A NEGATIVE FINDING ON PARAFFIN TEST IS NOT A CONCLUSIVE PROOF THAT ONE HAS NOT FIRED A GUN BECAUSE IT IS POSSIBLE FOR A PERSON TO FIRE A GUN AND YET BEAR NO TRACES OF NITRATES OR GUNPOWDER, AS WHEN THE CULPRIT WASHES HIS HANDS OR WEARS GLOVES.
Thursday, August 27, 2015
Wednesday, August 26, 2015
GENERAL PRINCIPLES:
As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive
effect. However, exceptions exist, and one such exception concerns a law that
is procedural in nature.
The reason is that a remedial statute or a statute relating to remedies or
modes of procedure does not create new rights or take away vested rights but
only operates in furtherance of the remedy or the confirmation of already
existing rights. A statute or rule regulating the procedure of the courts
will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time
of its passage. All procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that
extent. The retroactive application is not violative of any right of a person
who may feel adversely affected, for, verily, no vested right generally
attaches to or arises from procedural laws.
Tuesday, August 25, 2015
WELL-SETTLED IS THE RULE THAT FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN ARE CONCLUSIVE UPON THE SUPREME COURT SAVE IN THE FOLLOWING CASES:
1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmise and conjecture; 2) the inference made is manifestly an
error or founded on a mistake; 3) there is grave abuse of discretion; 4) the
judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; 5) the findings of fact are
premised on a want of evidence and are contradicted by evidence on
record; and 6) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based. Between
the Sandiganbayan and the Supreme Court, the former was concededly in a better
position to determine whether or not a witness was telling the truth.
Monday, August 24, 2015
PROHIBITION:
Prohibition
or a "writ of prohibition" is that process by which a superior court
prevents inferior courts, tribunals, officers, or persons from usurping or
exercising a jurisdiction with which they have not been vested by law. As its
name indicates, the writ is one that commands the person or tribunal to whom it
is directed not to do something which he or she is about to do. The writ is
also commonly defined as one to prevent a tribunal possessing judicial or
quasi-judicial powers from exercising jurisdiction over matters not within its
cognizance or exceeding its jurisdiction in matters of which it has cognizance.
At common law, prohibition was a remedy used when subordinate courts and
inferior tribunals assumed jurisdiction which was not properly theirs.
Prohibition,
at common law, was a remedy against encroachment of jurisdiction. Its office
was to restrain subordinate courts and inferior judicial tribunals from
extending their jurisdiction and, in adopting the remedy, the courts have
almost universally preserved its original common-law nature, object and
function. Thus, as a rule, its proper function is to prevent courts, or other
tribunals, officers, or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction with
which they are not vested by law, and confine them to the exercise of those
powers legally conferred. However, the function of the writ has been extended
by some authorities to cover situations where, even though the lower tribunal
has jurisdiction, the superior court deems it necessary and advisable to issue
the writ to prevent some palpable and irremediable injustice, and, x x x the
office of the remedy in some jurisdictions has been enlarged or restricted by
constitutional or statutory provisions. While prohibition has been classified
as an equitable remedy, it is generally referred to as a common-law remedy or
writ; it is a remedy which is in nature legal, although, x x x its issuance is
governed by equitable principles.
Prohibition
is not a new concept. It is a remedy of ancient origin. It is even said that it
is as old as common law itself. The concept originated in conflicts of
jurisdiction between royal courts and those of the church. In our jurisdiction,
the rule on prohibition is enshrined in Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules on
Civil Procedure, to wit:
Sec.
2. Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that the judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from
further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise
granting such incidental reliefs as the law and justice require.
The
petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified true copy of the
judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and
documents relevant and pertinent thereto and a sworn certification of non-forum
shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.
It is very clear that
before resorting to the remedy of prohibition, there should be "no appeal
or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law." Thus, jurisprudence teaches that resort to administrative remedies should
be had first before judicial intervention can be availed of.
Thursday, August 20, 2015
PERSONAL NOTICE TO THE MORTGAGOR IS NOT NECESSARY FOR THE VALIDITY OF THE FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS:
As held by the Supreme Court in Philippine National Bank v. Nepomuceno
Productions, Inc., x x x personal notice to the mortgagor is not
necessary for the validity of the foreclosure proceedings, thus: "The
principal object of a notice of sale in a foreclosure of mortgage is not so
much to notify the mortgagor as to inform the public generally of the nature
and condition of the property to be sold, and of the time, place, and terms of
the sale. Notices are given to secure bidders and prevent a sacrifice of the
property. Clearly, the statutory requirements of posting and publication are
mandated, not for the mortgagor’s benefit, but for the public or third persons.
In fact, personal notice to the mortgagor in extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings is not even necessary, unless stipulated"
Wednesday, August 19, 2015
THE WRIT OF AMPARO IS NOT A WRIT TO PROTECT CONCERNS THAT ARE PURELY PROPERTY OR COMMERCIAL. NEITHER IS IT A WRIT THAT SHALL ISSUE ON AMORPHOUS AND UNCERTAIN GROUNDS:
Consequently, the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo – in line with the extraordinary character
of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands – requires
that every petition for the issuance of
the writ must be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to
wit: “(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner; (b)
The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the
threat, act or omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the
respondent may be described by an assumed appellation; (c) The right to life,
liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat
or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in
supporting affidavits; (d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the
names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or
individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together
with any report; (e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to
determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of
the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and (f) The relief
prayed for. The petition may include a general prayer for other just and
equitable reliefs.”
Tuesday, August 18, 2015
NEW STANDARD OF RELAXED ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE IN AMPARO PETITIONS:
In Razon, Jr. vs. Tagitis, G.R. No. 182498, December 3, 2009, the
Court laid down a new standard of relaxed admissibility of evidence to enable
amparo petitioners to meet the required amount of proof showing the State's
direct or indirect involvement in the purported violations and found it a fair
and proper rule in amparo cases “to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced
in their totality” and “to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under
our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible
evidence adduced.” Put simply, evidence is not to be rejected outright because
it is inadmissible under the rules for as long as it satisfies “the most basic
test of reason – i.e., relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its
consistency with all other pieces of adduced evidence.”
As emphasized by Justice Arturo D. Brion (Justice Brion) during the deliberations on
this case, in cases of enforced disappearance, the evidence that would
directly establish a violation of the right to life, liberty and security is
indubitably in the State’s possession. The same is not equally true in
cases where the amparo petitioner alleges (as in this case) a threatened
violation of his/her rights since the facts, circumstances and the link between
these that create an actual threat to his/her life are measurably within the
ability of the amparo petitioner to prove. A mere inclusion of one’s name in
the Order Battle List, without more, does not suffice to discharge the burden
to establish actual threat to one’s right to life, liberty and security by
substantial evidence.
In the case of Secretary of National Defense vs. Manalo, G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008, the
Supreme Court ruled that a person's right to security is, in one sense,
“freedom from fear” and that any threat to the rights to life, liberty or
security is an actionable wrong. The term “any threat,” however, cannot be
taken to mean every conceivable threat in the mind that may cause one to fear
for his life, liberty or security. The Court explicated therein that “[f]ear is
a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. In the
words of Justice Brion, in the context of the Amparo rule, only actual threats, as may be
established from all the facts and circumstances of the case, can qualify as a
violation that may be addressed under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. (In The Matter of the Petition for the
Issuance of A Writ of Amparo in Favor of Lilibeth O. Ladaga [2012]).
Friday, August 14, 2015
APPEALS:
The right to appeal is
not a natural right or a part of due process, but merely a statutory
privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with
the provisions of the law. The
party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the
rules, failing in which the right to appeal is lost.
Thursday, August 13, 2015
A NATURAL MOTHER HAS THE CORRESPONDING NATURAL AND LEGAL RIGHT TO THE CUSTODY OF A MINOR. SHE HAS THE PREFERENTIAL RIGHT OVER THE GRANDMOTHER OF THE SAID MINOR:
The basic issue
for our resolution is who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent
should be his guardian. The Supreme Court agreed with the ruling of the
Court of Appeals that respondent, being the natural mother of the minor, has
the preferential right over that of petitioner to be his
guardian. This ruling finds support in Article 211 of the Family
Code. Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent, respondent has the
corresponding natural and legal right to his custody. In Sagala-Eslao
vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
116773, January 16, 1997, the
Supreme Court held: “Of considerable
importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that ‘the right of parents
to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to
parenthood,’ a right supported by law and sound public policy. The
right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state or decisions of the
courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship.”
Tuesday, August 11, 2015
A PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF MAY ALSO BE TREATED AS A PETITION FOR MANDAMUS IF THE ISSUE INVOLVED HAS FAR-REACHING IMPLICATIONS:
In Salvacion
v. Central Bank of the Philippines, 343 Phil. 539 (1997) the Supreme
Court treated the petition for declaratory relief as one for mandamus
considering the grave injustice that would result in the interpretation of a
banking law. The Supreme Court similarly brushed aside the procedural
infirmity of the petition for declaratory relief and treated the same as one
for mandamus.
Thursday, August 6, 2015
PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION:
The rule is that every act or omission punishable by law has its
accompanying civil liability. The civil aspect of every criminal case is
based on the principle that every person criminally liable is also civilly
liable.
If the accused, however, is not
found to be criminally liable, it does not necessarily mean that he will
not likewise be held civilly liable because extinction of the penal
action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action.
This rule more specifically applies
when (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the
liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil
liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of
which the accused was acquitted.
The civil action based on the delict is extinguished
if there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act
or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the
accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.
Wednesday, August 5, 2015
THE SUPREME COURT HAS STRICTLY CONSTRUED THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE PROPER SERVICE OF PAPERS AND JUDGMENTS.
Both in Heirs
of Delos Santos v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 139167, 29 June 2005, 462 SCRA 98 and Tuazon v. Molina, No. L-55697, 26
February 1981, 103 SCRA 365, the service of the trial court’s decision at an adjacent
office and the receipt thereof by a person not authorized by the
counsel of record was held ineffective. Likewise, the service of the decision
made at the ground floor instead of at the 9th floor of a
building in the address on record of petitioners counsel, was held invalid in PLDT v. NLRC, No. L-60050, 213
Phil. 362 (1984).
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