DEAD MAN’S STATUTE:

    The “Dead Man’s Statute” provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction. But before this rule can be successfully invoked to bar the introduction of testimonial evidence, it is necessary that:  1.  The witness is a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted; 2.  The action is against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person or a person of unsound mind; 3.  The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against person of unsound mind; and 4.  His testimony refers to any matter of fact which occurred before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind.” Well entrenched is the rule that when it is the executor or administrator or representatives of the estate that sets up the counterclaim, the plaintiff, herein respondent, may testify to occurrences before the death of the deceased to defeat the counterclaim. Moreover, as defendant in the counterclaim, respondent is not disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact occurring before the death of the deceased, said action not having been brought against but by the estate or representatives of the deceased. (Sunga-Chan vs. Chua, G.R. No. 143340, August 15, 2001, Gonzaga-Reyes, J.).

OBJECT EVIDENCE:

     NATURE OF OBJECT EVIDENCE: Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence. On many occasions, the Supreme Court has relied principally upon physical evidence in ascertaining the truth. Where the physical evidence on record runs counter to the testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses, the Supreme Court has consistently ruled that the physical evidence should prevail. (Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 157177, February 11, 2008, Austria-Martinez, J.).

RULES DNA EVIDENCE:

     DNA is an organic substance found in a person’s cells which contains his or her genetic code.  Except for identical twins, each person’s DNA profile is distinct and unique. The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association exists between the evidence sample and the reference sample. In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among others things, the following data:  a) How the samples were collected; b) How they were handled; c) The possibility of contamination of the samples; d) The procedure followed in analyzing the samples; e) Whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests; and f) The qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.  (People vs. Vallejo, G.R. No. 144656.  May 9, 2002, Per Curiam).

RECEIVERSHIP:

     The purpose of a receivership is to protect and preserve the rights of the parties during the pendency of the main action. Receivership is also aimed at preservation of, and at making more secure, existing rights. It cannot be used as an instrument for the destruction of those rights.

IN THE APPOINTMENT OF ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, THE SURVIVING SPOUSE IS PREFERRED OVER THE NEXT OF KIN OF THE DECEDENT:

     When the law speaks of "next of kin", the reference is to those who are entitled, under the statute of distribution, to the decedent’s property; or one whose relationship is such that he is entitled to share in the estate as distributed, or, in short, an heir. In resolving, therefore, the issue of whether an applicant for letters of administration is a next of kin or an heir of the decedent, the probate court perforce has to determine and pass upon the issue of filiation. A separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits. (Belen Sagad Angeles, vs. Aleli "Corazon" Angeles Maglaya, G.R. No. 153798 September 2, 2005, GARCIA, J.).

HABEAS CORPUS AS A POST-CONVICTION REMEDY:

      The writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement or detention in which individuals are deprived of liberty. The writ may not be availed of when the person in custody is under a judicial process or by virtue of a valid judgment.However, as a post-conviction remedy, it may be allowed when, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, any of the following exceptional circumstances is attendant: (1) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (3) the imposed penalty has been excessive, thus voiding the sentence as to such excess. (Andal v. People, 307 SCRA 605 [1999]; Go vs. Dimagiba, G.R. No. 151876, June 21, 2005).

JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL:

     It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a judgment of acquittal shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.(Id.) When the exoneration is merely due to the failure to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the court should award the civil liability in favor of the offended party in the same criminal action. (Id.)  In other words, the “extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil [liability] might arise did not exist.”   In Banal v. Tadeo, Jr., 240 Phil. 326, 331 (1987), the Supreme Court elucidated on the civil liability of the accused despite his exoneration in this wise: While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another.  Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law. x x x  Simply stated, civil liability arises when one, by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, causes damage to another.  Hence, for petitioner to be civilly liable to spouses Alonto, it must be proven that the acts he committed had caused damage to the spouses. (FELIXBERTO A. ABELLANA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILS. ET AL., G.R. NO. 174654, AUGUST 17, 2011, DEL CASTILLO, J.).

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65: THERE IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHERE THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTS IN A CAPRICIOUS, WHIMSICAL, ARBITRARY OR DESPOTIC MANNER IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS JUDGMENT AS TO BE EQUIVALENT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION:

     The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. (Marino B. Icdang vs. Sandiganbayan (Second Division) and People of the Phils., G.R. No. 185960, Jan. 25, 2012, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

RES INTER ACTA ALTERI NOCERE NON DEBET RULE: THE RULE ON RES INTER ALIOS ACTA PROVIDES THAT THE RIGHTS OF A PARTY CANNOT BE PREJUDICED BY AN ACT, DECLARATION, OR OMISSION OF ANOTHER:

     Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-accused and is considered as hearsay against them. The reason for this rule is that: “On a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man’s own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him” (HAROLD V. TAMARGO vs. ROMULO AWINGAN, et al. G.R. No. 177727, January 19, 2010, Third Division, Corona, J.).

CONDITIONAL EXAMINATION OF BOTH THE DEFENSE AND PROSECUTION WITNESSES:

     In criminal proceedings, Sections 12, 13 and 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, allow the conditional examination of both the defense and prosecution witnesses. Rule 119 specifically states that a witness may be conditionally examined: 1) if the witness is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial; or 2) if the witness has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning. Thus, when Concepcion moved that her deposition be taken, had she not been too sick at that time, her motion would have been denied. Instead of conditionally examining her outside the trial court, she would have been compelled to appear before the court for examination during the trial proper. (CONCEPCION CUENCO VDA. DE MANGUERRA vs. RAUL RISOS, G.R. No. 152643, August 28, 2008)

JUDICIAL ADMISSION:

     A judicial admission is an admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, which dispenses with the need for proof with respect to the matter or fact admitted.  It may be contradicted only by a showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.  x x x  Under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, petitioners may not contradict this judicial admission unless they are able to show that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. (HEIRS OF ANTONIO FERAREN ET AL. VS. COURT OF APPEALS & CECILIA TADIAR, G.R. NO. 159328, OCT. 5, 2011, PERALTA, J.).

DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE:

     A demurrer to evidence is filed after the prosecution has rested its case and the trial court is required to evaluate whether the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient enough to warrant the conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. If the court finds that the evidence is not sufficient and grants the demurrer to evidence, such dismissal of the case is one on the merits, which is equivalent to the acquittal of the accused. Well-established is the rule that the Court cannot review an order granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused on the ground of insufficiency of evidence because to do so will place the accused in double jeopardy (BENJAMIN B.. BANGAYAN, JR. VS. SALLY GO BANGAYAN, G.R. NO. 172777, OCTOBER 19, 2011, MENDOZA, J.).

DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED TO BECOME A STATE WITNESS:

It is a requirement for the discharge of an accused to be a state witness under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court that the testimony to be given can be substantially corroborated in its material points. “Sec. 17.  Discharge of accused to be state witness. — When two or more persons are jointly charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state when, after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the court is satisfied that:  (a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested; (b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused; (c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points; (d)  Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and (e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part of the trial. If the court denies the motion for discharge of the accused as state witness, his sworn statement shall be inadmissible in evidence.  (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

          The Court is not unaware that as an exception to the general rule requiring corroboration, the uncorroborated testimony of a state witness may be sufficient when it is shown to be sincere in itself because it is given unhesitatingly and in a straightforward manner and full of details which, by their nature, could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought. This exception, however, applies only if the state witness is an eyewitness since the testimony would then be direct evidence.  The above-quoted Section 17 of Rule 119 actually assumes that the testimony of the accused sought to be discharged as a state witness would constitute direct evidence (i.e., that he or she is an eyewitness) in that it requires that there is no other direct evidence, except the testimony of the said accused. (PEOPLE VS. FELICIANO ANABE Y CAPILLAN, G.R. NO. 179033, SEPTEMBER 6, 2010, CARPIO MORALES, J.).