION BUTTON MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES ET AL., G.R. NO. 155849, AUGUST 31, 2011, BERSAMIN, J.). 

CONTEMPT OF COURT

It is the willful disregard or disobedience of a public authority. In its broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body. In its restricted and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of a court. The phrase contempt of court is generic, embracing within its legal signification a variety of different acts.The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and need not be specifically granted by statute. x x x x

           

         Contempt of court is of two kinds, namely: direct contempt, which is committed in the presence of or so near the judge as to obstruct him in the administration of justice; and constructive or indirect contempt, which consists of willful disobedience of the lawful process or order of the court. (Narcida v. Bowen, 22 Phil. 365.). The punishment for the first is generally summary and immediate, and no process or evidence is necessary because the act is committed in facie curiae. The inherent power of courts to punish contempt of court committed in the presence of the courts without further proof of facts and without aid of a trial is not open to question, considering that this power is essential to preserve their authority and to prevent the administration of justice from falling into disrepute; such summary conviction and punishment accord with due process of law. There is authority for the view, however, that an act, to constitute direct contempt punishable by summary proceeding, need not be committed in the immediate presence of the court, if it tends to obstruct justice or to interfere with the actions of the court in the courtroom itself. Also, contemptuous acts committed out of the presence of the court, if admitted by the contemnor in open court, may be punished summarily as a direct contempt although it is advisable to proceed by requiring the person charged to appear and show cause why he should not be punished when the judge is without personal knowledge of the misbehavior and is informed of it only by a confession of the contemnor or by testimony under oath of other persons. In contrast, the second usually requires proceedings less summary than the first. The proceedings for the punishment of the contumacious act committed outside the personal knowledge of the judge generally need the observance of all the elements of due process of law, that is, notice, written charges, and an opportunity to deny and to defend such charges before guilt is adjudged and sentence imposed. Plainly, therefore, the word summary with respect to the punishment for contempt refers not to the timing of the action with reference to the offense but to the procedure that dispenses with the formality, delay, and digression that result from the issuance of process, service of complaint and answer, holding hearings, taking evidence, listening to arguments, awaiting briefs, submission of findings, and all that goes with a conventional court trial. (LORENZO SHIPPING CORPORATION ET AL. VS. DISTRIBUTION BUTTON MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES ET AL., G.R. NO. 155849, AUGUST 31, 2011, BERSAMIN, J.).

            

       in-court contempts and out-of-court contempts: A distinction between in-court contempts, which disrupt court proceedings and for which a hearing and formal presentation of evidence are dispensed with, and out-of-court contempts, which require normal adversary procedures, is drawn for the purpose of prescribing what procedures must attend the exercise of a court’s authority to deal with contempt. The distinction does not limit the ability of courts to initiate contempt prosecutions to the summary punishment of in-court contempts that interfere with the judicial process. (Young v. United States, 481 US 787.). (LORENZO SHIPPING CORPORATION ET AL. VS. DISTRIBUTION BUTTON MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 155849, AUGUST 31, 2011, BERSAMIN, J.).

            

        

JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL:

It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a judgment of acquittal shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.(Id.) When the exoneration is merely due to the failure to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the court should award the civil liability in favor of the offended party in the same criminal action. (Id.)  In other words, the “extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil [liability] might arise did not exist.” (Calalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74613, February 27, 1991, 194 SCRA 514, 523-524.)  In Banal v. Tadeo, Jr., 240 Phil. 326, 331 (1987), the Supreme Court elucidated on the civil liability of the accused despite his exoneration in this wise:

While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another.  Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law. x x x 

Simply stated, civil liability arises when one, by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, causes damage to another.  Hence, for petitioner to be civilly liable to spouses Alonto, it must be proven that the acts he committed had caused damage to the spouses. (FELIXBERTO A. ABELLANA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILS. ET AL., G.R. NO. 174654, AUGUST 17, 2011, DEL CASTILLO, J.). 

AS A GENERAL RULE, AN ORDER GRANTING THE ACCUSED’S DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE AMOUNTS TO AN ACQUITTAL.

There are certain exceptions, however, as when the grant thereof would not violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. For instance, this Court ruled that when there is a finding that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence, its judgment is considered void, as this Court ruled in People v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 128587, 16 March 2007, 518 SCRA 393.) By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review dismissal orders of trial courts granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence. This may be done via the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 based on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal order, being considered void judgment, does not result in jeopardy. Thus, when the order of dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate court in an original special civil action via certiorari, the right of the accused against double jeopardy is not violated. In the instant case, having affirmed the CA finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court when it granted the accused’s demurrer to evidence, the Supreme Curt  deem its consequent order of acquittal void (HON. JUDGE JESUS B. MUPAS VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILS., ET AL.G.R. NO. 189365, OCTOBER 12, 2011, SERENO, J.). 

2012 Special Pre-Bar Lecture in Remedial Law

Good day!

          We are glad to inform you that Prof. Christian “Kit” Villasis will be holding a Special Pre-Bar Lecture covering the doctrinal pronouncements of Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and latest Supreme Court decisions until April 2012 on September 20-21 at the Audio Visual Room (AVR), EAC building V, Emilio Aguinaldo College (EAC), United Nations avenue corner San Marcelino Street, Ermita, Manila. 

          The two-day lecture will be for P1,000, inclusive of a review material on the Latest Jurisprudential Developments in Remedial Law. Limited reserved slots only. Enroll now! Reservation period is from September 3 to 17.  Law students and undergraduates are welcome to enroll.

For reservations, you can reply to this e-mail or contact the numbers 0906-2784262 or 0922-8988626. You may also call 470-8163 and look for Mr. Jowel or Ms. Madel. 

          Meanwhile, you can check your e-mails for the Remedial Law Review Material that Prof. Villasis initially sent to you.

          Thank you very much. More power and best regards!