2012 SPECIAL PRE-BAR LECTURE IN REMEDIAL LAW

Good day!

  We are glad to inform you that Prof. Christian “Kit” Villasis will be holding a Special Pre-Bar Lecture covering the doctrinal pronouncements of Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and latest Supreme Court decisions until April 2012 on September 20-21 at the Audio Visual Room (AVR), EAC Building V, Emilio Aguinaldo College (EAC), United Nations avenue corner San Marcelino Street, Ermita, Manila. 

The two-day lecture will be for P1, 000, inclusive of review materials. Limited slots only. Reservation period is from September 3 to 14.  A 20% discount shall be given to those who will register on Sept. 3 – 5.  For reservations, you can reply to this e-mail or contact the numbers 0906-2784262 or 0922-8988626, you may also call at 470-8163 and look for Mr. Jowel or Ms. Madel. 

Thank you very much. More power and best regards! 

PART OF RES GESTAE

Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae (Rule 140, Section 42 of then Rules of Court). The term res gestae refers to "those circumstances which are the undesigned incidents of a particular litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative of such act”.  In a general way, res gestae includes the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and which are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication.

The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. 

The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded a part of the principal fact or event itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony. 

A declaration or an utterance is thus deemed as part of the res gestae that is admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances (PEOPLE VS. GILBERTO VILLARICO ET AL., G.R. NO. 158362, APRIL 4, 2011, BERSAMIN, J). 

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR. PROCEDURAL RULES ARE NOT TO BE DISDAINED AS MERE TECHNICALITIES

They may not be ignored to suit the convenience of a party.  Adjective law ensures the effective enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and speedy administration of justice.  Rules are not intended to hamper litigants or complicate litigation.  But they help provide for a vital system of justice where suitors may be heard following judicial procedure and in the correct forum.  Public order and our system of justice are well served by a conscientious observance by the parties of the procedural rules (Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hyatt (SAMASAH-NUWHRAIN), VS. HON. VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR BUENAVENTURA C.  MAGSALIN AND  HOTEL  ENTERPRISES OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 172303, JUNE 6, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: THE DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST THOSE IN PUBLIC OFFICE DURING A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS A FUNCTION THAT BELONGS TO THE OMBUDSMAN

The Ombudsman is vested with the sole power to investigate and prosecute, motu proprio or upon the complaint of any person, any act or omission which appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient (Vergara v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 174567, March 12, 2009, 580 SCRA 693, 708.). It has the discretion to determine whether a criminal case, given its attendant facts and circumstances, should be filed or not.

As explained in Esquivel v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 137237, September 17, 2002, 389: The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts.  Settled is the rule that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman’s exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise.  Said exercise of powers is based upon his constitutional mandate and the courts will not interfere in its exercise.  The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman will grievously hamper the functions of the office and the courts, in much the same way that courts will be swamped if they had to review the exercise of discretion on the part of public prosecutors each time they decided to file an information or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant. (M.A. JIMENEZ ENTERPRISES, INC., VS. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN, JESUS P.  CAMMAYO G.R. NO. 155307, JUNE 6, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS

Lis pendens, which literally means pending suit, refers to the jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until final judgment.   Founded upon public policy and necessity, lis pendens is intended to keep the properties in litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated, and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation.  Its notice is an announcement to the whole world that a particular property is in litigation and serves as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property. 

 The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect: (1) to keep the subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the final judgment to prevent the defeat of the final judgment by successive alienations; and (2) to bind a purchaser, bona fide or not, of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court will promulgate subsequently. Once a notice of lis pendens has been duly registered, any subsequent transaction affecting the land involved would have to be subject to the outcome of the litigation. (Vicente v. Avera, G.R. No. 169970, January 20, 2009). x x x x   Thus,  the Supreme Court has held that one who buys land where there is a pending notice of lis pendens cannot invoke the right of a purchaser in good faith; neither can he have acquired better rights than those of his predecessor in interest (Top Management Programs Corporation vs. Luis Fajardo & The Register of Deeds of Las Pinas City, G.R. No. 150462, June 15, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

COORDINATION WITH THE PDEA IS NOT AN INDISPENSABLE REQUIREMENT BEFORE POLICE AUTHORITIES MAY CARRY OUT A BUY-BUST OPERATION

While it is true that Section 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 requires the National Bureau of Investigation, PNP and the Bureau of Customs to maintain "close coordination with the PDEA on all drug-related matters," the provision does not, by so saying, make PDEA's participation a condition sine qua non for every buy-bust operation. After all, a buy-bust is just a form of an in flagrante arrest sanctioned by Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of the Court, which police authorities may rightfully resort to in apprehending violators of Republic Act No. 9165 in support of the PDEA. A buy-bust operation is not invalidated by mere non-coordination with the PDEA. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILS. VS. ALLEN UDTOJAN MANTALABA, G.R. NO. 186227, JULY 20, 2011, PERALTA, J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: EXPROPRIATION: THE POWER TO DECIDE JUST COMPENSATION CASES FOR THE TAKING OF LANDS UNDER R.A. NO. 6657 IS VESTED IN THE COURTS:

In Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132767, January 18, 2000, 322 SCRA 139.), petitioner landowner who was dissatisfied with the valuation made by LBP and DARAB, filed a petition for determination of just compensation in the RTC (SAC).  However, the RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that it was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period for filing appeals from the orders of the DARAB.  On appeal, the CA upheld the order of dismissal. When the case was elevated to the Supreme Court, it likewise affirmed the CA and declared that:

As we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals, this rule is an acknowledgment by the DARAB that the power to decide just compensation cases for the taking of lands under R.A. No. 6657 is vested in the courts.  It is error to think that, because of Rule XIII, §11, the original and exclusive jurisdiction given to the courts to decide petitions for determination of just compensation has thereby been transformed into an appellate jurisdiction.  It only means that, in accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR as an administrative agency to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid for the lands taken under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, but such determination is subject to challenge in the courts.

           The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts is not any less “original and exclusive” because the question is first passed upon by the DAR, as the judicial proceedings are not a continuation of the administrative determination.  For that matter, the law may provide that the decision of the DAR is final and unappealable.  Nevertheless, resort to the courts cannot be foreclosed on the theory that courts are the guarantors of the legality of the administrative action (Land Bank of the Phils. vs. Severino Listana, G.R. No. 168105, July 27, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

AL. V � s a p�^ �X mso-bidi-font-weight:bold'>DISTRIBUTION BUTTON MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES ET AL., G.R. NO. 155849, AUGUST 31, 2011, BERSAMIN, J.). 

CONTEMPT OF COURT

It is the willful disregard or disobedience of a public authority. In its broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body. In its restricted and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of a court. The phrase contempt of court is generic, embracing within its legal signification a variety of different acts.The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and need not be specifically granted by statute. x x x x

          Contempt of court is of two kinds, namely: direct contempt, which is committed in the presence of or so near the judge as to obstruct him in the administration of justice; and constructive or indirect contempt, which consists of willful disobedience of the lawful process or order of the court. (Narcida v. Bowen, 22 Phil. 365.). The punishment for the first is generally summary and immediate, and no process or evidence is necessary because the act is committed in facie curiae. The inherent power of courts to punish contempt of court committed in the presence of the courts without further proof of facts and without aid of a trial is not open to question, considering that this power is essential to preserve their authority and to prevent the administration of justice from falling into disrepute; such summary conviction and punishment accord with due process of law. There is authority for the view, however, that an act, to constitute direct contempt punishable by summary proceeding, need not be committed in the immediate presence of the court, if it tends to obstruct justice or to interfere with the actions of the court in the courtroom itself. Also, contemptuous acts committed out of the presence of the court, if admitted by the contemnor in open court, may be punished summarily as a direct contempt although it is advisable to proceed by requiring the person charged to appear and show cause why he should not be punished when the judge is without personal knowledge of the misbehavior and is informed of it only by a confession of the contemnor or by testimony under oath of other persons. In contrast, the second usually requires proceedings less summary than the first. The proceedings for the punishment of the contumacious act committed outside the personal knowledge of the judge generally need the observance of all the elements of due process of law, that is, notice, written charges, and an opportunity to deny and to defend such charges before guilt is adjudged and sentence imposed.

          Plainly, therefore, the word summary with respect to the punishment for contempt refers not to the timing of the action with reference to the offense but to the procedure that dispenses with the formality, delay, and digression that result from the issuance of process, service of complaint and answer, holding hearings, taking evidence, listening to arguments, awaiting briefs, submission of findings, and all that goes with a conventional court trial. (LORENZO SHIPPING CORPORATION ET AL. VS. DISTRIBUTION BUTTON MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES ET AL., G.R. NO. 155849, AUGUST 31, 2011, BERSAMIN, J.).

THE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR LIES WITHIN THE DISCRETION OF THE COURT

In Heirs of Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo v. Lacuata-Gabriel, G.R. No. 162934, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 747, 759-760, it was stated that:

“It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior or preferred right of certain persons to the appointment of administrator under Section 1, Rule 81, as well as the statutory provisions as to causes for removal of an executor or administrator under section 653 of Act No. 190, now Section 2, Rule 83, do not apply to the selection or removal of special administrator. x x x As the law does not say who shall be appointed as special administrator and the qualifications the appointee must have, the judge or court has discretion in the selection of the person to be appointed, discretion which must be sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary to reason, justice or equity. (Emphasis supplied; citation omitted.)

This principle was reiterated in the Ocampo case, where the Supreme Court ruled that: “While the RTC considered that respondents were the nearest of kin to their deceased parents in their appointment as joint special administrators, this is not a mandatory requirement for the appointment. It has long been settled that the selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators. The probate court may appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules at its discretion, such that the need to first pass upon and resolve the issues of fitness or unfitness and the application of the order of preference under Section 6 of Rule 78, as would be proper in the case of a regular administrator, do not obtain. As long as the discretion is exercised without grave abuse, and is based on reason, equity, justice, and legal principles, interference by higher courts is unwarranted (Emphasis supplied.)

While the trial court has the discretion to appoint anyone as a special administrator of the estate, such discretion must be exercised with reason, guided by the directives of equity, justice and legal principles. It may, therefore, not be remiss to reiterate that the role of a special administrator is to preserve the estate until a regular administrator is appointed. As stated in Sec. 2, Rule 80 of the Rules:

Section 2. Powers and duties of special adminsitrator. — Such special administrator shall take possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the executors or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose may commence and maintain suits as administrator. He may sell only such perishable and other property as the court orders sold. A special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the deceased unless so ordered by the court.

Given this duty on the part of the special administrator, it would, therefore, be prudent and reasonable to appoint someone interested in preserving the estate for its eventual distribution to the heirs. Such choice would ensure that such person would not expose the estate to losses that would effectively diminish his or her share. While the court may use its discretion and depart from such reasoning, still, there is no logical reason to appoint a person who is a debtor of the estate and otherwise a stranger to the deceased. To do so would be tantamount to grave abuse of discretion. (DIOSDADO MANUNGAS VS. MARGARITA AVILA LORETO & FLORENCIA AVILA PARRENO, G.R. NO. 193161, AUGUST 22, 2011, VELASCO, JR., J.).

MODES OF APPEAL

Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides the three modes of appeal, which are as follows:

“Section 2.  Modes of appeal. —

(a)     Ordinary appeal. — The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.  No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require.  In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.

(b)     Petition for review. — The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in accordance with Rule 42.

(c)     Appeal by certiorari. — In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45” (emphasis supplied). 

The first mode of appeal, the ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, is brought to the CA from the RTC, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, and resolves questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal, the petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, is brought to the CA from the RTC, acting in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, and resolves questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal, the appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, is brought to the Supreme Court and resolves only questions of law (HEIRS OF NICOLAS S. CABIGAS VS. MELBA L. LIMBACO ET AL., G.R. NO. 175291, JULY 27, 2011, BRION, J.). 

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: A LAWYER MAY BE SUSPENDED OR DISBARRED FOR ANY MISCONDUCT SHOWING ANY FAULT OR DEFICIENCY IN HIS MORAL CHARACTER, HONESTY, PROBITY OR GOOD DEMEANOR

A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor (Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court). In Gonzales, the notary public who notarized the document despite the non-appearance of one of the signatories was meted the penalties of revocation of his notarial commission and disqualification from re-appointment for two years. The notary in Gonzales was likewise suspended from the practice of law for one year. x x x  The Court found that by notarizing the questioned deed, the respondent in Gonzales engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.  In the instant case, the Supreme Court held that respondent should similarly be meted the penalty of suspension and revocation of his notarial commission for having violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice (Pacita Caalim-Verzonilla vs. Atty. Victoriano G. Pascua, A.C. No. 6655 , October 11, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.). 

PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE

The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The burden lies on the prosecution to overcome such presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence required. In doing so, the prosecution must rest its case on its own merits and cannot merely rely on the weakness of the defense. If the prosecution fails to meet the required quantum of evidence, the defense does  not even need to present any evidence in its behalf; the presumption of innocence prevails and the accused should be acquitted (People v. Cantalejo, G.R. No. 182790, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 777, 783 cited in PEOPLE OF THE PHILS. VS. JHON-JHON ALEJANDRO, G.R. NO. 176350, AUGUST 10, 2011, BRION, J.).

HIERARCHY OF EVIDENTIARY VALUES

In the hierarchy of evidentiary values, proof beyond reasonable doubt is at the highest level, followed by clear and convincing evidence, then by preponderance of evidence, and lastly by substantial evidence, in that order (Manalo v. Roldan-Confessor, G.R. No. 102358, 19 November 1992, 215 SCRA 808, 819 citerd in SHERYL C. DELA CRUZ VS. PAMELA P. MALUNAO, A.M. NO. P-11-3019, MARCH 20, 2012, PER CURIAM)

THE TESTIMONY OF A HANDWRITING EXPERT, WHILE USEFUL, IS NOT INDISPENSABLE IN EXAMINING OR COMPARING HANDWRITINGS OR SIGNATURES (Progressive Trade & Service Enterprises v. Antonio, G.R. No. 179502, September 18, 2009, 600 SCRA 683, 689.) (EQUITABLE CARDNETWORK, INC. VS. JOSEFA BORROMEO CAPISTRANO, G.R. NO. 180157, FEBRUARY 8, 2012, ABAD, J.).

DOUBLE JEOPARDY

Double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. A first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. (JOSEPH C. CEREZO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILS., G.R. NO. 185230, JUNE 1, 2011, NACHURA, J.). 

EXECUTION SALE: THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR ALLEGING LACK OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE POSTING AND PUBLICATION REQUIREMENTS OF THE AUCTION SALE (SECTION 15, RULES 39 OF THE RULES OF COURT) IS BEHOOVED TO PROVE SUCH ALLEGATION (Venzon v. Spouses Juan, 471 Phil. 152 (2004)

x x x [T]he duty imposed by Section [18] (c) is reposed upon the sheriff, who is charged with the enforcement of the writ. Respondent spouses had a right to presume that he had regularly performed his duty. It was not incumbent upon them to present him as a witness for, in the absence of the sheriff, the burden to prove lack of posting and publication remained with petitioner. (Id. at 161-162.)     (Emphasis supplied)

Respondents made no attempt to meet this burden of evidence, simply maintaining lack of notice of the entire proceedings (execution and issuance of a new title over the subject property) before the trial court. Hence, the Supreme Court cannot subscribe to respondents’ belated posturing.

The disputable presumption that official duty has been regularly performed was not overcome by respondents. (Section 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court.)  The documents on record lead us to the inevitable conclusion that respondents had constructive, if not actual, notice of the execution proceedings from the issuance of the Writ of Execution, the levy on the subject property, its subjection to execution sale, up to and until the proceedings in the RTC relating to the issuance of a new certificate of title over the subject property.  Certainly, respondents are precluded from feigning ignorance of MFR (substituted by Reyes) staking a claim thereon.

There was substantial compliance with Section 15, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court: the documents in support thereof, i.e., the Certificate of Posting issued by Sheriff Legaspi and the Affidavit of Publication executed by the publisher of The Times Newsweekly, appear to be in order. In this case, the purpose of giving notice through posting and publication under Section 15(c) of the same rule—to let the public know of the sale to the end that the best price or a better bid may be made possible to minimize prejudice to the judgment debtor—was realized (RUBEN C. REYES VS. TANG SOAT ING & ANDO G. SY, G.R. NO. 185620, DECEMBER 14, 2011, PEREZ, J.). 

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS FOR MONEY

Section 31, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court then applicable provides: “SEC. 31. Effect of redemption by judgment debtor, and a certificate to be delivered and recorded thereupon. To whom payments on redemption made.—If the judgment debtor redeem, he must make the same payments as are required to effect a redemption by a redemptioner, whereupon the effect of the sale is terminated and he is restored to his estate, and the person to whom the payment is made must execute and deliver to him a certificate of redemption acknowledged or approved before a notary public or other officer authorized to take acknowledgments of conveyances of real property. Such certificate must be filed and recorded in the office of the registrar of deeds of the province in which the property is situated, and the registrar of deeds must note the record thereof on the margin of the record of the certificate of sale. The payments mentioned in this and the last preceding sections may be made to the purchaser or redemptioner, or for him to the officer who made the sale” (Emphasis supplied). (Sps. Francisco D. Yap & Whelma S. Yap vs. Sps. Zosimo Dy, Jr. & Natividad Chiu Dy, G.R. No. 171868, July 27, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE RULES

                 Facsimile or Fax Transmission: In Garvida v. Sales, Jr.,( G.R. No. 124893, April 18, 1997, 271 SCRA 767) the Supreme Court found inadmissible in evidence the filing of pleadings through fax machines and ruled that:

          

A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and reproduction of printed and graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or tone of each area by a specified amount of electric current. The current is transmitted as a signal over regular telephone lines or via microwave relay and is used by the receiver to reproduce an image of the elemental area in the proper position and the correct shade. The receiver is equipped with a stylus or other device that produces a printed record on paper referred to as a facsimile. x x x  A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the marks of an original. Without the original, there is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading. x x x (Id. at 779. (Citations omitted.)

         

         Moreover, a facsimile transmission is not considered as an electronic evidence under the Electronic Commerce Act.  In MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation, (G.R. No. 170633, October 17, 2007, 536 SCRA 408.) the Supreme Courtdetermined the question of whether the original facsimile transmissions are "electronic data messages" or "electronic documents" within the context of the Electronic Commerce Act, and it said:

       

      We, therefore, conclude that the terms "electronic data message" and "electronic document," as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission.  Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence.  It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence. (ELLERY MARCH G. TORRES VS. PHIL. AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 193531, DECEMBER 14, 2011, PERALTA, J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: “GOOD REASONS” AS GROUND FOR EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL

In Florendo v. Paramount Insurance Corp., G.R. No. 167976, January 20, 2010, 610 SCRA 377, 384-385, citing Flexo Manufacturing Corporation v. Columbus Foods, Inc.,  495 Phil. 254, 260 (2005) and Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay v. National Power Corp., G.R. No. 141447, May 4, 2006, 489 SCRA 401, 417. The Supreme Court held: 

          x x x “Good reasons,” it has been held, consist of compelling circumstances that justify immediate execution lest the judgment becomes illusory. The circumstances must be superior, outweighing the injury or damages that might result should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment. Lesser reasons would make of execution pending appeal, instead of an instrument of solicitude and justice, a tool of oppression and inequity.

           “Good reason” as required by Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court does not necessarily mean unassailable and flawless basis but at the very least, it must be on solid footing.   Dire financial conditions of the plaintiffs supported by mere self-serving statements as “good reason” for the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal does not stand on solid footing.  It does not even stand on its own (NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS. JUDGWE SANTOS ADIONG, July 27, 2011 VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILlARAMA, JR.: EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL IS NOT APPLICABLE IN A LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDING

execution pending appeal is not applicable in a land registration proceeding. It is fraught with dangerous consequences.  Innocent purchasers may be misled into purchasing real properties upon reliance on a judgment which may be reversed on appeal (Top Management Programs Corporation vs. Luis Fajardo & The Register of Deeds of Las Pinas City, G.R. No. 150462, June 15, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: DIRECT AND COLLTERAL ATACK ON THE TITLE

An action is deemed an attack on a title when its objective is to nullify the title, thereby challenging the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed.  The attack is direct when the objective is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement.  On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof (Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152627, September 16, 2005, 470 SCRA 99, 107-108 cited in Roman Catholic Archbishop of San Fernando Pampanga vs. Fernando Soriano Jr., et al., G.R. No. 153829, August 17, 2011,VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: CERTIORARI IS AN EXTRAORDINARY, PREROGATIVE REMEDY AND IS NEVER ISSUED AS A MATTER OF RIGHT

Certiorari is an extraordinary, prerogative remedy and is never issued as a matter of right.  Accordingly, the party who seeks to avail of it must strictly observe the rules laid down by law. (Eagle Ridge Golf & Country Club v. Court of Appeals & Eagle Ridge Employees Union (EREU), G.R. No. 178989, March 18, 2010, 616 SCRA 116.)

 Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

SECTION 1.  Petition for certiorari.- When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. 

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46. [Emphasis supplied] 

Under Rule 46, Section 3, paragraph 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, petitions for certiorari must be verified and accompanied by a sworn certification of non-forum shopping.

SECTION 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements. – The petition shall contain the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents, a concise statement of the matters involved, the factual background of the case, and the grounds relied upon for the relief prayed for. 

In actions filed under Rule 65, the petition shall further indicate the material dates showing when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the denial thereof was received.

It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof of service thereof on the respondent with the original copy intended for the court indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such material portions of the record as are referred to therein, and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto.  The certification shall be accomplished by the proper clerk of court or his duly authorized representative, or by the proper officer of the court, tribunal, agency or office involved or by his duly authorized representative.  The other requisite number of copies of the petition shall be accompanied by clearly legible plain copies of all documents attached to the original.

The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a sworn certification that he has not theretofore commenced any other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom. 

The petitioner shall pay the corresponding docket and other lawful fees to the clerk of court and deposit the amount of P500.00 for costs at the time of the filing of the petition.     

The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. [Emphases supplied]

The acceptance of a petition for certiorari as well as the grant of due course thereto is, in general, addressed to the sound discretion of the court.  Although the Court has absolute discretion to reject and dismiss a petition for certiorari, it does so only (1) when the petition fails to demonstrate grave abuse of discretion by any court, agency, or branch of the government; or  (2) when there are procedural errors, like violations of the Rules of Court or Supreme Court Circulars.( Athena Computers, Inc. and Joselito R. Jimenez v. Wesnu A. Reyes, G.R. No. 156905, September 5, 2007, 532 SCRA 343, 350.) [Emphasis supplied]

          Moreover, under Section 2, Rule 64, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, a judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65. Moreover, on the merits, the petition lacks merit. (CANDELARIO L. VERZOSA, JR. VS. GUILERMO N. CARAGUE, G.R. NO. 157838, MARCH 8, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: DECISIONS, ORDERS OR RULINGS OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT MAY BE BROUGHT TO THE SUPREME COURT ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 BY THE AGGRIEVED PARTY

To begin with, petitioner availed of the wrong remedy in filing a petition for review under Rule 45. Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution provides that decisions, orders or rulings of the Commission on Audit may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party (Reyes v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 125129, March 29, 1999, 305 SCRA 512, 516 cited in CANDELARIO L. VERZOSA, JR. VS. GUILERMO N. CARAGUE, G.R. NO. 157838, MARCH 8, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).        

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: THE TRIAL COURT’S DENIAL OF A MOTION TO DISMISS CANNOT BE QUESTIONED IN A CERTIORARI PROCEEDING UNDER RULE 65

           This is because a certiorari writ is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The appropriate course of action of the movant in such event is to file an answer and interpose as affirmative defenses the objections raised in the motion to dismiss.  If, later, the decision of the trial judge is adverse, the movant may then elevate on appeal the same issues raised in the motion. (Urethane Trading Specialist, Inc. v. Ong, G.R. No. 164632, October 29, 2008, 570 SCRA 188, 191-192.)

             

            The only exception to this rule is when the trial court gravely abused its discretion in denying the motion.⁽ See Nicolas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 175930-31 & 176010-11, February 11, 2008, 544 SCRA 324, 336 and Choa v. Choa, 441 Phil. 175, 182-183 (2002). This exception is, nevertheless, applied sparingly, and only in instances when there is a clear showing that the trial court exercised its judicial power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.⁽ Balo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129704, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 227, 234.)

          Further, the abuse of the court's discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by, or to act at all in contemplation of, law. (Roman Catholic Archbishop of San Fernando Pampanga vs. Fernando Soriano Jr., et al., G.R. No. 153829, August 17, 2011^, VILLARAMA, JR., J.:)

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT

            A petition for annulment of judgments or final orders of a Regional Trial Court in civil actions can only be availed of where “the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.” (Sec. 1, Rule 47, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.)  It is a remedy granted only under exceptional circumstances and such action is never resorted to as a substitute for a party’s own neglect in not promptly availing of the ordinary or other appropriate remedies.( Lazaro v. Rural Bank of Francisco Balagtas (Bulacan), Inc., G.R. No. 139895, August 15, 2003, 409 SCRA 186, 192.)  The only grounds provided in Sec. 2, Rule 47 are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

          

            As party litigants, they should have constantly monitored the progress of their case. Having completely entrusted their case to their former counsel and  believing his word that everything is alright, they have no one to blame but themselves when it turned out that their opportunity to appeal and other remedies from the adverse ruling of the RTC could no longer be availed of due to their counsel’s neglect.  That respondents continued to rely on the services of their counsel notwithstanding his chronic ailments that had him confined for long periods at the hospital is unthinkable.  Such negligence of counsel is binding on the client, especially when the latter offered no plausible explanation for his own inaction.  The Court has held that when a party retains the services of a lawyer, he is bound by his counsel’s actions and decisions regarding the conduct of the case.  This is true especially where he does not complain against the manner his counsel handles the suit.( Tolentino v. Leviste, G.R. No. 156118, November 19, 2004, 443 SCRA 274, 282, citing Alarcon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126802, January 28, 2000, 323 SCRA 716, 725.) The oft-repeated principle is that an action for annulment of judgment cannot and is not a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal.( Mercado v. Security Bank Corporation, G.R. No. 160445, February 16, 2006, 482 SCRA 501, 514.) 

         

           Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim.( Tolentino v. Leviste, supra note 14 at 284.) In a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, petitioner must show not merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack of jurisdiction.  Lack of jurisdiction means absence of or no jurisdiction, that is, the court should not have taken cognizance of the petition because the law does not vest it with jurisdiction over the subject matter.  Jurisdiction over the nature of the action or subject matter is conferred by law.( Durisol Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121106, February 20, 2002, 377 SCRA 353, 358.)

          

           There is no dispute that the RTC is vested with appellate jurisdiction over ejectment cases decided by the MeTC, MTC or MCTC.  We note that petitioners’ attack on the validity of the RTC decision pertains to a relief erroneously granted on appeal, and beyond the scope of judgment provided in Section 6 (now Section 17) of Rule 70.  While the court in an ejectment case may delve on the issue of ownership or possession de jure solely for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession de facto, it has no jurisdiction to settle with finality the issue of ownership and any pronouncement made by it on the question of ownership is provisional in nature. (Heirs of Rosendo Sevilla Florencio v. Heirs of Teresa Sevilla De Leon, G.R. No. 149570, March 12, 2004, 425 SCRA 447, 458.)

        

             A judgment in a forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no other issue than possession and establishes only who has the right of possession, but by no means constitutes a bar to an action for determination of who has the right or title of ownership. (Sec. 18, Rule 70, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; Custodio v. Corrado, G.R. No. 146082, July 30, 2004, 435 SCRA 500, 509.)     We have held that although it was proper for the RTC, on appeal in the ejectment suit, to delve on the issue of ownership and receive evidence on possession de jure, it cannot adjudicate with semblance of finality the ownership of the property to either party by ordering the cancellation of the TCT (Dizon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116854, November 19, 1996, 264 SCRA 391, 396.)

          

              Such erroneous grant of relief to the defendants on appeal, however, is but an exercise of jurisdiction by the RTC.  Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause, and not the decision rendered therein.( Tolentino v. Leviste, supra note 14 at 285.) The ground for annulment of the decision is absence of, or no, jurisdiction; that is, the court should not have taken cognizance of the petition because the law does not vest it with jurisdiction over the subject matter.( Republic v. Technological Advocates for Agro-Forest Programs Association, Inc., G.R. No. 165333, February 9, 2010, 612 SCRA 76, 86.) 

          

              On the timeliness of the petition for annulment of judgment filed with the CA, Section 3, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud must be filed within four years from its discovery; and if based on lack of jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or estoppel. The principle of laches or “stale demands” ordains that the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier—negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has abandoned it or declined to assert it.( Galicia v. Manliquez Vda. de Mindo, G.R. No. 155785, April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA 85, 96, citing Chua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125837, October 6, 2004, 440 SCRA 121, 135.)  There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances. (Id., citing Far East Bank and Trust Company v. Querimit, 424 Phil. 721, 732 (2002). (Sps. Eulogia Manila & Ramon Manila vs. Sps. Ederlina Gallardo-Manzo and Danial Manzo, G.R. No. 163602, September 7, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.). 

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: PAROL EVIDENCE RULE

Under the general rule in Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, when the terms of an agreement were reduced in writing, as in this case, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of such terms can be admitted other than the contents thereof. Rudlin argues that under Section 9, Rule 130, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if it is put in issue in the pleading, "[t]he failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and the agreement of the parties thereto." Assuming as true Rudlin’s claim that Exhibit "7" failed to accurately reflect an intent of the parties to fix the total contract price at P6,006,965.00, Rudlin failed to avail of its right to seek the reformation of the instrument to the end that such true intention may be expressed.

Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid contract. (Lapulapu Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 466 Phil. 53, 62 (2004), citing MC Engineering, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104047, April 3, 2002, 380 SCRA 116, 137).

“SEC. 9. Evidence of written agreements. — When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.

However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:

(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;

(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto;

(c) The validity of the written agreement; or

(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors-in-interest after the execution of the written agreement.

The term "agreement" includes wills” (emphasis supplied).

Rudlin cannot invoke the exception under (a) or (b) of the above provision. Such exception obtains only where "the written contract is so ambiguous or obscure in terms that the contractual intention of the parties cannot be understood from a mere reading of the instrument. In such a case, extrinsic evidence of the subject matter of the contract, of the relations of the parties to each other, and of the facts and circumstances surrounding them when they entered into the contract may be received to enable the court to make a proper interpretation of the instrument." (Seaoil Petroleum Corporation v. Autocorp Group, G.R. No. 164326, October 17, 2008, 569 SCRA 387, 396-397, citing Ortañez v. CA, 334 Phil. 514, 519-520 (1997) & Heirs of Amparo del Rosario v. Aurora Santos, et al., 194 Phil. 670, 687 (1981).

Under the fourth exception, however, Rudlin’s evidence is admissible to show the existence of such other terms agreed to by the parties after the execution of the contract. But apart from the Bar Chart and Cash Flow Chart prepared by FBC, and the testimony of Rodolfo J. Lagera, no competent evidence was adduced by Rudlin to prove that the amount of P6,006,965.00 stated therein as contract price was the actual decreased amount that FBC and Rudlin found mutually acceptable. As to the affidavits executed by Architect Quezon and his associate Roberto R. Antonio, the same do not serve as competent proof of the purported actual contract price as they did not testify thereon. Significantly, the June 5, 1986 Letter-Agreement did not at all mention the total contract price. Likewise, there is nothing in the various letters sent by Rudlin to FBC while construction was in progress and even subsequent to the execution of the said Letter-Agreement indicating that Rudlin corrected the contract price of P6,933,268.00 which FBC had repeatedly mentioned in its letters and documents (FINANCIAL BUILDING CORPORATION vs. CORPORATION, BLOOMFIELD EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION, INC., RODOLFO J. LAGERA, MA. ERLINDA J. LAGERA AND JOSAPHAT R. BRAVANTE, RUDLIN INTERNATIONAL, G.R. No. 164186, October 4, 2010, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).