72–HOUR TRO:

     Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules permits the executive judge to issue a TRO ex parte, effective for 72 hours, in case of extreme urgency to avoid grave injustice and irreparable injury. Then, after the lapse of the 72 hours, the Presiding Judge to whom the case was raffled shall then conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the TRO can be extended for another period. Under the circumstances, Judge Abul should not be penalized for failing to conduct the required summary hearing within 72 hours from the issuance of the original TRO. Though the Rules require the presiding judge to conduct a summary hearing before the expiration of the 72 hours, it could not, however, be complied with because of the remoteness and inaccessibility of the trial court from the parties’ addresses. The importance of notice to all parties concerned is so basic that it could not be dispensed with. The trial court cannot proceed with the summary hearing without giving all parties the opportunity to be heard. (Sps. Democrito and Oliva Lago vs.  Judge  Godofredo B. Abul, Jr.A.M. No. RTJ-10-2255, February 8, 2012, MENDOZA, J.).

IT IS NOT A VIABLE LEGAL POSITION TO CLAIM THAT A TRO AGAINST A WRIT OF EXECUTION IS ISSUED AGAINST AN ERRING SHERIFF, NOT AGAINST THE ISSUING JUDGE:

     A TRO enjoining the enforceability of a writ addresses the writ itself, not merely the executing sheriff. The duty of a sheriff in enforcing writs is ministerial and not discretionary. The appropriate action is to assail the implementation of the writ before the issuing court in whose behalf the sheriff acts, and, upon failure, to seek redress through a higher judicial body (ATTY. TOMAS ONG CABILI VS.  JUDGE RASAD G. BALINDONG, A.M. NO. RTJ-10-2225, SEPTEMBER 6, 2011, PER CURIAM).

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER:

     The purpose of a TRO is to prevent a threatened wrong and to protect the property or rights involved from further injury, until the issues can be determined after a hearing on the merits. Under Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a TRO may be issued only if it appears from the facts shown by affidavits or by a verified application that great or irreparable injury would be incurred by an applicant before the writ of preliminary injunction could be heard (NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS FOR REFORMS, INC. (NASECORE) VS. ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION ERC, G. R. NO. 190795, JULY 6, 2011, SERENO, J.)

REVIEWING THE EVIDENCE IN RAPE CASES:

     sweetheart defense.  The sweetheart defense is a much-abused defense that rashly derides the intelligence of the Court. Being an affirmative defense, the invocation of a love affair must be supported by convincing proof.  In this case, apart from his self-serving assertions, Cabanilla offered no sufficient and convincing evidence to substantiate his claim that they were lovers. (People vs. Arsenio Cabanilla, G.R. No. 185839, November 17, 2010, Mendoza, J.).

REVIEWING THE EVIDENCE IN RAPE CASES:

     A. In reviewing the evidence in rape cases, the following considerations should be made: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility, it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.  Nonetheless, it is also worth noting that rape is essentially committed in relative isolation or secrecy; thus, it is most often only the victim who can testify with regard to the fact of forced coitus. (People vs. Alfredo, G.R. No. 188560, December 15, 2010, Velasco, Jr., J.).

CHARACTER EVIDENCE OF THE OFFENDED PARTY IN CRIMINAL CASES:

     Sub-paragraph (3) of Section 51 of the said Rule refers to the character of the offended party. Character evidence, whether good or bad, of the offended party may be proved "if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense charged." Such evidence is most commonly offered to support a claim of self-defense in an assault or homicide case or a claim of consent in a rape case. (People of the Philippines vs. Noel Lee, G.R. No. 139070, May 29, 2002, Puno, J.)

CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE:

     The presentation of an informant is not a requisite in a prosecution for drug cases. The failure of the prosecution to present the informant does not vitiate its cause as the latter’s testimony is not indispensible to a successful prosecution for drug-pushing, since his testimony would be merely corroborative of and cumulative with that of the poseur-buyer who was presented in court and who testified on the facts and circumstances of the sale and delivery of the prohibited drug.  Failure of the prosecution to produce the informant in court is of no moment, especially when he is not even the best witness to establish the fact that the buy-bust operation has indeed been conducted. (People vs. Gonzaga, G.R. No. 184952, October 11, 2010, Del Castillo, J.).

SELF-SERVING EVIDENCE:

     Self-serving and unsubstantiated declarations are insufficient to establish a case before quasi-judicial bodies where the quantum of evidence required to establish a fact is substantial evidence. Often described as more than a mere scintilla,  substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might conceivably opine otherwise. (Coastal Safeway Marine Services Inc. vs. Esguerra, G.R. No.  185352, August 10, 2011, Perez, J.)

COMPETENT EVIDENCE:

     It is well-established that the flight of an accused is competent evidence to indicate his guilt; and flight, when unexplained, is a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn. Indeed, the wicked flee when no man pursueth, but the innocent are as bold as lion. (People vs. Combate, G.R. No. 189301, December 15, 2010, Velasco Jr., J.)

TO BE ENTITLED TO THE INJUNCTIVE WRIT, THE APPLICANT MUST SHOW THAT THERE EXISTS A RIGHT TO BE PROTECTED WHICH IS DIRECTLY THREATENED BY AN ACT SOUGHT TO BE ENJOINED:

      Furthermore, there must be a showing that the invasion of the right is material and substantial and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. The applicant’s right must be clear and unmistakable. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Where the applicant’s right or title is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for injunction. A clear and positive right especially calling for judicial protection must be shown. Injunction is not a remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or future rights; it will not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise, or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action. There must exist an actual right. There must be a patent showing by the applicant that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of said right. (Roman Catholic Archbishop of San Fernando Pampanga vs. Eduardo Soriano Jr., et al. ,G.R. No. 153829, August 17, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

REQUISITES FOR INJUNCTION TO BE ISSUED:

     For injunction to issue, two requisites must concur: first, there must be a right to be protected and second, the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right. Here, the two requisites are clearly present: there is a right to be protected, that is, respondents’ right over their concrete fence which cannot be removed without due process; and the act, the summary demolition of the concrete fence, against which the injunction is directed, would violate said right.  If petitioner indeed found respondents’ fence to have encroached on the sidewalk, his remedy is not to demolish the same summarily after respondents failed to heed his request to remove it.  Instead, he should go to court and prove respondents’ supposed violations in the construction of the concrete fence.  Indeed, unless a thing is a nuisance per se, it may not be abated summarily without judicial intervention. (Jaime Perez vs. Sps. Fortunate L. Madrona & Yolanda b. Pante, G.R. No. 184478, March 21, 2012, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION:

A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to judgment of final order, requiring a party, court, agency, or person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It is a preservative remedy to ensure the protection of a party’s substantive rights or interests pending the final judgment in the principal action. A plea for an injunctive writ lies upon the existence of a claimed emergency or extraordinary situation which should be avoided for otherwise, the outcome of a litigation would be useless as far as the party applying for the writ is concerned.  At times referred to as the “Strong Arm of Equity,” the Suprteme Court has consistently ruled that there is no power the exercise of which is more delicate and which calls for greater circumspection than the issuance of an injunction. It should only be extended in cases of great injury where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in damages;  “in cases of extreme urgency; where the right is very clear; where considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly in complainant’s favor; where there is a willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiff’s right against his protest and remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one, and where the effect of the mandatory injunction is rather to reestablish and maintain a preexisting continuing relation between the parties, recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant, than to establish a new relation.” For the writ to issue, two requisites must be present, namely, the existence of the right to be protected, and that the facts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right. It is necessary that one must show an unquestionable right over the premises. Thus, the following requisites must be proved before a writ of preliminary injunction, be it mandatory or prohibitory, will issue:

(1)      The applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, that is a right in esse;

(2)      There is a material and substantial invasion of such right;

(3)     There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and

(4)       No other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.

                        x x x  It bears stressing that an injunction is not a remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or future rights; it will not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise, or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action. There must exist an actual right. Verily, petitioner cannot lay claim to an actual, clear and positive right based on an expired service contract.Moreover, well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that no court can compel a party to agree to a contract through the instrumentality of a writ of preliminary injunction (Thunder Security and Investigation Agency/Lourdes M. Lasala  vs. National Food Authority (NFA) & NFA Regional Bids and Awards Committee (Region 1), G.R. No. 182042, July 27, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL ARREST:

     When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapon that the latter might use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction.  Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area within the latter’s reach. Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The phrase "within the area of his immediate control" means the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested. (VALEROSO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 164815, September 3, 2009, Third Divisio, Nachura, J.).

SEARCH AND SEIZURE:

     A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal property: (a) Subject of the offense; (b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or (c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. (Section 3, Rule 126, Rules of Criminal Procedure)

THE VALIDITY OF THE ISSUANCE OF A SEARCH WARRANT RESTS UPON THE FOLLOWING FACTORS:

     (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons and things to be seized. (HPS Software and Communication Corporation vs. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT), G.R. No. 170217, December 10, 2012, Leonardo-De Castro, J.)

REPLEVIN:

Replevin is one of the most ancient actions known to law, taking its name from the object of its process (Stone v. Church, 16 N.Y.S.2d 512, 515, 172 Misc. 1007, 1008 (1939). It originated in common law as a remedy against the wrongful exercise of the right of distress for rent and, according to some authorities, could only be maintained in such a case (Palmer v. King, 41 App. DC. 419, L.R.A.1916D 278, Ann. Cas.1915C 1139 (1914). But by the weight of authority, the remedy is not and never was restricted to cases of wrongful distress in the absence of any statutes relating to the subject, but is a proper remedy for any unlawful taking (Stone v. Church, 2216 N.Y.S.2d 512, 515, 172 Misc. 1007, 1008 (1939). “Replevied,” used in its technical sense, means delivered to the owner (Steuer v. Maguire, 66 N. E. 706, 707; 182 Mass. 575, 576 (1903) while the words “to replevy” means to recover possession by an action of replevin (Tillson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89870, May 28, 1991, 197 SCRA 587, 598).

Broadly understood in this jurisdiction, replevin is both a form of principal remedy and of provisional relief.  It may refer either to the action itself, i.e., to regain the possession of personal chattels being wrongfully detained from the plaintiff by another, or to the provisional remedy that would allow the plaintiff to retain the thing during the pendency of the action and to hold it pendente lite (BA Finance Corporation v. CA, 327 Phil. 716, 724-725 (1996); See also Tillson v. Court of Appeals, id.; Bouvier's Dictionary, Third (Rawle's) Revision, Vol. 2; Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 1299). The action is primarily possessory in nature and generally determines nothing more than the right of possession. (BA Finance Corporation v. CA, supra, at 725). The law presumes that every possessor is a possessor in good faith (Art. 527 of the New Civil Code). He is entitled to be respected and protected in his possession (Art. 539 of the New Civil Code) as if he were the true owner thereof until a competent court rules otherwise (Yu v. Honrado, No. 50025, August 21, 1980, 99 SCRA 273, 277, citing Chua Hai v. Kapunan,  Jr., etc. and Ong Shu, 104 Phil. 110, 118 (1958).

Before a final judgment, property cannot be seized unless by virtue of some provision of law. (Heath v. Steamer “San Nicolas,” 7 Phil. 532, 538 (1907). The Rules of Court, under Rule 60, authorizes such seizure in cases of replevin. However, a person seeking a remedy in an action for replevin must follow the course laid down in the statute, since the remedy is penal in nature. (Weaver Piano Co., Inc. v. Curtis, 158 S.C. 117; 155 SE 291, 300 (1930).

When no attempt is made to comply with the provisions of the law relating to seizure in this kind of action, the writ or order allowing the seizure is erroneous and may be set aside on motion (Heath v. Steamer “San Nicolas) by the adverse party. Be it noted, however, that a motion to quash the writ of replevin goes to the technical regularity of procedure, and not to the merits of the case (Cummings v. Gordon, 29 Pa. Dist. 740; 77 C.J.S. 120) in the principal action. The process regarding the execution of the writ of replevin in Section 4 of Rule 60 is unambiguous: the sheriff, upon receipt of the writ of replevin and prior to the taking of the property, must serve a copy thereof to the adverse party (petitioner, in this case) together with the application, the affidavit of merit, and the replevin bond. (Sec. 4, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court). The reasons are simple, i.e., to provide proper notice to the adverse party that his property is being seized in accordance with the court’s order upon application by the other party, and ultimately to allow the adverse party to take the proper remedy consequent thereto.

Service of the writ upon the adverse party is mandatory in line with the constitutional guaranty on procedural due process and as safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures. (Sections 1 and 2, Art. III of the Constitution). If the writ was not served upon the adverse party but was instead merely handed to a person who is neither an agent of the adverse party nor a person authorized to receive court processes on his behalf, the service thereof is erroneous and is, therefore, invalid, running afoul of the statutory and constitutional requirements. The service is likewise invalid if the writ of replevin was served without the required documents.  Under these circumstances, no right to seize and to detain the property shall pass, the act of the sheriff being both unlawful and unconstitutional.

In the case at bar, petitioner avers that the writ of replevin was served upon the security guard where the rock-crushing plant to be seized was located. The signature of the receiving party indicates that the writ was received on April 29, 2003 by a certain Joseph Rejumo, the guard on duty in a plant in Sariaya, Quezon, where the property to be seized was located, and witnessed by Claudio Palatino, respondent’s caretaker. The sheriff’s return, however, peremptorily states that both the writ of replevin and the summons were served upon Rivera. On May 8, 2003, or nine (9) days after the writ was served on the security guard, petitioner filed an answer to the complaint accompanied by a prayer for the approval of her redelivery bond. The RTC, however, denied the redelivery bond for having been filed beyond the five-day mandatory period prescribed in Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 60. But since the writ was invalidly served, petitioner is correct in contending that there is no reckoning point from which the mandatory five-day period shall commence to run.

         The trial court is reminded that not only should the writ or order of replevin comply with all the requirements as to matters of form or contents prescribed by the Rules of Court. (Vicente Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, Provisional Remedies, Vol. IV-A, 1971, p. 394, citing 77 C.J.S. 81-82). The writ must also satisfy proper service in order to be valid and effective: i.e. it should be directed to the officer who is authorized to serve it; and it should be served upon the person who not only has the possession or custody of the property involved but who is also a party or agent of a party to the action. Consequently, a trial court is deemed to have acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction with respect to the ancillary action of replevin if it seizes and detains a personalty on the basis of a writ that was improperly served, such as what happened in this case. At the outset, petitioner’s proper remedy should have been to file a motion to quash the writ of replevin or a motion to vacate the order of seizure. Nevertheless, petitioner’s filing of an application for a redelivery bond, while not necessary, did not thereby waive her right to question the improper service. It now becomes imperative for the trial court to restore the parties to their former positions by returning the seized property to petitioner and by discharging the replevin bond filed by respondent. The trial, with respect to the main action, shall continue. Respondent may, however, file a new application for replevin should he choose to do so (TERLYNGRACE RIVERA vs. FLORENCIO L. VARGAS, G.R. No. 165895, 2009 June 5, Nachura J).

REPLEVIN:

     Replevin is an action whereby the owner or person entitled to repossession of goods or chattels may recover those goods or chattels from one who has wrongfully distrained or taken, or who wrongfully detains such goods or chattels. It is designed to permit one having right to possession to recover property in specie from one who has wrongfully taken or detained the property. The term may refer either to the action itself, for the recovery of personalty, or to the provisional remedy traditionally associated with it, by which possession of the property may be obtained by the plaintiff and retained during the pendency of the action. Contrary to the CA’s ratiocination, the RTC rightfully assumed jurisdiction over the suit and acted well within its discretion in denying Astorga’s motion to dismiss. SMART’s demand for payment of the market value of the car or, in the alternative, the surrender of the car, is not a labor, but a civil, dispute. It involves the relationship of debtor and creditor rather than employee-employer relations.As such, the dispute falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. (SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC., vs. REGINA M. ASTORGA, G.R. No. 148132, January 28, 2008, NACHURA, J.).

JURISDICTION OF PROBATE COURT:

     The jurisdiction of the probate court merely relates to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and the probate of wills of deceased persons, and the appointment and removal of administrators, executors, guardians and trustees. (Heirs of Oscar Reyes vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 139587, November 22, 2000, Gonzaga-Reyes, J.)

VENUE IN JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE:

     For purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another. (Edgar San Luis vs. Felicidad San Luis, G.R. No. 133743, February 6, 2007; Rodolfo San Luis vs. Felicidad Sagalongos, G.R. No. 134029, February 6, 2007, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.).

IN PERSONAM, IN REM AND QUASI IN REM ACTIONS:

     An action in personam is lodged against a person based on personal liability; an action in rem is directed against the thing itself instead of the person; while an action quasi in rem names a person as defendant, but its object is to subject that person's interest in a property to a corresponding lien or obligation. A petition directed against the "thing" itself or the res, which concerns the status of a person, like a petition for adoption, annulment of marriage, or correction of entries in the birth certificate, is an action in rem. (JESSE U. LUCAS vs. JESUS S. LUCAS, G.R. No. 190710, SECOND DIVISION, June 6, 2011 NACHURA, J.)

PERSONAL ACTION AND REAL ACTIONS:

     In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a contract, or the recovery of damages. Real actions, on the other hand, are those affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein (IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 154096, August 22, 2008, 2nd Division, Velasco, Jr., J.).

CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE:

     Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be established by inference. At times, resort to circumstantial evidence is imperative since to insist on direct testimony would, in many cases, result in setting felons free and deny proper protection to the community. Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if the following requisites are complied with: (1)   There is more than one circumstance; (2)   The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3)   The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.  All the circumstances must be consistent with one another, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent. Thus, conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld, provided that the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.  To assay its probative value, circumstantial evidence must be tested against Four (4) necessary guidelines: x x x x (a) It should be acted upon with caution; (b) All the essential facts must be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt; (c) The facts must exclude every other theory but that of guilt of the accused; and (d) The facts must establish with certainty the guilt of the accused as to convince beyond reasonable doubt that he was the perpetrator of the offense. The peculiarity of circumstantial evidence is that the series of events pointing to the commission of a felony is appreciated not singly but collectively. The guilt of the accused cannot be deduced from scrutinizing just one (1) particular piece of evidence. It is more like a puzzle which when put together reveals a convincing picture pointing to the conclusion that the accused is the author of the crime. (NOVER BRYAN SALVADOR y DE LEON. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 164266, July 23, 2008, Third Division, Nachura, J.).

SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSONS:

     Settlement of estate of a decedent is a proceeding in rem binding against the whole world. (Philippine Savings Bank vs. Lantin, G.R. 33929 September 2, 1983)

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION:

     Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is directed either to do a particular act, in which case it is called a mandatory injunction or to refrain from doing a particular act, in which case it is called a prohibitory injunction. As a main action, injunction seeks to permanently enjoin the defendant through a final injunction issued by the court and contained in the judgment (Section 9, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). Two (2) requisites must concur for injunction to issue: (1) there must be a right to be protected and (2) the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right. x x x To authorize a temporary injunction, the complainant must make out at least a prima facie showing of a right to the final relief.  Preliminary injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse.  These principles are equally relevant to actions seeking permanent injunction (PHIL. ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY, et al. vs. JOSEPH JUDE CARATES, G.R. No. 181274, June 23, 2010, Third Division, Villarama, Jr. J.). 

VALID WARRANTLESS SEARCHES: THE FOLLOWING ARE THE WELL-RECOGNIZED INSTANCES WHERE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES ARE ALLOWED EVEN WITHOUT A VALID WARRANT:

     (1) Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest: (2) [Seizure] of evidence in "plain view." The elements are: a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search; (3) Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity; (4) Consented warrantless search; (5) Customs search; (6) Stop and Frisk; (7) Exigent and emergency circumstances; (8) Search of vessels and aircraft; [and] (9) Inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations. x x x x In the exceptional instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured (VALEROSO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 164815, September 3, 2009, Third DivisioN, Nachura, J.).

APPLICATION FOR SEARCH WARRANT, WHERE FILED:

     1. As a rule, search warrants should be filed with the court within whose territorial jurisdiction the crime was committed (Sec. 2 (a), Rule 126, Rules of Court). The exceptions to the general rule are: (a) for compelling reasons, it can be filed with the court within whose judicial region the offense was committed or where the warrant is to be served; (b) but if the criminal action has already been filed, the application for a search warrant can only be made in the court where the criminal action is pending; and (c) in case of search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions as well as violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the Intellectual Property Code, the Anti- Money Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff and Customs Code, the Executive Judges and, whenever they are on official leave of absence or are not physically present in the station, the Vice-Executive Judges of the RTC of Manila and Quezon City shall have authority to act on applications filed by the NBI, PNP and the Anti-Crime Task Force (ACTAF), Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOC-TF), and the Reaction Against Crime Task Force (REACT-TF). (a.m. no. 99-10-09-sc dated January 25, 2000; Sps. Marimla vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 158467, Oct. 16, 2009).