AN ORDER GRANTING AN ACCUSED’S DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE IS A RESOLUTION OF THE CASE ON THE MERITS, AND IT AMOUNTS TO AN ACQUITTAL

       Generally, any further prosecution of the accused after an acquittal would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. (People v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 128587, 16 March 2007, 518 SCRA 393, 403.)

         

          It is settled that a judgment of acquittal cannot be recalled or withdrawn by another order reconsidering the dismissal of the case, (Catilo v. Abaya, 94 Phil. 1014 (1954) nor can it be modified except to eliminate something which is civil or administrative in nature (People v. Yelo, 83 Phil. 618 (1949); People v. Bautista,, 96 Phil. 43 (1954).  x x x One exception to the rule is when the prosecution is denied due process of law (Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 228 Phil. 42 (1986). Another exception is when the trial court commits grave abuse of discretion in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence (People v. Uy, 508 Phil. 637 (2005). If there is grave abuse of discretion, granting Goodland’s prayer is not tantamount to putting Co and Chan in double jeopardy.

           

            We have explained “grave abuse of discretion” to mean thus:

          

           An act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as committed in grave abuse of discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility. (Litton Mills, Inc. v. Galleon Trader, Inc., 246 Phil. 503, 509 (1988) cited in Goodland Company, Inc. vs. Abraham Co & Christine Chan, G. R. No. 196685, December 14, 2011, CARPIO, J.).