AMENDED JUDGMENT AND SUPPLEMENTAL JUDGMENT:

There is a difference between an amended judgment and a supplemental judgment.  In an amended and clarified judgment, the lower court makes a thorough study of the original judgment and renders the amended and clarified judgment only after considering all the factual and legal issues. The amended and clarified decision is an entirely new decision which supersedes the original decision.

On the other hand, following the Supreme Court's differentiation of a supplemental pleading from an amending pleading, it can be said that a supplemental decision does not take the place or extinguish the existence of the original. As its very name denotes, it only serves to bolster or adds something to the primary decision. A supplement exists side by side with the original. It does not replace that which it supplements (ASSOCIATED ANGLO-AMERICAN TOBACCO CORPORATION and FLORANTE DY, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. CRISPIN C. LARON, G.R. No. 167237, April 23, 2010 DEL CASTILLO, J.). 

AS A RULE, A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IS NOT AVAILABLE AFTER THE LAPSE OF THE PERIOD TO FILE AN APPEAL. EXCEPTIONS:

While ordinarily, certiorari is unavailing where the appeal period has lapsed, there are exceptions.

Among them are (a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the broader interest of justice so requires; (c) when the writs issued are null and void; or (d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.  (Martillano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 148277, June 29, 2004, 433 SCRA 195, 201; Sps. Go v. Tong, 462 Phil. 256, 266 (2003); Uy Chua v. Court of Appeals, 398 Phil. 17, 30 (2000) cited in ASSOCIATED ANGLO-AMERICAN TOBACCO CORPORATION and FLORANTE DY, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. CRISPIN C. LARON, G.R. No. 167237, April 23, 2010 DEL CASTILLO, J.). 

JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. However, in actions for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved (Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court).

The trial court has the discretion to grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by a party if there is no controverted matter in the case after the answer is filed (Sps. Hontiveros v. RTC, Br. 25, Iloilo City, 368 Phil. 653 (1999).  A judgment on the pleadings is a judgment on the facts as pleaded (Narra Integrated Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 398 Phil. 733 (2000), and is based exclusively upon the allegations appearing in the pleadings of the parties and the accompanying annexes (DORIS U. SUNBANUN  vs AURORA B. GO, G.R. No. 163280, February 2, 2010, CARPIO, J.). 

EVIDENCE: PARENTAL AND FILIAL PRIVILEGE RULE (JUSTICE ROBERTO ABAD)

Under Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence “No person may be compelled to testify against his parents, other direct ascendants, children or other direct descendants.”

The afore-quoted rule is an adaptation from a similar provision in Article 315 of the Civil Code that applies only in criminal cases. But those who revised the Rules of Civil Procedure chose to extend the prohibition to all kinds of actions, whether civil, criminal, or administrative, filed against parents and other direct ascendants or descendants.

In Emma Lee vs. Court of Appeals, the person (TIU) who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the stepmother of petitioner Emma Lee. The Supreme Court declared that the privilege cannot apply to them because the rule applies only to "direct" ascendants and descendants, a family tie connected by a common ancestry.  A stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her stepmother.

Relative thereto, Article 965 of the New Civil Code provides: “The direct line is either descending or ascending. The former unites the head of the family with those who descend from him. The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends.” Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner Emma Lee. (EMMA K. LEE vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 177861, July 13, 2010, ABAD, J.).

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CERTIORARI REMEDIES UNDER RULE 45 AND RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT

In Mercado v. Court of Appeals, 484 Phil. 438 (2004), the Supreme  Court had again stressed the difference of the remedies provided for under Rule 45 and Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

x x x [T]he proper remedy of the party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review under Rule 45, which is not identical with a petition for review under Rule 65.  Under Rule 45, decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to us (SC) by filing a petition for review, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. On the other hand, a special civil action under Rule 65 is an independent action based on the specific ground therein provided and, as a general rule, cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, including that to be taken under Rule 45.”

Relative thereto, One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefore is grave abuse of discretion. (VMC Rural Electric Service Cooperative, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 153144, October 16, 2006, 504 SCRA 336, 352). 

In Artistica Ceramica, Inc. vs. Ciudad Homeowners Association, Inc., the Supreme Court stated that a perusal of the records will show that petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration to the January 4, 2005 CA Decision, which was, however, denied by the CA via a Resolution dated March 18, 2005. As manifested by petitioners, they received a copy of the March 18, 2005 CA Resolution on March 28, 2005. Thus, from March 28, 2005, petitioners had 15 days, or until April 12, 2005, to appeal the CA Resolution under Rule 45. Clearly, petitioners had an available appeal under Rule 45 which, under the circumstances, was the plain, speedy and adequate remedy. However, petitioners instead chose to file a special civil action for certiorari, under Rule 65, on April 18, 2005, which was 6 days after the reglementary period under Rule 45 had expired.  xxxx

 Accordingly, when a party adopts an improper remedy, his petition may be dismissed outright. Pertinent, therefore, to a resolution of the case at bar is a determination of whether or not an appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy was still available to petitioners, the absence of which would warrant petitioners’ decision to seek refuge under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. xxxxx Since petitioners filed the instant special civil action for certiorari, instead of appeal via a petition for review, the petition should be dismissed. (ARTISTICA CERAMICA, INC. vs. CIUDAD DEL CARMEN HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATION, INC., G.R. Nos. 167583-84, June 16, 2010, PERALTA, J.).

A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS A CONDITION SINE QUA NON FOR THE FILING OF A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

Concededly, the settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja, G.R. No. 169241, May, 2 2006, 488 SCRA 574, 580).  Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. (Estate of Salvador Serra Serra v. Heirs of Primitivo Hernaez, 466 SCRA 120, 127 (2005); National Housing Authority v. Court of Appeals, 413 Phil. 58, 64 (2001).

The rule is, however, circumscribed by well-defined exceptions, such as (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo had no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte, or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved. (BEATRIZ SIOK PING TANG vs. SUBIC BAY DISTRIBUTION, INC., G.R. No. 162575, December 15, 2010, PERALTA, J.). 

JURISDICTION OF THE FIRST LEVEL COURTS OUTSIDE METRO MANILA; and EXCEPTION TO THE PROSCRIPTION AGAINST AN AMENDMENT TO CONFER JURISDICTION TO THE COURT

            Section 19(8) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, also known as “The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.” as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, or otherwise known as An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, states:

         

“SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

x x x x

           

(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).”

           

Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7691 further provides:

           

“SEC. 5. After five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act, the jurisdictional amounts mentioned in Sec. 19(3), (4), and (8); and Sec. 33(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by this Act, shall be adjusted to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00). Five (5) years thereafter, such jurisdictional   amounts shall be adjusted further to Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00): Provided, however, That in the case of Metro Manila, the abovementioned jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted after five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00).”

Relative thereto, the Supreme Court Circular No. 21-99 which was issued declaring the first adjustment on the jurisdictional amount of first level courts or the MTCs outside of Metro Manila from P100,000.00 to P200,000.00 took effect on March 20, 1999.  

On the other hand, the second adjustment from P200,000.00 to P300,000.00 became effective on February 22, 2004 in accordance with OCA Circular No. 65-2004 issued by the Office of the Court Administrator on May 13, 2004. 

In Irene Sante vs. Hon. Claravall, the Supreme Court stated that since at the time of the filing of the complaint on April 5, 2004, the MTCC’s jurisdictional amount has already been adjusted to P300,000.00, there is no doubt that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) has jurisdiction over the case since the total amount of damages being claimed by the petitioner in the case was P420,000.00.

        Moreover, in the said case the Supreme Court found no error, much less grave abuse of discretion, on the part of the Court of Appeals in affirming the RTC’s order allowing the amendment of the original complaint from P300,000.00 to P1,000,000.00 despite the pendency of a petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals. 

The High Court declared that while it is a basic jurisprudential principle that an amendment cannot be allowed when the court has no jurisdiction over the original complaint and the purpose of the amendment is to confer jurisdiction on the court (Siasoco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132753, February 15, 1999, 303 SCRA 186, 196), the RTC in the case clearly had jurisdiction over the original complaint and the amendment of the complaint was then still a matter of right under Section 2, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court.  Ergo, the amendment of the complaint was in order. (IRENE SANTE AND REYNALDOSANTE vs. HON. EDILBERTO T. CLARAVALL, G.R. No. 173915, February 22, 2010, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

THE FILING OF A MOTION TO DISMISS IS NOT AUTOMATICALLY CONSIDERED VOLUNTARY APPEARANCE OR INVOCATION OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

A special appearance before the court––challenging its jurisdiction over the person through a motion to dismiss even if the movant invokes other grounds––is not tantamount to estoppel or a waiver by the movant of his objection to jurisdiction over his person; and such is not constitutive of a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court (La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 103200, August 31, 1994, 236 SCRA 78). 

In other words, a defendant who files a motion to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the court over his person, together with other grounds raised therein, is not deemed to have appeared voluntarily before the court. What the rule on voluntary appearance means is that the voluntary appearance of the defendant in court is without qualification, in which case he is deemed to have waived his defense of lack of jurisdiction over his person due to improper service of summons. (Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 170122, October 12, 2009).

In Edna Lhuillier vs. British Airways, the Supreme Court clarified that the special appearance of the counsel of respondent in filing the Motion to Dismiss and other pleadings before the trial court cannot be deemed to be voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the said trial court. The High Court disagreed with the contention of the petitioner and ruled that there was no voluntary appearance before the trial court that could constitute estoppel or a waiver of respondent’s objection to jurisdiction over its person.

“Jurisdictio est potestas de publico introducta cum necessitate juris dicendi” means jurisdiction is a power introduced for the public good, on account of the necessity of dispensing justice. (50 C.J.S. 1089). (EDNA DIAGO LHUILLIER vs. BRITISH AIRWAYS, G.R. No. 171092, March 15, 2010, DEL CASTILLO, J.).

JURISDICTION OVER CASES WHERE THE CLAIM FOR DAMAGES IS THE MAIN CAUSE OF ACTION

In Irene Sante and Reynaldo Sante vs. Hon. Edilberto Claraval,  the Supreme Court clarified that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s causes of action (Nocum v. Tan, G.R. No. 145022, September 23, 2005, 470 SCRA 639, 644-645).  Since it is clear, based on the allegations of the complaint therein that respondent’s main action is for damages, the other forms of damages being claimed by respondent, e.g., exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, are not merely incidental to or consequences of the main action but constitute the primary relief prayed for in the complaint.  

The exclusion of the term “damages of whatever kind” in determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action.   However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court (Administrative Circular No. 09-94).

This is the tenor of the ruling of the Supreme Court in Mendoza v. Soriano, (G.R. No. 164012, June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 260, 266-267), where it held that in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.  In the said case, the respondent’s claim of P929,000.06 in damages and P25,000 attorney’s fees plus P500 per court appearance was held to represent the monetary equivalent for compensation of the alleged injury.  The Court therein held that the total amount of monetary claims including the claims for damages was the basis to determine the jurisdictional amount. x x x x x

Similarly, in Iniego v. Purganan, G.R. No. 166876, March 24, 2006, 485 SCRA 394, 4020, the Supreme Court held that “the amount of damages claimed is within the jurisdiction    of the RTC, since it is the claim for all kinds of damages that is the basis of determining the jurisdiction of courts, whether the claims for damages arise from the same or from different causes of action.  x x x x

Considering therefore that the total amount of damages being claimed by respondent herein (moral damages in the amount of P300,000.00; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; P50,000.00 attorney’s fees; P20,000.00 litigation expenses; and costs of suit) for the alleged shame and injury suffered by reason of petitioners’ utterance while they were at a police station in Pangasinan was P420,000.00, the case falls within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan. (IRENE SANTE AND REYNALDOSANTE vs. HON. EDILBERTO T. CLARAVALL, G.R. No. 173915, February 22, 2010, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

JURISDICTION: ACTIONS WHICH ARE INCAPABLE OF PECUNIARY ESTIMATION FALL WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS

It is well-settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law.

Relative thereto, the statutory law vests on Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions incapable of pecuniary estimation.  

An action for specific performance, such as a suit to enforce the Agreement on Joint Child Custody, belongs to this species of actions.  Thus, jurisdiction-wise, it belongs to the RTC. (Dacasin vs. Dacasin, G.R. No. 168785, February 05, 2010, CARPIO, J.).

CIVIL PROCEDURE: HOW TO COMPUTE TIME FOR FILING PLEADINGS IN THE COURT

In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by the Rules of Court, or by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of performance included. If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day (Section 1 of Rule 22 of the Rules of Court).  xxxxx

 In Alma Russel vs. Teofista Ebasan, the Supreme Court ruled that when petitioner filed her petition for review with the appellate court on May 15, 2007, the same was well within the extended period for the filing thereof. This is true because petitioner’s Fifteen (15) days from April 28, 2007 would be May 13, 2007. This was, however, a Sunday. On the other hand, May 14, 2007, the following day, was a legal holiday—the holding of the national and local elections. Therefore, the filing of petition on May 15, 2007 was done within the reglementary period. (ALMA B. RUSSEL vs. TEOFISTA EBASAN and AGAPITO AUSTRIA, G.R. No. 184542, April 23, 2010, NACHURA, J.). 

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL

An accused’s right to "have a speedy, impartial, and public trial" is guaranteed in criminal cases by Section 14(2) of Article III of the Constitution. This right to a speedy trial may be defined as one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its "salutary objective" being to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose. Intimating historical perspective on the evolution of the right to speedy trial, the Supreme Court reiterated the old legal maxim, "justice delayed is justice denied." This oft-repeated adage requires the expeditious resolution of disputes, much more so in criminal cases where an accused is constitutionally guaranteed the right to a speedy trial (TAN vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 173637, April 21, 2009, Third Division, Chico-Nazario, J.).

 The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case against him was designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the administration of justice by mandating the courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases. Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been denied such right is not susceptible by precise qualification. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.  xxxxxxx A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily compels the court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.

In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, Four (4) factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendant’s assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant. x x x. Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification of the State for such delay. Different weights should be assigned to different reasons or justifications invoked by the State. xxxx (Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 162214, 11 November 2004, 442 SCRA 294, 312-313).   

Relative thereto, the Supreme Court has clarified that in determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts are required to do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is clearly insufficient, and particular regard must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.

            In Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan, (G.R. No. 101689, 17 March 1993, 220 SCRA 55) the Court ruled that there was no violation of the right to speedy trial and speedy disposition. The Court took into account the reasons for the delay, i.e., the frequent amendments of procedural laws by presidential decrees, the structural reorganizations in existing prosecutorial agencies and the creation of new ones by executive fiat, resulting in changes of personnel, preliminary jurisdiction, and the functions and powers of prosecuting agencies. The Court also considered the failure of the accused to assert such right, and the lack of prejudice caused by the delay to the accused.

In Defensor-Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, 408 Phil. 767 (2001), the complexity of the issues and the failure of the accused to invoke her right to speedy disposition at the appropriate time spelled defeat for her claim to the constitutional guarantee.

In Cadalin v. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration’s Administrator, (G.R. No. 104776, 5 December 1994, 238 SCRA 721), the Court, considering also the complexity of the cases and the conduct of the parties’ lawyers, held that the right to speedy disposition was not violated therein.

“Petitioner’s objection to the prosecution’s stand that he gave an implied consent to the separate trial of Criminal Case No. 119830 is belied by the records of the case. No objection was interposed by his defense counsel when this matter was discussed during the initial hearing. Petitioner’s conformity thereto can be deduced from his non-objection at the preliminary hearing when the prosecution manifested that the evidence to be presented would be only for Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832. His failure to object to the prosecution’s manifestation that the cases be tried separately is fatal to his case. The acts, mistakes and negligence of counsel bind his client, except only when such mistakes would result in serious injustice. In fact, petitioner’s acquiescence is evident from the transcript of stenographic notes during the initial presentation of the People’s evidence in the five BW cases.” xxxxx

In the case of Tan vs. People, the length of delay, complexity of the issues and the petitioner’s failure to invoke said right to speedy trial at the appropriate time tolled the death knell on his claim to the constitutional guarantee. More importantly, in failing to interpose a timely objection to the prosecution’s manifestation during the preliminary hearings that the cases be tried separately, one after the other, petitioner was deemed to have acquiesced and waived his objection thereto. For the reasons above-stated, there is clearly insufficient ground to conclude that the prosecution is guilty of violating petitioner’s right to speedy trial (TAN vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 173637, April 21, 2009, 3rd Division, Chico-Nazario, J.).

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION: A PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF DOES NOT NECESSARILY FALL UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF THE RTC

An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and determination of the validity of the written instrument and the judicial declaration of the parties’ rights or duties thereunder. Petitions for declaratory relief are governed by Rule 63 of the Rules of Court.

Be that as it may, we have to make a distinction between the first and the second paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court.

The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, describes the general circumstances in which a person may file a petition for declaratory relief, to wit:  

“Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder” (emphasis ours).

As the afore-quoted provision states, a petition for declaratory relief under the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 may be brought before the appropriate RTC.

Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court further provides in its second paragraph that:

“An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule” (emphasis ours).

The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court specifically refers to (1) an action for the reformation of an instrument, recognized under Articles 1359 to 1369 of the Civil Code; (2) an action to quiet title, authorized by Articles 476 to 481 of the Civil Code; and (3) an action to consolidate ownership required by Article 1607 of the Civil Code in a sale with a right to repurchase. These three remedies are considered similar to declaratory relief because they also result in the adjudication of the legal rights of the litigants, often without the need of execution to carry the judgment into effect.

To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions identified in the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, said provision must be read together with those of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended.

Hence, it is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court does not categorically require that an action to quiet title be filed before the RTC. It repeatedly uses the word "may" – that an action for quieting of title "may be brought under [the] Rule" on petitions for declaratory relief, and a person desiring to file a petition for declaratory relief "may x x x bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court." The use of the word "may" in a statute denotes that the provision is merely permissive and indicates a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option.

In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, uses the word "shall" and explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve title to or possession of real property where the assessed value does not exceed P20,000.00, thus:

“Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases.—Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

                                              x x x x

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs: (MALANA vs. TAPPA, G.R. No. 181303, September 17, 2009, Third Division, Chico-Nazario, J.).

            From the foregoing, there is no doubt that even an MTC can take cognizance over declaratory relief cases as long as the same falls under its jurisdiction.   Therefore, it does not follow that a declaratory relief under the second paragraph should be filed before the Regional Trial Court.

Meanwhile, it has to be emphasized that an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder. Since the purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute, deed, or contract to which it refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for ending controversies that have not reached the state where another relief is immediately available; and supplies the need for a form of action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs.

Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief, the courts can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In other words, a court has no more jurisdiction over an action for declaratory relief if its subject has already been infringed or transgressed before the institution of the action (MALANA vs. TAPPA, G.R. No. 181303, September 17, 2009, Third Division, Chico-Nazario, J.).

ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT as a Post-Judgment remedy after the finality of a judgment

Annulment of Judgment is a recourse equitable in character and allowed only in exceptional cases where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of petitioner. Section 2 of the said Rule provides that the annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, although jurisprudence recognizes denial of due process as an additional ground.

          A.   Fraud

Fraud is of two categories. It may either be: (a) actual or constructive and (b) extrinsic or intrinsic.

Actual or positive fraud proceeds from an intentional deception practiced by means of the misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact. Constructive fraud is construed as such because of its detrimental effect upon public interest and public or private confidence, even though the act is not done with an actual design to commit positive fraud or injury upon other persons.

On the other hand, fraud may also be either extrinsic or intrinsic. There is intrinsic fraud where the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action, or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated therein. Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where the act prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured, so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy. Extrinsic fraud is also actual fraud, but collateral to the transaction sued upon. xxxxx

Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent. The fraud or deceit cannot be of the losing party's own doing, nor must such party contribute to it. The extrinsic fraud must be employed against it by the adverse party, who, because of some trick, artifice, or device, naturally prevails in the suit. It affects not the judgment itself but the manner in which the said judgment is obtained.

Extrinsic fraud is also present where the unsuccessful party has been prevented by his opponent from exhibiting fully his case by keeping the former away from court or giving him a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, having been kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority assumed to represent a party and connived at his defeat; or where the attorney regularly employed corruptly sold out his client's interest to the other side. The overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court (CITY GOVERNMENT OF TAGAYTAY vs. GUERRERO, G.R. Nos. 140743 & 140745, September 17, 2009, Third Division, Nachura, J.).

Where a fraud is the ground for annulment of judgment, it must be extrinsic or collateral. There is extrinsic fraud when a party is prevented from fully presenting his case to the court as when the lawyer connives to defeat or corruptly sells out his client’s interest (SY BANG vs. SY, G.R. No. 179955, April 24, 2009, Thied Division, Chico-Nazario, J.).

B. Lack of jurisdiction

An action to annul a final judgment is an extraordinary remedy, which is not to be granted indiscriminately by the Court. It is a recourse equitable in character allowed only in exceptional cases. The reason for the restriction is to prevent this extraordinary action from being used by a losing party to make a complete farce of a duly promulgated decision that has long become final and executory. Under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the only grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim (NUDO vs. CAGUIOA, G.R. No. 176906, August 4, 2009, Third Division, Nachura, J.).

When a petition for annulment of judgment or final order under Rule 47 is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, the petitioner does not need to allege that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, or petition for relief are no longer available through no fault of his or her own (GALURA vs. MATH-AGRO CORPORATION, G.R. No. 167230, August 14, 2009, First Division, Carpio, J.).

EVIDENCE: "RES INTER ALIOS ACTA ALTERI NOCERE NON DEBET" RULE IN RELATION TO THE RULE ON EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION

The rule on res inter alios acta provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-accused and is considered as hearsay against them. The reason for this rule is that:

“On a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man’s own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him” (HAROLD V. TAMARGO vs. ROMULO AWINGAN, et al. G.R. No. 177727, January 19, 2010, Third Division, Corona, J.).

An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:

“Admission by conspirator. — The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration” (emphasis  supplied).

This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against co-conspirators provided that the conspiracy is shown by independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial confession. Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself (b) the admission relates to the common object and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. Otherwise, it cannot be used against the alleged co-conspirators without violating their constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against them and to cross-examine them.

In Harold Tamargo vs. Romulo Awingan, et. al., aside from the extrajudicial confession, which was later on recanted, no other piece of evidence was presented to prove the alleged conspiracy. There was no other prosecution evidence, direct or circumstantial, which the extrajudicial confession could corroborate. Therefore, the recanted confession, which was the sole evidence against respondents, had no probative value and was inadmissible as evidence against them (HAROLD V. TAMARGO vs. ROMULO AWINGAN, et al. G.R. No. 177727, January 19, 2010, Third Division, Corona, J.).

SPECIAL PROCEDINGS: APPLICATION OF THE WRITS OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA

The writs of amparo and habeas data cannot be used as tools to stall the execution of a final and executory decision in a proper dispute pursuant to Section 19 of The Rule on the Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC), which was essentially reproduced in the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC).   

The Court is, under the Constitution, empowered to promulgate rules for the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. In view of the heightening prevalence of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued and took effect on October 24, 2007 which coincided with the celebration of United Nations Day and affirmed the Court’s commitment towards internationalization of human rights. More than three months later or on February 2, 2008, the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data was promulgated.  Thus:

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:

“Section 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:

          “Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party” (emphasis supplied).

From the above-quoted provisions, it can be gleaned that the coverage of the writs is limited to the protection of rights to life, liberty and security. And the writs cover not only actual but also threats of unlawful acts or omissions.

In Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008, 568 SCRA 1, the Supreme Court empathetically stated:

“As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof.  "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law.

To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the threshold requirement that their right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an unlawful act or omission. Evidently, the present controversy arose out of a property dispute between the Provincial Government and respondents. Absent any considerable nexus between the acts complained of and its effect on respondents’ right to life, liberty and security, the Court will not delve on the propriety of petitioners’ entry into the property“ (emphasis supplied).

Apropos is the Court’s ruling in Tapuz v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 182484, June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 768:

“To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo – in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands – requires that every petition for the issuance of the writ must be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit:

x x x x

The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed.”

Tapuz also arose out of a property dispute, albeit between private individuals, with the petitioners therein branding as "acts of terrorism" the therein respondents’ alleged entry into the disputed land with armed men in tow. The Court therein held:

“On the whole, what is clear from these statements – both sworn and unsworn – is the overriding involvement of property issues as the petition traces its roots to questions of physical possession of the property disputed by the private parties. If at all, issues relating to the right to life or to liberty can hardly be discerned except to the extent that the occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The right to security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the treats and harassments implied from the presence of "armed men bare to the waist" and the alleged pointing and firing of weapons. Notably, none of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or continuing.

In Castillo vs. Cruz, the Supreme Court emphasized that respondents’ petition did not show any actual violation, imminent or continuing threat to their life, liberty and security.

“Bare allegations that petitioners "in unison, conspiracy and in contempt of court, there and then willfully, forcibly and feloniously with the use of force and intimidation entered and forcibly, physically manhandled the petitioners (respondents) and arrested the herein petitioners (respondents)" will not suffice to prove entitlement to the remedy of the writ of amparo. No undue confinement or detention was present. In fact, respondents were even able to post bail for the offenses a day after their arrest. 

Although respondents’ release from confinement does not necessarily hinder supplication for the writ of amparo, absent any evidence or even an allegation in the petition that there is undue and continuing restraint on their liberty, and/or that there exists threat or intimidation that destroys the efficacy of their right to be secure in their persons, the issuance of the writ cannot be justified.

Oddly, respondents also seek the issuance of a writ of habeas data when it is not even alleged that petitioners are gathering, collecting or storing data or information regarding their person, family, home and correspondence.

It thus appears that respondents are not without recourse and have in fact taken full advantage of the legal system with the filing of civil, criminal and administrative charges. It need not be underlined that respondents’ petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data are extraordinary remedies which cannot be used as tools to stall the execution of a final and executory decision in a property dispute.

At all events, respondents’ filing of the petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data should have been barred, for criminal proceedings against them had commenced after they were arrested in flagrante delicto and proceeded against in accordance with Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Validity of the arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense that may be set up by respondents during trial and not before a petition for writs of amparo and habeas data. The reliefs afforded by the writs may, however, be made available to the aggrieved party by motion in the criminal proceedings (CASTILLO vs. CRUZ, G.R. No. 182165, November 25, 2009, En Banc, Carpio Morales, J.).

In Armando Canlas, et. al., vs. NAPICO Homeowners Association et al., the High court also reiterated that the writ of amparo will not be issued where the person’s right to life, liberty and security is not threatened. Thus:

Petitioners herein knew before hand that: there can be no motion for reconsideration for the second or third time to be filed before this Honorable Supreme Court. As such therefore, Petitioners herein are aware of the opinion that this present petition should not in any way be treated as such motions for reconsideration. Solely, this petition is only for the possible issuance of the writ of amparo, although it might affect the previous rulings of the Honorable Supreme Court in these cases, G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701 and 177038. Inherent in the powers of the Supreme Court of the Philippines is to modify, reverse and set aside, even its own previous decision that cannot be thwarted nor influenced by any one, but, only on the basis of merits and evidence. This is the purpose of this petition for the Writ of Amparo. xxxxxx

The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court, which in this case was affirmed with finality by this Court in G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701, 177038, is not included among the enumeration of rights as stated in the Section 1 for which the remedy of a writ of amparo is made available. Their claim to their dwelling, assuming they still have any despite the final and executory judgment adverse to them, does not constitute right to life, liberty and security. There is, therefore, no legal basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo.

xxxx No writ of amparo may be issued unless there is a clear allegation of the supposed factual and legal basis of the right sought to be protected. xxxxxx

Under Section 6 of the same rules, the court shall issue the writ upon the filing of the petition, only if on its face, the court ought to issue said writ.

“Section 6. Issuance of the Writ. – Upon the filing of the petition, the court, justice or judge shall immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The clerk of court shall issue the writ under the seal of the court; or in case of urgent necessity, the justice or the judge may issue the writ under his or her own hand, and may deputize any officer or person to serve it.

The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which shall not be later than seven (7) days from the date of its issuance” (emphasis supplied). 

Considering that there is no legal basis for its issuance, as in this case, the writ will not be issued and the petition will be dismissed outright.

This new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by this Court is intended for the protection of the highest possible rights of any person, which is his or her right to life, liberty and security. The Court will not spare any time or effort on its part in order to give priority to petitions of this nature. However, the Court will also not waste its precious time and effort on matters not covered by the writ. Therefore the Petition should be dismissed (ARMANDO Q. CANLAS, MIGUEL D. CANLAS, MARRIETA PIA vs. NAPICO HOMEOWNERS ASS’N - XIII, INC., et al. G.R. No. 182795, June 5, 2008, En Banc, Reyes, R.T. J.).